A history of terrorism in the age of freedom by Erlenbusch, Verena
   
 
A University of Sussex DPhil thesis 
Available online via Sussex Research Online: 
http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/   
This thesis is protected by copyright which belongs to the author.   
This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first 
obtaining permission in writing from the Author   
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any 
format or medium without the formal permission of the Author   
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the 
author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given 
Please visit Sussex Research Online for more information and further details   
  
Verena Erlenbusch 
Recipient of a DOC-fellowship of the Austrian Academy of Sciences at the Centre for 
Social and Political Thought 
School of History, Art History and Philosophy 
University of Sussex 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A HISTORY OF TERRORISM IN THE AGE OF FREEDOM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (DPhil) 
August 2011 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I hereby declare that this thesis has not been and will not be submitted in whole or in 
part to another university for the award of any other degree. 
 
 
 
Signature: …………………………………………………… 
  
3 
 
UNIVERSITY OF SUSSEX 
VERENA ERLENBUSCH 
DPHIL IN SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THOUGHT 
A HISTORY OF TERRORISM IN THE AGE OF FREEDOM 
SUMMARY 
 
This thesis constitutes a critical intervention in contemporary research on 
terrorism. It seeks to address the problems resulting from a reductive understanding of 
terrorism and from a predominant concern with terrorism after 9/11. For this purpose, 
this thesis charts and critically engages certain watershed moments in the history of 
terrorism since its emergence in the French Revolution. The aim is to show that 
terrorism is not a historically constant and readily identifiable form of violence but a 
variable element in a wider context of power relations. 
The discourses of terrorism examined in this thesis show that conceptions of 
terrorism are tied to and function within a wider context of changing political interests 
and an evolving modern economy of power. I show that there are reasons for the 
different meanings and roles of terrorism across time and between societies, and that 
these reasons shed light on larger social, political, cultural or economic developments. 
It is in this context that particular discourses of terrorism help to legitimate political and 
legal regimes and allow for the selective exclusion of individuals, groups and ideologies 
from the political realm. 
I argue that a historically grounded and theoretically thorough analysis of 
terrorism can provide important insights into how the state has been able to sustain 
itself by incorporating and mobilizing different types of power. By way of a 
genealogical study of terrorism, my project attempts to map these forms of power as 
well as their dependence on various frameworks that are used to legitimize violence, to 
dismantle legal norms, and to expand power in the name of freedom and democracy. 
This thesis thus not only responds to the epistemological, methodological and temporal 
limitations of contemporary terrorism scholarship but is also of practical political 
relevance. 
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1 Introduction: definition, genealogy, critique 
 
1.1 The difficulty of defining terrorism 
What is terrorism? Although this seems to be a rather simple and straightforward 
question, attempts to provide an equally simple and straightforward answer have 
troubled legal, political and academic debates for the most part of the twentieth century. 
Since the beginning of the twenty-first century in particular, the question what terrorism 
is has been posed with new urgency and more than ever demands an unequivocal 
solution. Nevertheless, contemporary discourses on terrorism, in academia and 
elsewhere, are characterized by a lack of consensus about how to define terrorism. 
Instead, there is an assumption that what terrorism is, is what terrorists do, and that the 
question of who and what terrorists are is an ahistorical and context independent one. 
This problematic view of terrorism has particularly unfortunate consequences in legal 
and political practice. Backed by run-off-the-mill conceptions, terrorism is understood 
as a number of criminal actions that, under certain circumstances and when perpetrated 
by certain individuals or groups, count as terrorism. Yet it is not only political and legal 
practice that is marked by a dangerously vague idea of what terrorism is. Even within 
the academy, the disciplines most likely and most challenged to formulate a definition 
of terrorism, i.e. (Critical) Terrorism Studies, legal theory and security studies, suffer 
from an inability to fulfill this task. Given the pressing need to respond to an increasing 
number of ever more violent terrorist attacks, the failure to generate effective 
instructions for public policy based on a clear definition of terrorism is all the more 
disastrous. The result is a vicious circle in which responses to terrorism that result from 
a lack of understanding fuel rather than interrupt cycles of ever increasing violence. 
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In very general terms, four major approaches to the problem of determining 
what terrorism is have crystallized in academic debates on terrorism. The first approach 
is manifest in scholarship known as Terrorism Studies and began to develop in the late 
1960s.
1
 Its main objective was to establish a definition of terrorism that would be able 
to furnish and inform political and legal debates in a context of increased political 
violence. As a consequence, scholars produced an incalculable number of definitions 
that sought to identify the necessary features for an act of violence to qualify as 
terrorism.
 
In very general terms, Terrorism Studies answers the question ―what is 
terrorism?‖ with the ―indiscriminate use of violence against a civil population with the 
aim of spreading panic and pressurizing a government or an international political 
authority‖ (Zolo 2009b, 126).2 
The research undertaken by scholars associated with Terrorism Studies gave rise 
to a taxonomy of terrorism that classifies terrorism in terms of chronological 
periodization as well as with regard to its aims and ideological motivations. 
Continuities between manifestations of terrorism are established on the basis of ―similar 
                                                 
1
 Classic examples of conventional Terrorism Studies scholarship are Chaliand, Gérard and Arnaud Blin, 
(eds.) The History of Terrorism: From Antiquity to Al Qaeda. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 2007, Guelke, Adrian. The Age of Terrorism and the International Political System. 
London and New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1998, Laqueur, Walter. A History of Terrorism. New 
Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2009, Rapoport, David C. ―Fear and Trembling: Terrorism in Three 
Religious Traditions.‖ The American Political Science Review 78, no. 3 (1984): 658-677, Ibid., ―Religion 
and Terror: Thugs, Assassins, and Zealots.‖ In International Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, 
Controls, edited by Charles W. Kegley Jr, 146-157. New York: St. Martin‘s, 1990 and Waldmann, Peter. 
Terrorismus. Provokation der Macht. Munich: Gerling Akademie Verlag, 2001. 
2
 Examples of this approach are Chalk, Peter. West European Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: the 
Evolving Dynamic. Hampshire and London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1996, Crelinsten, Ronald D. ―Terrorism 
as Political Communication. The Relationship between the Controller and the Controlled.‖ In 
Contemporary Research on Terrorism, edited by Paul Wilkinson and Alasdair M. Stewart, 3-23. 
Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1987, Czempiel, Ernst-Otto. ―Der politische Terrorismus.‖ 
Internationale Politik 7 (2004): 74-81, Gearty, Conor. Terror. London and Boston: faber and faber, 1991, 
Laqueur, Walter. Terrorism. London: Redwood Burn Ltd., 1977, Ibid., ―Reflections on Terrorism.‖ 
Foreign Affairs Fall (1986): 86-100, Rapoport, David C. ―The Politics of Atrocity.‖ In Terrorism: 
Interdisciplinary Perspectives, edited by Yonah Alexander and Seymour Maxwell Finger, 46-61. 
Maidenhead: John Jay Press, 1977, Thackrah, Richard. ―Terrorism. A Definitional Problem.‖ In 
Contemporary Research on Terrorism, edited by Paul Wilkinson and Alasdair M. Stewart, 24-41. 
Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1987, Waldmann, Terrorismus and Ibid., ―Terrorismus im 
internationalen Umfeld.‖ Internationale Politik 2-3 (2004): 21-28. 
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activities [that] occur in several countries, driven by a common predominant energy that 
shapes the participating groups‘ characteristics and mutual relationships‖ (Rapoport 
2004, 47). The consequent categorization of terrorism, which has become customary in 
Terrorism Studies, largely distinguishes between (1) anti-colonial, ethno-nationalistic, 
or separatist terrorism, (2) social-revolutionary or ―New Left‖ terrorism, and (3) 
religious terrorism.
3
 
Moreover, this approach has led to the identification of similar manifestations of 
violence throughout history and has resulted in numerous attempts to universalize 
terrorism as a ubiquitous phenomenon. A whole strand of literature now compares and 
even equates modern terrorism with resistance against the Roman occupation in ancient 
Judea, to the Islamic sect of the Assassins in the Middle Ages, or to Thugee activities in 
eighteenth-century India.
4
 It seems to me that it does not make much sense to call the 
Zealots of ancient Judea or medieval Assassins terrorists avant la lettre. As we will see 
in due course, such an anachronistic use of the term terrorism decontextualizes the 
currently dominant understanding and imposes it on violent actions that had different 
aims, used different tactics and were interpreted in a different way at the time. 
Even if it were possible to unambiguously define terrorism on the basis of a set 
of constitutive elements, the discipline of Terrorism Studies nevertheless faces two 
                                                 
3
 See Clutterbuck, Richard. The Future of Political Violence. Destabilization, Disorder and Terrorism. 
London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1986, Crenshaw, Martha. ―The Causes of Terrorism.‖ In European 
Terrorism, edited by Edward Moxon-Browne, 379-399. Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Co Ltd, 1993, 
Gearty, Terror, Guelke, The Age of Terrorism, Hoffman, Bruce. Inside Terrorism. London: Victor 
Gollancz, 1998, Juergensmeyer, Mark. Terror in the Mind of God. The Global Rise of Religious Violence. 
Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2001, Laqueur, Terrorism, O‘Neill, Bard, 
William Heaton and Donald Albers. Insurgency in the Modern World. Boulder: Westview Press, 1980 
and Shultz, Richard. ―Conceptualizing Political Terrorism.‖ In International Terrorism: Characteristics, 
Causes, Controls, edited by Charles W. Kegley Jr, 45-50. New York: St. Martin‘s, 1990. 
4
 For such an account of terrorism see most notably Rapoport, Fear and Trembling, Ibid., Religion and 
Terror, Ibid., ―The Fourth Wave: September 11 in the History of Terrorism.‖ Current History 100 
(2001): 419-424, Ibid., ―The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11.‖ Anthropoetics 8, no. 1 
(2002) and Ibid., ―The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism.‖ In Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand 
Strategy, edited by Audrey Kurth Cronin and James M. Ludes, 46-73. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown 
University Press, 2004. 
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main problems: first, on a purely descriptive level, it seems that state conduct all too 
often appears as identical to terrorism. Second, the criterion by which a certain criminal 
act is established as terrorism is imposed by those political actors who have a stake in a 
particular way of defining terrorism. By deciding who is to be identified as a terrorist, 
states also posit that this term can never apply to themselves. In other words, it seems 
that if terrorism is understood as a set of criminal or illegal actions, then states are 
terrorists if they engage in these same actions. This is impossible, however, because the 
criterion by which terrorism is distinguished from state violence is a normative one that 
is always imposed by those who make the law.
5
 
In the same vein, Tarik Kochi argues that judgments about war and violence are 
―moment[s] of positing‖ and are, therefore, ―most often partisan judgments‖ (Kochi 
2009, 250). This is to say that the definition of terrorism always already contains its 
evaluation. As Butler maintains in her interpretation of Talal Asad‘s recent book ―On 
Suicide Bombing‖ (2009), such definitions function as means of justifying some forms 
of violence while disallowing others. Butler seeks to explain ―how the domain of 
justifiability is preemptively circumscribed by the definition of the form of violence at 
issue‖ (Butler 2009, 155). She contends that even though we think that our evaluation 
of a phenomenon is based on a definition that is purely descriptive, the situation is 
different in cases like terrorism when ―the very definition of the phenomenon involves a 
description of it as ‗evil‘‖ (Ibid.). Then, Butler argues, ―judgment is built into the 
definition (we are, in fact, judging before knowing), at which point the distinction 
between the descriptive and the normative becomes confused. … We judge a world we 
                                                 
5
 I follow Judith Butler in her understanding of normativity as ―pertaining to the norms that govern‖ 
terrorism as well as ―ethical justification, how it is established, and what concrete consequences proceed 
therefrom‖ (Butler 2007, xxi). 
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refuse to know, and our judgment becomes one means of refusing to know that world 
(Ibid., 155-156). 
Indeed, the ideological allegiances of Terrorism Studies come into sharp view in 
the biased description of the alleged motives of terrorists as morally despicable and evil. 
By professing to present a neutral view of terrorism that, however, includes its moral 
condemnation, terrorism scholars in fact conceal their complicity in normative 
evaluations of certain acts of violence behind claims to scientific objectivity. Moreover, 
they seek to provide valuable lessons for counter-terrorism policies through the 
investigation of historical examples. It is thus obvious why it is important for Terrorism 
Studies scholars to unequivocally define terrorism: if one knows what terrorism is, one 
can identify historical cases of terrorism in order to garner useful information for 
practices of counter-terrorism. The assumption is that if one understands how terrorism 
was fought and defeated in the past, effective counter-terrorist strategies can be 
developed on the basis of this knowledge. The interest in historical examples of 
terrorism is, therefore, guided by an ideological concern with counter-terrorist 
practices.
6
 In short, the main problem with these traditional attempts to define terrorism 
                                                 
6
 See for example Alexander, Yonah and Dennis Pluchinsky. Europe‟s Red Terrorists: The Fighting 
Communist Organizations. London: Routledge, 1992, Bjorgo, Tore. Terror from the Extreme Right. 
London: Routledge, 1995, Chalk, West European Terrorism, Clutterbuck, The Future of Political 
Violence, Crelinsten, Terrorism as Political Communication, Crenshaw, The Causes of Terrorism, Ibid., 
―Organized Disorder: Terrorism, Politics, and Society.‖ In The Democratic Imagination. Dialogues on 
the Work of Irving Louis Horowitz, edited by Ray C. Rist, 137-157. New Brunswick and London: 
Transaction Publishers, 1994, Ibid., Terrorism in Context. University Park: Pennsylvania State University 
Press, 1995, Guelke, The Age of Terrorism, Howard, R.D. and R.L. Sawyer. Terrorism and 
Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment: Readings & Interpretations. Guilford: 
McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2003, Kegley Jr, Charles W., (ed.) International Terrorism: Characteristics, 
Causes, Controls. New York: St. Martin‘s Press, 1990, Livingstone, Neil C. The War against Terrorism. 
Lexington: Lexington Books, 1984, Martin, C. Gus. Understanding Terrorism: Challenges, Perspectives, 
and Issues. London: Sage Publications, 2003, O‘Neill, Heaton and Albers, Insurgency in the Modern 
World, Rapoport, David C. and L. Weinberg. The Democratic Experience and Political Violence. 
Portland: Frank Cass, 2001, Schmid, Alex P. and Janny de Graaf. Violence as Communication: Insurgent 
Terrorism and the Western News Media. London: Sage Publications, 1982, Scott, Andrew M. 
Insurgency. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1970, Shultz, Conceptualizing Political 
Terrorism, Sing, Baljit. ―An Overview.‖ In Terrorism: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, edited by Yonah 
Alexander and Seymour Maxwell Finger, 6-17. Maidenhead: John Jay Press, 1977, Taylor, Lewis. 
―Counter-Insurgency Strategy, the PCP-Sendero Luminoso and the Civil War in Peru, 1980-1996.‖ 
13 
 
by reference to certain violent behaviors with particular political aims is that they 
partake in what might be called a history of the victors. Such a history fails to recognize 
the complex practices and mechanisms surrounding terrorism that go beyond mere 
criminalization. In other words, the suspension of rights and liberties not just with 
respect to the terrorist but to the population in general, the use of torture, or the waging 
of wars of aggression against so-called rogue states deemed to harbor terrorism cannot 
be explained by adopting descriptions that are based on allegedly neutral common sense 
presumptions about terrorist violence.
7
 Such assumptions conceal the relations of power 
that are at work in conceptions of terrorism. The danger is that scholars who 
unquestioningly adopt the dominant understanding of terrorism reproduce a 
reductionist, essentializing and ahistorical account that plays into the hands of the 
powerful. Perhaps the most damaging effect of Terrorism Studies thus lies in a 
decontextualization of the notion of terrorism that does not pay sufficient attention to 
history. By defining terrorism on the basis of its contemporary appearance and 
identifying similar forms of violent behavior in the past, scholars anachronistically 
impose current conceptions of terrorism onto historical examples instead of learning 
from the various meanings or the complete absence of the concept at different moments 
throughout history. 
It did not take long for the weaknesses of counter-terrorism policies based on 
conventional definitions of terrorism to materialize. Because terrorism was on this view 
                                                                                                                                               
Bulletin of Latin American Research 17, no. 1 (1998): 35-58, Thackrah, Terrorism. A Definitional 
Problem, Waldmann, Terrorismus, Weimann, Gabriel. Terror on the Internet: The New Arena, the New 
Challenges. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2006, Wilkinson, Paul. Political 
Terrorism. New York and Toronto: John Wiley & Sons, 1974, Ibid., Terrorism and the Liberal State. 
London: Macmillan, 1977, Ibid., ―Proposals for Government and International Responses to Terrorism.‖ 
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 5, no. 1 (1981): 161-193, Ibid., Terrorism Versus Democracy: The 
Liberal State Response. Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2006, Ibid., ―Overview of the Terrorist 
Threat to International Security.‖ Terrorism and Disarmament, DDA Occasional Papers (2001): 5 and 
Wilkinson, Paul and Brian M. Jenkins. Aviation Terrorism and Security. London and Portland: Frank 
Cass, 1999. 
7
 For a deconstruction of the notion of rogue states and a sustained reflection on the processes by which 
sovereigns become rogues see Derrida, Jacques. Rogues. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005. 
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recognized by way of identifying certain constitutive elements, it could only be 
confirmed retrospectively if a case of terrorism had happened. A drastic increase in 
terrorist attacks in the 1970s along with an internationalization of terrorism exacerbated 
the need for a way of identifying terrorists unequivocally. In order to prevent terrorism 
from occurring in the first place, policy makers pushed for a means of singling out 
terrorists before they actually became terrorists and carried out their violent acts. They 
insisted on a ―fixed and unambiguous ‗terrorist profile,‘ a list of characteristics that 
permit identification of actual or potential terrorists‖ (Crenshaw 2000, 407). It was in 
this context that a new approach took hold from within the social and natural sciences 
that sought to define terrorism by way of examining the terrorist personality and 
individual rationality rather than determining terrorism through a description and 
evaluation of the violence exercised. 
The first comprehensive socio-statistical attempt at terrorist profiling was made 
in the second half of the 1970s by two scientists at the US Air Force 
Counterintelligence Division, Charles A. Russell and Bowman H. Miller. Russell and 
Miller‘s ―Profile of A Terrorist‖ (1977) was based on a collection of biographical and 
sociological data of 350 identified terrorists. Analysis of eight criteria – age, sex, 
marital status, rural or urban origin, social and economic background, education or 
occupation, method or place of recruitment and political-economic philosophy – led to 
the conclusion that terrorists ―have been largely single men aged 22 to 24, with 
exceptions as noted, who have some university education, if not a college degree.‖ 
The Women terrorists, except for the West German groups and an occasional leading figure in the 
IRA [Irish Republican Army], JRA [Japanese Red Army] and PFLP [Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine], are preoccupied with support rather than operational roles. More often 
than not, these urban terrorists come from affluent, urban, middle-class families, many of whom 
enjoy considerable social prestige. … Whether having turned to terrorism as a university student 
15 
 
or later, most were provided an anarchistic or Marxist world view as well as recruited into 
terrorist operations while in the university (Russell and Miller 1977, 33). 
In other words, the typical terrorist turned out to be a rather average young man. 
Socio-statistical approaches failed to provide a conclusive and determinate terrorist 
profile and did not convincingly explain why relatively unsuspicious individuals turned 
to terrorism.
8
 
The impossibility to establish a clear connection between terrorism and personal 
hardship or a precarious social status gave rise to the hypothesis that any attempt at 
determining the rationality behind terrorism was futile because a terrorist rationality 
simply did not exist. Rather, it was surmised, terrorism was fundamentally irrational. 
Particularly in Germany, the Red Army Faction‘s (RAF) violent opposition to what its 
activists identified as the fascist substratum of a liberal-democratic political system 
resulted in ―the suspicion that its advocates are sick,‖ that is in an association of 
terrorism with psychopathological conditions (Rasch 1979, 79).
9
 
In a major survey of psychopathological approaches to terrorism, Andrew Silke 
charts the development of psychological research on terrorism and argues that the belief 
that ―terrorist are somehow psychologically different from the rest of the population has 
become an underlying assumption of much, if not most, psychological research on 
terrorists in the past 30 years‖ (Silke 1998, 53). Alongside more subtle references to the 
abnormality of terrorists by ―respected theorists‖ of terrorism such as Walter Laqueur, 
Silke contends that a whole range of systems of classification was developed on the 
                                                 
8
 Nevertheless, socio-statistical elements still play an important part in counter-terrorist strategies. See for 
example the following government guidelines for identifying terrorists: The National Terror Alert 
Response Center. http://www.nationalterroralert.com/suspicious-activity (accessed October 29, 2009) and 
Hyderabad City Police. ―Terror Signals.‖ http://www.hyderabadpolice.gov.in/FightingTerror/ 
TerrorSignals.htm (accessed October 29, 2009). 
9
 For a recent inquiry into the socio-psychological processes motivating the members of the Italian Red 
Brigades see Orsini, Alessandro. Anatomy of the Red Brigades: The Religious Mind-Set of Modern 
Terrorists. Translated by Sarah J. Nodes. New York: Cornell University Press, 2011. 
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basis of an alleged connection between terrorism and abnormality (Ibid., 52). According 
to Silke, the earliest psychopathological typology of terrorist personalities was 
presented in 1977 by Conrad Hassel and further developed by Johnson and Feldmann in 
1992.
10
 Similar classificatory systems emerged subsequently and either advocated a 
distinction between an inadequate personality, an antisocial personality, a paranoid 
personality and a manic or depressive personality; alternatively, they suggested a 
categorization of terrorists according to three main aspects, namely psychopathy, 
narcissism, and paranoia.
11
 A more psychoanalytical approach that investigated the 
connection between childhood trauma, low self-esteem and terrorist behavior, Martha 
Crenshaw claims, was noticeable in studies of female terrorists who were described as 
―everything women are not supposed to be‖ (Crenshaw 2000, 408).12 Again, deviance 
from the norm and failure to conform to expected behavior was invoked to explain 
terrorist predispositions. 
Silke questions the validity and plausibility of much of the psychological 
research on terrorism because of its reliance on largely ―anecdotal evidence‖ and the 
lack of ―detailed descriptions of the data … gathered or of … analysis procedures‖ 
(Silke 1998, 61). More differentiated studies in the field show that there is little to no 
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evidence suggesting a link between terrorism and mental illness.
13
 In the same vein, 
Rasch‘s examination of eleven RAF members, still a standard reference in 
psychological research on terrorism, comes to the conclusion that ―no conclusive 
evidence has been found for the assumption that a significant number of them are 
disturbed or abnormal‖ (Rasch 1979, 80). The strength of such critical psychological 
studies of the terrorist mind is that they are based on contextualized accounts and 
specific case studies that avoid wholesale diagnoses about something like an ideal-type 
terrorist. As a consequence, the contention of these studies that there is no link between 
terrorism and madness seems a great deal more reliable than generalized and obscure 
judgments about the terrorist as such. 
Nevertheless, recent years have seen a shift of focus in psychological research in 
order to gain more reliable insights into the terrorist mind. While statements about the 
individual psyche of the terrorist are increasingly regarded as implausible, there is now 
a certain optimism that some general arguments about terrorism can be inferred from an 
observation of group dynamics and organizational patterns. By identifying so-called 
pathways of terrorism, current psychological research seeks to identify particular life 
events that explain why individuals turn to terrorism. This approach, it is argued, gives 
some indication of significant events and developments through the life course that 
might make seemingly irrational behavior understandable. Pathways research therefore 
concentrates on identifying the ways and means which affect, limit and constrain 
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rationality.
14
 It fails, however, to subject the standards of rationality it applies to critical 
analysis.
 
The adjustment of psychological research and the new focus on questions of 
rationality and the ways in which rational action becomes implausible or altogether 
impossible for particular individuals result from a growing acceptance that 
psychopathological explanations are inadequate as a general framework for 
understanding terrorism. However, even though ―Blatant abnormality is rejected by 
most commentators,‖ Silke argues, ―a pervasive perception exists that terrorists are 
abnormal in more subtle ways‖ (Silke 1998, 67).  
The reluctance to let go of largely refuted assumptions about the psychological 
abnormality of terrorists is anchored in the political usefulness of associating terrorism 
and deviance. For instance, Rasch argues that ―endeavours to explain the phenomenon 
of terrorism with the help of psychological or psychopathological models or, as has 
been done during trials, to denounce the offenders simply as paranoids, neurotics, or 
psychopaths, are intentionally part of the psychological warfare by which the offenders, 
their goals and their ideas, are disqualified. If this can be achieved, a discussion of the 
terrorists‘ political arguments and related issues may be avoided‖ (Rasch 1979, 79). The 
consequences are enormous. As early as 1979, Rasch observed that the statistical, 
sociological and psychological instruments deployed in terrorism research were used to 
create a ―vast apparatus for the ‗fight against terrorism‘‖ which allowed for the 
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screening of more than half a million people, ―not just for highly treasonable or terrorist 
activities, but for any activities that might cast doubts on their political ‗reliability‘‖ 
(Ibid., 85).
15 
It is undeniable that ostensibly neutral scientific data about terrorism serve the 
same ideological interests as the knowledge produced by Terrorism Studies. The 
accumulation of socio-statistical, psychological and psychiatric information about 
terrorists under the pretext of counter-terrorism and security aids the political purposes 
of governments. It therefore seems safe to say that what is required for a more 
productive understanding of terrorism is not its purportedly neutral description but, as 
Butler has recently suggested, a consideration of ―how a phenomenon like ‗terrorism‘ 
becomes defined in ways that are vague and overly inclusive‖ (Butler 2009, 156). 
A similar response to the problems arising from the ideological undertones of 
traditional Terrorism Studies and psychopathological approaches was proposed in 1996 
by two anthropologists who conducted an ethnographic study of the Basque experience 
with terrorism. Joseba Zulaika and William A. Douglass proposed an understanding of 
terrorism as a discourse that constructs the terrorist as a political subject, thereby 
facilitating otherwise unjustifiable techniques of power. Insisting on the discursive 
construction of a terrorist threat, on the one hand, and on the very real effects of 
discursive formations, on the other, the authors show how an image of terrorism 
becomes a structural reality and a historical force (Zulaika and Douglass 1996). Yet it 
took another decade for their work to set off a serious attempt at a ―revitalising ‗critical 
turn‘ within the broader terrorism studies field‖ (Jackson 2009, 67). The newly 
emerging field of Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) pitches itself against the bulk of ―the 
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truly voluminous output‖ of mainstream terrorism studies after the attacks of September 
11, 2001 (Jackson et al. 2009b, 1). In their edited volume on ―Critical Terrorism 
Studies: A New Research Agenda‖ (2009), the ―founders‖ of CTS, Richard Jackson, 
Marie Breen Smyth and Jeroen Gunning, argue that a critical perspective on terrorism is 
pertinent given the limitations of traditional accounts. This is because the latter are 
characterized by a ―lack of debate over substantive issues and accepted knowledge,‖ the 
failure to generate new data, an over-emphasis on Al-Q‘aida at the expense of a 
consideration of the historical and conceptual dimensions of terrorism, the lack of 
multi-disciplinarity, reliance on biased data and information, and research practices that 
compromise the independence and credibility of terrorism scholars (Ibid., 5). 
Emphasizing the need for a new methodological approach as well as a new objectivity 
in terrorism research, CTS has since found its niche within an academic landscape that 
is increasingly concerned with the justification of a spatially and temporally unlimited 
war on terrorism and the problematic relationship between international law, national 
sovereignty, and imperial power.
16
 
Even though CTS scholars correctly point out the major shortcomings of 
conventional Terrorism Studies, they remain wedded to an understanding of terrorism 
and violence that posits terrorism as a ―form of behaviour that can, within specific 
discursive and structural contexts, be understood as ‗terrorist‘‖ (Ibid., 6). Elaborating on 
this point, Jeffrey A. Sluka explains: 
There are many dozens of examples of the abuse of the epithet ‗terrorism‘ by applying it to 
legitimate armed resistance movements, but just a few prominent contemporary examples include 
all of the major hot spots of political violence in the world today – including the Colombian 
government‘s claim that the FARC are ‗terrorists‘, the Israeli government‘s claim that the PLO 
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and the Hamas are ‗terrorists‘, the Chinese government‘s claim that Uigher and Tibetan activists 
are ‗terrorists‘, the Indonesian government‘s claim that the Free Papua Movement (OPM) and 
Free Aceh Movement (GAM) are ‗terrorists‘, the Sri Lanka government‘s claim that the Tamil 
Tigers (LTTE) are ‗terrorists‘, the Spanish and French governments‘ claim that the Basque ETA 
are ‗terrorists‘, the Burmese junta‘s claim that the ethnic rebels in the highlands are ‗terrorists‘, 
the Indian government‘s claim that the indigenous rebels in Kashmir and other regions are 
‗terrorists‘, and the US and UK governments‘ claim that the insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan 
are ‗terrorists‘ (Sluka 2009, 150). 
In other words, even though CTS scholars are critical of the attribution of the 
label ―terrorism‖ to certain kinds of violence, they agree with traditional accounts of 
terrorism that something like terrorism exists and that it is possible to define it and to 
identify acts of terrorism accordingly. The problem diagnosed by CTS, then, is not that 
governments themselves seem to engage in what they define as terrorism, but that 
governments apply the term to forms of violence that are, in fact, legitimate forms of 
resistance, insurgency or civil conflict. CTS scholars claim to know that governments 
do this for ideological reasons. They also argue that governments are not justified in 
doing so. Consequently, CTS scholars seek to reclaim and reserve the label terrorism 
for forms of violence that are ―properly‖ terrorist. 
It is, however, not at all clear by what standards this distinction is made or on 
what basis CTS scholars can claim a privileged position in distinguishing between 
legitimate and illegitimate violence. In addition, CTS scholars have to introduce another 
criterion by which to differentiate terrorism proper from legitimate violence, a criterion 
that is neither clear cut nor historically or contextually stable. Justifications of violence 
in terms of a natural or moral right to violent resistance are not too far away from the 
legitimation of state violence proffered by conventional terrorism research. It seems, 
moreover, that the campaign for a more precise and more balanced understanding of 
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terrorism that takes into account the view of those who are currently marginalized is 
politically ineffective. Such an approach brackets out the political stakes of defining 
terrorism as a certain kind of behavior. In fact, such a view enshrines terrorism as an 
instrument for classifying particular types of behavior and then giving that classification 
the force of law. In other words, by announcing its critical stance towards governments‘ 
opportunism and politicization of terrorism, CTS covers over its own complicity in the 
production of a powerful weapon that allows for the delegitimation and criminalization 
of resistance to hegemonic political interests. 
There is no doubt that, as critical theorists and political activists, we need to 
rethink the frameworks through which we understand war, violence and terrorism. 
However, the usefulness of yet another definition of terrorism that is then applied to 
oppose and criticize dominant understandings seems to be far from obvious. One thing 
we certainly do not need in debates about terrorism is one more addition to the endless 
list of definitions that claim to be the right ones. Widening, narrowing or amending the 
definition of terrorism is addressing symptoms, not curing the disease. Instead, we 
should understand terrorism in the context of wider relations of power. This argument 
will be outlined shortly and developed in detail in subsequent chapters. For the moment, 
it suffices to note that if terrorism is understood as the result of a more general economy 
of power, these relationships of power also need to be taken into account. 
In fact, a fourth approach to the question what terrorism is emerged in response 
to the failure of CTS to analyze the power relations in which terrorism is embedded. 
Terrorism is here understood as the effect of and response to global relations of 
domination and oppression. Pointing out that state violence, too, meets the criteria of 
terrorism, some commentators have tried to present terrorism as an understandable form 
of resistance against the West. At first sight, this view seems to avoid the naturalizing 
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and ahistorical tendencies of traditional and Critical Terrorism Studies. On a pragmatic 
level, however, explanations such as Žižek‘s reflections on terrorism as divine violence, 
or Baudrillard‘s suggestion that the suicide bombers of 9/11 only did what ―we‖ had 
wished for, are at best waived aside as the ravings of madmen; in the worst case, one 
risks censorship, personal accusation and the destruction of one‘s credibility not only as 
a scholar, but as a speaking subject (Baudrillard 2002, Žižek 2008). Moreover, such 
accounts of terrorism remain theoretically unsatisfactory and politically unproductive. It 
seems that the illusion that there is a kind of violence which is readily identifiable as 
terrorism has also contaminated approaches that claim to be critical of essentializing 
and ideological accounts of terrorism. Even though these polemical portrayals of 
terrorism do not make the mistake of defining it as a naturally given and relatively 
stable form of violence, they nevertheless see terrorism in its continuity as the 
constitutive outside or the unavoidable product of liberalism and capitalism. This 
explanation is no less reductive than mainstream and Critical Terrorism Studies because 
it fails to take seriously the complex and uneven development of both terrorism and 
liberalism. This approach is equally ideological and bound up with a different yet no 
less problematic regime of truth in which terrorism is constituted. 
This brief survey of the main responses to the question what terrorism is reveals 
a major problem faced by any attempt to define terrorism by identifying its truth or 
essence in a set of naturally given constitutive elements. This problem can be described 
as the relationship between conceptions of terrorism and regimes of truth. Foucault calls 
a regime of truth (régime de vérité) the conditions that make discourses function as true 
within a given society. Regimes of truth consist of mechanisms that enable the 
distinction between true and false statements and provide the means by which truth is to 
be obtained. In modern societies, Foucault explains, regimes of truth are characterized 
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by five elements: first, truth is tethered to a scientific discourse and those institutions 
that produce it; second, truth is constantly instigated by political and economic 
processes; third, truth circulates in institutions that are at the same time diffuse and 
restricted; fourth, truth is distributed by political and economic institutions; and fifth, 
truth is the object of ideological disputes (Foucault 1977, 158-159). In the case of 
terrorism, too, regimes of truth regulate when the statement that an act of violence is 
terrorism counts as true. This truth is congealed in a juridical structure that produces, 
reproduces and regulates terrorism as a kind of behavior and as a particular form of 
violence. This violence is diffuse and, at the same time, strictly policed. In a cycle that 
obscures the discursive production of terrorism and instead naturalizes it, terrorism 
legitimates, indeed requires, an expansion of power. In other words, terrorism becomes 
the pretext for various disciplinary measures that are deployed in the name of security 
and that work in favor of wider economic and political goals. 
 
1.2 From definition to genealogy 
A more meaningful attempt to explore what terrorism is, has to avoid the pitfalls 
discussed in the previous section and must seek to uncover the economies of power and 
the regimes of truth underlying dominant presumptions about terrorism. It has to 
eschew politically charged, ahistorical and naturalizing assumptions about terrorism. 
For this purpose, the present investigation draws from disciplines such as critical 
political philosophy, legal theory and history, bringing together different bodies of 
knowledge for a philosophical history, or genealogy, of terrorism. This 
interdisciplinarity will hopefully allow for the ―emergence of theory at the site where 
cultural horizons meet, where the demand for translation is acute and its promise of 
success, uncertain‖ (Butler 2007, x). This demand for translation, the need to come up 
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with new and more productive ways of thinking about terrorism is undeniable. For most 
of its history, the response to terrorism has been some sort of military or police action 
rather than a critical examination of the relationship between terrorism and power. It 
has led to more violence and a dynamic by which terrorist attacks and retaliatory strike 
result in permanent war. 
To generate an account of terrorism that is theoretically thorough, avoids the 
anachronistic attribution of concepts across time and space, yet is still historically 
grounded, the point of departure of the present project is not ―Terrorism‖ understood as 
an unequivocal and consistent phenomenon. As will become obvious in subsequent 
chapters, the assumption that there is a universal basis or an essence of terrorism is 
rendered problematic by its instability and its historical as well as contextual flexibility. 
While I agree that there are certain similarities that can be found in perceptions of the 
terrorist at various points in time, I dispute the conclusion that terrorism is some kind of 
readily identifiable, unchanging natural given. Such thinking ignores and actually 
obscures the contestations over the term, the resistances against dominant 
interpretations, the power struggles underlying these frictions, and the various effects 
terrorism discourse produces in different social, historical and political contexts. In 
other words, an understanding of terrorism as a historical phenomenon has to start with 
its function within power relations rather than from an attempt to establish its definition. 
To this end, the methodological framework organizing the analysis of terrorism in this 
thesis is guided by the kind of critical historiography envisaged by Friedrich Nietzsche 
and Michel Foucault. 
Nietzsche has noted the difficulty of defining historical phenomena on different 
occasions. In ―The Genealogy of Morals‖ (1887), Nietzsche emphasizes that the 
practices and procedures that become mastered and subjugated to a particular meaning 
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are older than the sense that is given to them. At a certain point in time, practices that 
have existed long before ―crystallize in a sort of unity which is difficult to unravel, 
difficult to analyze and … completely beyond definition. … Only that which is without 
history can be defined‖ (Nietzsche 1996, 57-61). For Nietzsche, the impossibility of 
defining historical phenomena is due to their permanent development and mutability. 
The unification of long existing and previously unrelated practices in something like a 
definition or a concept indicates that someone had a stake in their consolidation and 
institutionalization.
17
 Imposing a definition on historical processes constitutes a 
snapshot, so to speak, of an ever changing and evolving network of forces. It is an 
operation of power and the sign and seal of a victory, albeit a temporary one, in a 
continuous struggle for power. Nietzsche thus shifts the focus from a stable and 
naturally given to a variable and discursively produced reality of historical figures.
18 
Foucault develops a similar argument towards the end of his second lecture 
series on modern governmentality, ―The Birth of Biopolitics‖ (1978/79), where he 
charts the development of civil society as a correlate of an emerging economy of 
power.
19
 Civil society, he maintains, is not ―an historical-natural given which functions 
in some way as both the foundation of and source of opposition to the state or political 
institutions‖ (Foucault 2010a, 297). It is ―not a primary and immediate reality‖ but 
rather has the status of what Foucault calls ―transactional realities‖ (réalités de 
transaction) in the history of governmental techniques (Ibid.). This means, Foucault 
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explains, that ―those transactional and transitional figures that we call civil society, 
madness, and so on, which, although they have not always existed are nonetheless real, 
are born precisely from the interplay of relations of power and everything which 
constantly eludes them, at the interface, so to speak, of governors and governed‖ (Ibid.). 
For Foucault, these transactional figures are effects of and ―absolutely correlative to the 
form of governmental technology we call liberalism‖ (Ibid.). 
Foucault is even more explicit in his skepticism toward the status of reality of 
such transactional figures in his 1982/83 lecture series, ―The Government of Self and 
Others.‖ Here, he distinguishes his general project from a ―history of knowledge 
undertaken in terms of an index of truth‖ as well as from a ―history of ideologies 
undertaken by reference to a criterion of reality‖ (Foucault 2010b, 310). Instead, 
Foucault situates his own work between or, rather, at the intersection of these two 
traditional approaches as a history of thought. ―And by ‗thought,‘‖ Foucault clarifies, ―I 
meant an analysis of what could be called focal points of experience in which forms of 
a possible knowledge (savoir), normative frameworks of behavior for individuals, and 
potential modes of existence for possible subjects are linked together‖ (Ibid., 3). Rather 
than merely asking whether or not a discourse actually speaks the truth, or why it might 
fail to do so, a history of thought constitutes a ―history of the ontologies of veridiction‖ 
and ―poses at least three questions.‖ 
First: What is the mode of being peculiar to this or that discourse, as distinct from others, when it 
introduces a certain specific game of truth into reality? Second question: What is the mode of 
being that this discourse of veridiction confers on the reality it talks about, through the game of 
truth it practices? Third question: What is the mode of being that this discourse of veridiction 
imposes on the subject who employs it, such that this subject can play this specific game of truth 
properly? (Ibid., 309-310). 
28 
 
What such an approach entails, Foucault continues, is that every discourse of 
truth has to be regarded as a practice whose correlate is an understanding of truth in 
terms of a ―game of veridiction‖ (Ibid., 310). Consequently, Foucault maintains, every 
ontology must be ―analyzed as a fiction. Which means again: the history of thought 
must always be the history of singular inventions‖ (Ibid.). In other words, both Foucault 
and Nietzsche urge us to abandon the question ―what is X?‖ in order to replace it with 
the question ―what does X do, how does it function, and what does it mean in a 
particular context?‖ whenever we are dealing with historical phenomena. 
The impossibility of defining terrorism unequivocally due to its historicity and 
its mutability over time thus suggests an account of terrorism on the basis of its 
historical manifestations understood as singular inventions. As a consequence, I want to 
steer clear of an understanding of terrorism that ascribes to it a universal, ahistorical 
character and that tries to identify its essence. I instead seek to offer an analysis of 
terrorism as a fiction, i.e. as a phenomenon whose status of reality is determined by the 
effects of its discursive ontology rather than by its existence as a natural or historical 
given. The focus thus has to be shifted from an investigation of terrorism on the basis of 
its definition, to an analysis of terrorism by way of its effects. If the question is no 
longer what terrorism is but what it does, the obvious answer seems to be that it does 
different things at different times and in different contexts. In other words, terrorism has 
multiple effects that range from the dismantling of legal norms, to the legitimation of 
state violence and the expansion and dissemination of sovereign power in the name of 
freedom and security. More recently, the effects of terrorism have appeared in measures 
such as indefinite detention, torture, the suspension of basic constitutional rights and 
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liberties, or the militarization of airports.
20
 In short, terrorism plays out on the level of a 
more general economy of power. 
This type of investigation into the constitution of historical phenomena is what 
Foucault calls genealogy or effective history.
21
 The point of genealogy, he argues in 
―Nietzsche, Genealogy, History‖ (1971), is not to ―demonstrate that the past actively 
exists in the present, that it continues secretly to animate the present, having imposed a 
predetermined form on all its vicissitudes‖ (Foucault 1991b, 81). Genealogy does not 
regard the emergence of its object as ―the final term of a historical development,‖ but 
instead grasps it as a ―place of confrontation,‖ or rather ―a ‗non-place‘, a pure distance, 
which indicates that the adversaries do not belong to a common space‖ (Ibid., 74-85). 
The drama taking place in this non-place is ―the endlessly repeated play of 
dominations‖ (Ibid., 85). 
The aim of a genealogy of terrorism is, therefore, not to find its chronological 
origin and to trace the continuity of what has once been established as terrorism through 
time. Even though we will see in the following chapter that the historical origin of the 
concept terrorism can easily be identified, this beginning is not the origin of terrorism in 
any genealogical sense. Instead, the genealogical origin of terrorism must be understood 
as a continuously repeated struggle that is operative in every attempt to define what we 
mean when we talk about terrorism. Borrowing from Agamben, I argue that the origin 
of terrorism can usefully be understood as a field of historical tensions that is 
demarcated by the opposition of illegitimate violence on one side and legitimate 
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violence on the other (Agamben 2009). Since today, according to Max Weber, 
legitimate violence is monopolized by the state, what is at stake in a genealogy of 
terrorism is the continuous rearticulation of terrorism in opposition to the state (Weber 
1991). 
Accordingly, this project charts and critically engages certain watershed 
moments in the historical development of those forms of violence that are represented 
as terrorism in order to cast light on the economy of power that organizes, manages, and 
controls the ways in which terrorism is articulated and deployed. On this account, the 
development of terrorism and its concomitant practices maps out a field of power 
relations that also produces a political rationality which seeks to limit government 
interference in favor of economic processes and promotes a type of public liberty that is 
modeled on the freedom of the market. In the balance are, in other words, terrorism and 
liberalism as effects of a new economy of power which emerged in Europe around the 
late sixteenth and early seventeenth century. This is not to say that terrorism is always 
and inevitably the diametrical opposite of liberalism. Rather, even though terrorism and 
liberalism have historically been related political phenomena for the last two hundred 
years, we will see in subsequent chapters that they have not always been in the same 
relation. There is no smooth development of liberalism and terrorism; on the contrary, 
terrorism plays an important role in the uneven advance of liberalism. 
Nevertheless, terrorism is part of this economy of power which displaced the 
medieval model of sovereign power and to which, Foucault argues, the state owes its 
survival. On his view, the state appears as the ―effect, the profile, the mobile shape of a 
perpetual statification (étatisation) or statifications, in the sense of incessant 
transactions which modify, or move, or drastically change, or insidiously shift sources 
of finances, modes of investment, decision-making centers, forms and types of control, 
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relationships between local powers, the central authority, and so on‖ (Foucault 2010a, 
77). Since the state is itself the product of changing relations of power and articulated 
through shifting political rationalities, terrorism and the state ultimately appear as 
symmetrical phenomena of the same economy of power that are at the same time 
coincidental and politically useful. An adequate understanding of terrorism as a 
historical figure with contextually variable functions thus requires not only an 
examination of the processes by which terrorism and the state are defined in opposition 
to each other but also demands an inquiry into the articulation of both state and 
terrorism in relation to political concepts such as the nation or, more recently, humanity 
and the universality of human rights. As a result, what needs to be considered are the 
political rationalities which give rise to and, indeed, require the representation of 
terrorism as illegitimate violence and of state violence as legitimate. 
 
1.3 Terrorism and the state 
So far, we have established that a genealogy of terrorism appears as a salutary 
alternative to problematic attempts to define terrorism. We have also found that such a 
project has to be situated in the context of an analysis of a wider economy of power. A 
number of authors have offered important insights into the power relations undergirding 
modern politics of the kind envisaged by Nietzsche and Foucault. Max Weber, Walter 
Benjamin, Carl Schmitt, Hannah Arendt and the Frankfurt School are perhaps the most 
relevant examples with regard to the concern of this thesis.
22
 They are also important 
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intellectual sources of Giorgio Agamben, whose work has been widely received in 
recent years, particularly with regard to the legal and political developments in many 
Western states in reaction to terrorism.
23
 
Agamben identifies the state of exception as the paradigm of Western politics 
since its inception in the Greek polis. Even though he admits that ―Security as leading 
principle of state politics dates back to the birth of the modern state,‖ he also claims to 
have demonstrated that the political concern with the natural life of individuals – which 
arguably is at issue in anti-terrorist measures – has been the object of sovereign power 
throughout the history of Western politics (Agamben 2002, 1).
24
 Arguing that homo 
sacer, a figure of archaic Roman law who can be killed with impunity but not 
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sacrificed, constitutes the paradigmatic rendering of bare life as at the same time 
included in and excluded from the political sphere, Agamben infers that ―homo sacer 
names something like the originary ‗political‘ relation, which is to say, bare life insofar 
as it operates in an inclusive exclusion as the referent of the sovereign decision‖ 
(Agamben 1998, 84). Agamben thus characterizes ―the modern State‖ as feeding on a 
concealed relation between power and life that ties modern to archaic power and that 
only comes to light in exceptional instances. Moreover, he argues, it is not just 
totalitarian regimes that depend on the politicization of bare life. Determining the 
liberal premise that one has to become a subject before one can become the bearer of 
rights as ―modern democracy‘s secret biopolitical calling,‖ Agamben brings out the 
connection between law and life that is at work even in liberal democracy (Ibid., 124). 
―Law needs a body in order to be in force,‖ and this body becomes ―the bearer both of 
subjection to sovereign power and of individual liberties‖ (Ibid., 124-125). 
Following Agamben‘s analysis, it might be argued that the dismantling of legal 
norms and the outlawing of terrorist suspects in recent years merely constitutes the 
culmination of a long-standing tradition of Western politics. In fact, Agamben presents 
a similar argument with regard to the Nazi concentration camp which he sees as the 
paradigm of the entire tradition of Western politics. On this account, terrorism – like the 
camp – would seem to reveal the inability of liberal democratic politics to distinguish 
between the body as a holder of rights and the body as the surface of sovereign power. 
In an emergency (im Ernstfall), this indistinction results in the abrogation of legal 
entitlements and legal protection. 
Seven years before the enactment of the USA Patriot Act and the setting up of 
detention camps in Guantanamo Bay and elsewhere, Agamben warned that, since all 
politics is exceptional and, hence, the exception is not so much an exception as the rule, 
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―we must expect not only new camps but also always and more lunatic regulative 
definitions of the inscription of life in the city‖ (Ibid., 176). Given this almost prophetic 
portrayal of the political landscape in the wake of 9/11 and the War on Terror, 
Agamben‘s widespread reception and his massive influence across academic disciplines 
are hardly surprising. Even though Agamben provides important insights into the 
structural continuity of mechanisms by which law is suspended and state violence 
targets the life of individuals, his analysis of modern power is nevertheless problematic 
for an account of terrorism because the conclusion he draws is an untenable 
generalization and fails to explain the underlying political interests giving rise to the 
suspension of legal norms. 
Agamben tends to treat present-day political practices as the logical result of an 
inescapable historical development of ―the (liberal democratic) State.‖ This explanation 
fails to account for the complex mechanisms that have historically been, and still are 
used in a variety of ways and that make up very different kinds of states. Agamben 
neglects the importance of historical as well as constitutional differences between 
states, instead making sweeping claims about ―the modern State‖ – as if there was a 
constant and readily recognizable distinctly modern arrangement of institutions that 
could be identified as such. Ultimately, Agamben‘s account is reductionist and its 
consequences are as problematic as they are counterproductive. In both practical and 
theoretical terms, simply drawing a line from homo sacer to Nazi concentration camps 
to detention centers à la Abu Ghraib or Guantanamo Bay reduces to sameness what are, 
in fact, important differences.25 
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In addition, Agamben explains the politicization of life in a state of exception as 
the effect of the general function of sovereignty. He therefore assumes that the 
suspension of law with regard to political subjects is the result of a certain continuity in 
how power is exercised. Agamben thereby fails to investigate the underlying reasons, 
the political interests and the changes in power relations that demand the use of certain 
measures. In other words, just because terrorists are treated in ways that appear to be 
identical to other examples of homines sacri, neither the reasons behind their precarious 
legal status nor their role within a wider political context are the same. Agamben‘s 
analysis stops short of going behind the manifestation of power in order to explain the 
ways in which similar techniques of power are deployed in different contexts, for 
different reasons, and with different intentions.  
A critical investigation of the relation between terrorism and the state as both 
effects of a wider field of power relations permits a more nuanced critique of the state 
than Agamben‘s account. Exploring the significance of larger political rationalities for 
particular conceptions of both terrorism and the state effectively addresses the 
shortcomings of wholesale condemnations of ―the State,‖ especially in its liberal 
democratic form, which supposedly has its decay from latent to more overt 
authoritarian tendencies built in at the very core. Exploring terrorism in its historically 
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variable meanings and functions helps us to correct Agamben‘s account by bringing 
into view the state not as an unchanging institutional arrangement but as the effect of an 
evolving economy of power. To speak with Foucault, terrorism appears as a pivotal 
element in processes of governmentalization. 
 
1.4 Terrorism and governmentality 
A more productive understanding of terrorism as part of a larger economy of 
power demands the abandonment of grand narratives of the type Agamben writes. 
Instead, it is necessary to pay attention to the processes through which formal 
structures, institutions and practices are co-opted, diverted and inverted for actual 
operations of power. In ―Security, Territory, Population‖ (1977/78), Foucault criticizes 
(at the time predominantly Marxist) accounts of the state which, he argues, consist in 
―reducing the state to a number of functions‖ and which fail to understand that ―the 
state, doubtless no more today than in the past, does not have this unity, individuality, 
and rigorous functionality, nor, I would go so far as to say, this importance. After all, 
maybe the state is only a composite reality and a mythicized abstraction whose 
importance is much less than we think‖ (Foucault 2009b, 109). Accordingly, Foucault 
proposes to substitute institutional and state-centered accounts of power with ―a history 
of the actual techniques themselves.‖ 
There is another history, which would be the history of technologies, that is to say the much more 
general, but of course much more fuzzy history of the correlations and systems of the dominant 
feature which determine that, in a given society and for a given sector – for things do not 
necessarily develop in step in different sectors, at a given moment, in a given society, in a given 
country – a technology of security, for example, will be set up, taking up again and sometimes 
even multiplying juridical and disciplinary elements and redeploying them within its specific 
tactic (Ibid., 8-9). 
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On this view, the state appears as ―constituted by the set of practices by which 
the state actually became a way of governing, a way of doing things, and a way too of 
relating to government‖ (Ibid., 277). The state is the ―regulatory idea of governmental 
reason,‖ a ―principle of intelligibility of reality for this political thought that was 
seeking the rationality of an art of government,‖ a ―way of thinking the specific nature, 
connections, and relations of certain already given elements and institutions‖ (Ibid., 
286). It is in this context that the function of terrorism and counter-terrorism practices 
has to be analyzed. Since moreover the state is itself the product of variable practices of 
government and thus subject to transformation, most significantly perhaps through 
processes of globalization, a genealogical study of terrorism and the state has to take 
political developments and changes in power structures into consideration. Even though 
Foucault was not explicitly concerned with a newly emerging post-national economy of 
power, his work nevertheless permits for an analysis of recent challenges posed to 
power relations on the level of the nation-state. 
Such an account of contemporary counter-terrorism practices under conditions 
of governmentality has been developed by Judith Butler in her essay ―Indefinite 
Detention‖ (2004). By way of mobilizing a Foucauldian framework of theorizing 
power, Butler is able to account for the coexistence of different forms of power in a 
single political regime. Her work therefore seems to be more promising than 
Agamben‘s as a theoretical starting point for the kind of genealogical study of terrorism 
developed in this thesis. Even though heavily influenced by Agamben, Butler offers a 
more careful interpretation of power that resonates with Foucault‘s work on 
governmentality. Her essay offers an insightful meditation on power in post-9/11 
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America, thereby proposing important corrections of Agamben‘s misrepresentation of 
Foucault as well as of the theoretical implications that follow from it.
26
 
Butler shifts the focus from sovereignty and juridical-institutional models of 
power to an analysis of power more broadly conceived.
27
 Butler takes seriously 
Foucault‘s contention that, in political theory, we need to cut off the king‘s head and 
abandon a unitary theory of power as concentrated in a self-grounding and unified 
sovereign and the prohibitive function of the law. She therefore seeks to rethink the 
relationship between sovereignty and biopolitics and the divergences and 
transformations of both forms of power under conditions of permanent emergency. 
Nevertheless, she shares Agamben‘s view that Foucault‘s portrayal of power needs to 
be revised in order to account for the strange hybrid of sovereignty and governmentality 
that has emerged in response to an apparently heightened threat of terrorism in the 
United States. What cannot be explained in the way of Foucault‘s account, she claims, 
is the anachronistic resurgence of sovereignty within governmentality in a state of 
emergency. 
Over and against Agamben, Butler insists that Foucault makes an analytic, not a 
temporal distinction between sovereignty and governmentality, and that it is thus 
possible to think a coexistence of both forms of power. ―Procedures of governmentality, 
which are irreducible to law,‖ Butler explains, ―are invoked to extend and fortify forms 
of sovereignty that are equally irreducible to law.‖ 
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Neither is necessarily grounded in law, and neither deploys legal tactics exclusively in the field of 
their respective operations. The suspension of the rule of law allows for the convergence of 
governmentality and sovereignty; sovereignty is exercised in the act of suspension, but also in the 
self-allocation of legal prerogative; governmentality denotes an operation of administration power 
that is extra-legal, even as it can and does return to law as a field of tactical operations. The state 
is neither identified with the acts of sovereignty nor with the field of governmentality, and yet 
both act in the name of the state. … [P]recisely because our historical situation is marked by 
governmentality, and this implies, to a certain degree, a loss of sovereignty, that loss is 
compensated through the resurgence of sovereignty within the field of governmentality. … The 
resurrected sovereignty is thus not the sovereignty of unified power under the conditions of 
legitimacy, the form of power that guarantees the representative status of political institutions. It 
is, rather, a lawless and prerogatory power, a ―rogue‖ power par excellence (Butler 2004a, 55-56). 
The guidelines introduced at Guantanamo Bay in March 2002 that allocated to 
state officials the power to decide who was and who was not to be tried according to 
national, military and international legal frameworks, illustrate Butler‘s claim that, 
under conditions of governmentality, sovereignty is transformed and used as a tactic, 
thereby producing a lawless power that relies on both sovereignty and governmentality 
and that acts in the name of the state. Not only did the Department of Defense put the 
question of whether or not a trial was to be held at all at the discretion of government 
officials; it also maintained that acquittal would not necessarily end detention and 
revoked any right of appeal for those detainees tried in military tribunals. In other 
words, the Department of Defense suspended the separation of powers as well as basic 
human and civil rights, thereby extending its sovereign power to decide whether or not 
the law applied to terrorist suspects temporally (that is indefinitely) and geographically 
(that is beyond US territory). 
Moreover, the decision to hold trial or to detain indefinitely was transferred to 
government representatives who are neither elected democratically nor members of the 
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judiciary. As ―managerial officials with no clear claim to legitimacy,‖ they undoubtedly 
belong to a governmental system (Ibid., 54). Their exercise of managerial power, 
however, occasions an anachronistic revival of sovereignty. For Butler, these ―petty 
sovereigns‖ are ―part of the apparatus of governmentality; their decision, the power 
they wield to ‗deem‘ someone dangerous and constitute them effectively as such, is a 
sovereign power, a ghostly and forceful resurgence of sovereignty in the midst of 
governmentality‖ (Ibid., 56-59). As a result, Butler understands this contemporary 
version of sovereignty as a ―spectral sovereignty‖ (Ibid., 61), which ―becomes an 
instrument of power by which law is either used tactically or suspended, populations are 
monitored, detained, regulated, inspected, interrogated, rendered uniform in their 
actions, fully ritualized and exposed to control and regulation in their daily lives‖ (Ibid., 
97). This new form of sovereignty is not self-grounding and, therefore, not true 
sovereignty. The new sovereigns‘ authority to decide over the application of law and, 
hence, over the life and death of certain individuals depends on a delegation of power 
that is distributed and circulates within a governmental field. On this view, 
―Governmentality is the condition of this new exercise of sovereignty in the sense that it 
first establishes law as a ‗tactic,‘ something of instrumental value, and not ‗binding‘ by 
virtue of its status as law‖ (Ibid., 62).28 
In contrast to Agamben‘s sovereignty, which is a relation of power and law that 
takes the form of the law‘s suspension, Butler‘s new sovereignty is not the cause but the 
effect of the suspension of law. Under conditions of governmentality, she argues, state 
power creates sovereignty through the suspension of a law that is no longer binding but 
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rather seen as a more or less useful tactic. This does not mean that the state stops 
creating law. Yet, the law produced in circumstances of lawlessness is what Agamben 
understands as ―executive decree,‖ that is, an extension of executive power into the 
legislative sphere rather than law produced by a legislative body (Agamben 2005, 13).
29
 
As such, it appears, on the one hand, as illegitimate by the standards of traditional 
accounts of law. On the other, it perpetuates the exercise of new sovereignty. For 
Butler, both governmentality and sovereignty are, in the last instance, extra-legal; the 
former because of its use of law as tactics, the latter because of its being ungrounded in 
law. What governmentality ultimately reveals is that power is ―irreducible to law‖ 
(Butler 2004a, 94). 
Butler‘s reflections demand attention to the function of terrorism discourse in 
processes of mobilizing and repositioning sovereign practices, disciplinary mechanisms 
and biopolitical techniques in a coherent political regime. She adds an important 
element to Foucault‘s analysis of modern power by shedding light on the ways in which 
practices which are traditionally identified as elements of sovereignty are revived, co-
opted and integrated into the fabric of governmentality under conditions of permanent 
emergency and in the context of increasingly post-national politics. However, like most 
critical analyses of terrorism as an element in changing networks of power, Butler is 
concerned with terrorism in post-9/11 American politics.
30
 Such narrow focus not only 
                                                 
29
 On the distinction between laws and decrees see Schmitt, Carl. Legalität und Legitimität. Berlin: 
Duncker & Humblot, 2005a, published in English as Legality and Legitimacy. Translated by Jeffrey 
Seitzer. Durham: Duke University Press, 2004b. 
30
 See also Amoore, Louise and Marieke De Goede. Risk and the War on Terror. London and New York: 
Routledge, 2008, Colás, Alejandro and Richard Saull, (eds.) The War on Terror and the American 
„Empire‟ After the Cold War. New York: Routledge, 2006, Danner, Mark. Torture and Truth: America, 
Abu Ghraib, and the War on Terror. New York Review Books, New York, 2004, Dauphinee and 
Masters, (eds.) The Logics of Biopower and the War on Terror, Debrix, François. Tabloid Terror: War, 
Culture, and Geopolitics. New York: Routledge, 2007, Dillon, Michael and Julian Reid. The Liberal Way 
of War: Killing to Make Life Live. London and New York: Routledge, 2009, Hardt, Michael and Antonio 
Negri. Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire. New York: Penguin, 2004, Mitchell, 
William J. Thomas. Cloning Terror: The War of Images, 9/11 to the Present. Chicago and London: The 
University of Chicago Press, 2011, Puar, Jasbir K. Terrorist Assemblages. Homonationalism in Queer 
42 
 
downplays the significance of terrorism discourse in various historical contexts, but also 
misses interesting historical insights that are of relevance for contemporary analyses of 
terrorism. Moreover, a wider range of examples from different historical periods would 
further substantiate the theoretical points developed by Butler and others. 
 
1.5 Understanding terrorism in context 
In this chapter, we have explored the analytical and epistemological problems of 
terrorism research arising from the particular status of reality of a phenomenon like 
terrorism. We have found that there are no historically or contextually stable answers to 
the question what terrorism is. Instead, it has become clear that a more adequate 
understanding of terrorism requires that the question be changed. In the case of 
historical figures like terrorism, asking what a phenomenon is amounts to asking what it 
means, what it does or helps to do, and how it functions in a given context. In other 
words, if the ―being‖ of terrorism is understood not as the ontological status of a natural 
or historical given but as the function of an ontological fiction that is nevertheless real, 
then terrorism ―is‖ something different in different historical, social and political 
circumstances. We have also seen that more productive approaches, which situate 
terrorism within a wider economy of power in order to analyze its function, remain 
largely focused on terrorism in post-9/11, specifically American, politics. 
We can thus identify the predicament of contemporary terrorism research as 
follows: scholarship that takes into consideration a variety of historical manifestations 
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of terrorism does so on the basis of problematic definitions that are used to 
anachronistically identify behaviors in the past that correspond to contemporary 
definitions of terrorism. By contrast, differentiated accounts which pay attention to the 
function of terrorism in changing economies of power fail to extend the analysis beyond 
the twenty-first century and to investigate a larger set of historical examples of 
terrorism. In order to respond to these deficits, this thesis mobilizes a largely 
Foucauldian explanatory framework so as to make sense of terrorism as an element in 
an economy of power under consideration of its varying historical manifestations. 
Even though the theoretical position developed in subsequent chapters draws 
heavily from Foucault, I want to avoid presenting archival evidence so as to simply 
confirm and historically substantiate his account of power and violence. Instead, the 
genealogical mapping of decisive moments in the history of terrorism allows us to 
identify and respond to potential limits and blind spots of Foucauldian theory. In the 
first instance, this thesis questions the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate 
violence before distinguishing and categorizing violent actions in these terms. Before 
we can ask if forms of violence that are commonly regarded as illegitimate are really 
illegitimate or if state violence might not be just as illegitimate as terrorism, we have to 
understand the reasons why legitimacy and illegitimacy are attributed to particular acts 
of violence, and by what standards.
31
 
We will see that the processes and rationalities through which terrorism is 
represented as illegitimate also problematize the ostensible legitimacy of state violence. 
Archival research will show how terrorism here functions as a way of legitimating 
increasingly excessive state violence when its lack of legitimacy becomes painfully 
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obvious. In this context, we will also examine how terrorism helps to cover over the 
problems resulting from the ambiguous grounds of law, which have been exacerbated in 
the process of increased internationalization and the creation of a new international 
legal order after the Second World War. For this purpose, we will consider the role of 
terrorism in processes of legal and political transformation in the global sphere. It will 
be seen that these transformations are best understood as resulting from an attempt to 
exercise sovereign power globally by way of integrating technologies of power 
traditionally associated with state sovereignty (such as a state of necessity or the 
justification of violence to maintain international order and peace) into post- and 
transnational political relations. 
In order to provide a more detailed investigation of the setbacks, reversals and 
complete failures in the development of liberal governmentality, we will turn to the 
work of Max Weber so as to complement and refine the Foucauldian approach 
developed in this thesis. To account for the global political and legal developments in 
the twentieth and twenty-first century, we will critically engage the work of Carl 
Schmitt, most importantly his analyses in ―Der Begriff des Politischen‖ (1932) and 
―Der Nomos der Erde im Völkerrecht des Jus Publicum Europaeum‖ (1950).32 We will 
see how, in an era of post-national politics, conceptions of terrorism are shaped by 
humanitarian considerations and a commitment to the universality of human rights. At 
the same time, this rearticulation of terrorism allows for the reconciliation of different 
forms of power exercised on a global scale. 
The following chapters thus examine three important examples in the history of 
terrorism in order to explore the changing meanings and functions of terrorism as a 
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 The English editions referred to in this thesis are Schmitt, Carl. The Concept of the Political. 
Translated by George Schwab. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996b and Ibid., The Nomos of 
the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum. Translated by Gary L. Ulmen. New 
York: Telos Press, 2003. 
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pivotal element in an evolving economy of power. We will see that the political 
rationalities that undergird relations of power simultaneously shape conceptions of 
terrorism, which in turn allow for the legitimation of political and legal regimes as well 
as for the selective exclusion of individuals, groups and ideologies from the political 
realm. 
Chapter 2 traces the historical beginnings of terrorism in the context of the rise 
of the bourgeoisie as the subject of national universality in the French Revolution. For 
this purpose, the chapter examines a specific fragment of the revolution, namely the 
conflict between Jacobins, Thermidorians and other political opponents of a liberal 
bourgeois order. Rather than attempting to understand the Thermidorian reaction and 
the ensuing period of liberal stabilization as a way of keeping terrorism in check, I seek 
to show how the difficulties of establishing a bourgeois liberal order faced by the 
Thermidorians in fact required and allowed for something like terrorism to be brought 
into existence. 
Chapter 3, by contrast, examines the rhetoric of terrorism in late imperial Russia 
to show how the concept of terrorism that had been formed in eighteenth-century 
France became detached from its original context and used against the very processes of 
liberalization it had helped to promote a century earlier. In Russia, an autocratic regime 
mobilized terrorism discourse to counteract the political effects of economic 
liberalization. We will see how this use of terrorism discourse backfired on the tsar by 
preparing the grounds for an expansion of the bureaucracy that further weakened the 
monarch‘s position. 
Chapter 4 explores how terrorism became marked out as the subject of legal 
debates in the twentieth century. We will investigate how a particular legal discourse 
anchors terrorism in a certain economy of power that can be described as a globalized 
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governmental field in the making. It will be seen that the lack of a legal definition of 
terrorism prepares the ground for a rearticulation of terrorism that helps to justify state-
approved violence on a global scale. The sometimes excessive use of force is authorized 
by major powers in the name of national self-defense and humanitarianism over and 
against these states‘ own professed commitment to the elimination of war and violence. 
What follows is, therefore, a genealogy of terrorism as a history of differences, 
transformations, discontinuities, and at times random, at times strategic, yet always 
consequential inventions. There will be no simple and straightforward answer that once 
and for all settles the question what terrorism really is. Instead of dismissing this 
investigation as a frustrating exercise in historical relativism, however, it is worth 
considering that it might be precisely its fluidity and instability that makes terrorism 
such a successful political concept. There are reasons for the varying meanings and 
roles of terrorism across time and between societies, and these reasons shed light on 
larger social, political, cultural or economic developments. In the last two hundred 
years, terrorism has at times fulfilled a crucial task in the establishment, expansion or 
stabilization of liberalism. In other contexts, it has been co-opted and strategically 
deployed against the political consequences of economically necessary liberalization. 
Terrorism has provided the constitutive outside in opposition to which liberal principles 
could be justified, and it has been an instrument of despotic rulers against the spread of 
liberal ideas. These different articulations and applications of the term make it 
impossible to tell a history of terrorism either as the history of a particular type of 
violence or as the diametrical opposite of liberal modernity. If we succeed in 
comprehending terrorism in its variable historical functions, perhaps we have found the 
starting point for a more meaningful and politically productive evaluation of terrorism 
as well as other forms of political violence.  
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The terrorist as the enemy of the nation 
 
1.6 The emergence of terrorism in the French Revolution33 
1.6.1 “C’est la justice des cannibales…” 
On August 3, 1794, six days after the execution of Robespierre, Jean Lambert 
Tallien addressed the National Convention in his new role as the leading Thermidorian 
and Robespierre‘s successor on the Committee of Public Safety, the executive branch of 
the Jacobin government.
34
 For Tallien, Robespierre‘s death was proof that the Jacobin 
Reign of Terror had been defeated by the champions of liberty and democracy. Against 
the arbitrary violence of the Jacobins, Tallien declared, the new government would 
restore public liberty. To safeguard the people‘s happiness, the Jacobin notion of 
justice, a ―justice of cannibals‖ (la justice des cannibales) which would ―never be that 
of the French people‖ (ce ne sera jamais celle du peuple français), had to be replaced 
with the justice of the law (Tallien 1847, 615). The justice of the Jacobins, Tallien 
maintained, did not judge but assassinate. ―There is only one kind of justice,‖ he 
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 A quick note on translation: Apart from Robespierre‘s speeches, archival documents are only available 
in French. English citations in the text are my translations; the French original is given in parentheses in 
the text or, in case of longer citations, in footnotes. The careful reader will notice a slightly confusing 
pagination in references to Babeuf‘s work. The collection of Babeuf‘s pamphlets is divided into two 
volumes. Volume 1, ―Journal de la Liberté de la Presse,‖ contains numbers 1 to 32 of Babeuf‘s journal, 
which appeared in An II and An III of the revolution (September 3, 1794 to February 1, 1795). Number 
22 is the last issue under the old title, ―Journal de la Liberté de la Presse.‖ Numbers 23 to 32, even 
though included in the first volume, are entitled ―Le Tribun du Peuple, ou Le Défenseur des Droits de 
l‟Homme; en continuation du Journal de la Liberté de la Presse.‖ Moreover, pagination of each issue 
including number 26 starts over with page one. It is only with number 27 that continuous pagination 
begins (on page 209). This is reflected in the bibliography of this thesis in the lack of page numbers for 
Nr. 4 of the Journal and Nr. 25 of the Tribun. Volume 2 of the collection, ―Le Tribun du Peuple, ou Le 
Défenseur des Droits de l‟Homme,‖ contains numbers 34 to 43, which appeared in An III and An IV 
(November 6, 1795 to April 24, 1796). Issue number 33 was never published. 
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 Tallien had started his political career as a Jacobin. When Robespierre turned against his fellow 
Jacobins, however, Tallien changed his political allegiances and instigated what became known as the 
Thermidorian Reaction against Robespierre. For a critical evaluation of Tallien‘s historical relevance see 
Gendron, François. The Gilded Youth of Thermidor. Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1993. 
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contended: ―It is justice that does not know man, but that measures actions‖ (Ibid.).35 In 
other words, justice had to be codified in the form of law, and violence was its means to 
punish ―no one but the bad citizens, the intriguers, and the rogues‖ (Ibid., 612).36 The 
interruption of the Jacobins‘ bloody reign achieved through Robespierre‘s execution 
had to be seized for the instantiation of a new legal order that would end the permanent 
spiral of ever increasing violence and bring back freedom and justice. ―Once terrorism 
stops for a moment to terrify,‖ Tallien proclaimed, ―it can only tremble itself‖ (Ibid., 
614).
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1.6.2 Jacobin republicanism 
Tallien‘s justification of Robespierre‘s execution and the institution of a new 
government was framed in stark opposition to the political rationality of the Jacobins 
which, Tallien claimed, represented a distorted and illegitimate version of liberty, 
justice, law and violence. A new government was therefore needed that was committed 
to safeguarding the freedom of the people by instituting a legal system that would 
prohibit the illegitimate use of force. A particular understanding of these concepts had 
indeed been central to Jacobin ideology and had fueled the implementation of the 
régime de terreur. The Jacobin understanding, however, had itself been developed in 
contrast to the lack of freedom and justice under absolutist monarchical rule. 
As Foucault shows in ―Security, Territory, Population,‖ the context in which 
concepts of freedom, justice and the function of law were articulated in the eighteenth 
century was shaped by considerations that were most distinctly articulated in the 
economic theories of the physiocrats. According to Foucault, the physiocrats had 
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 … il n‟y a qu‟une justice, citoyens: c‟est celle qui ne connaît point les hommes, mais qui pèse les 
actions. 
36
 … qu‟il ne sera terrible que pour les mauvais citoyens, les intrigants et les fripons. 
37
 Quand le terrorisme a cessé un instant de faire trembler, il ne peut que trembler lui-même. 
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imposed on the French government an idea of freedom modeled on the free play of 
forces in the marketplace. This, so they claimed, was the most effective way of 
maximizing the wealth of the state. The physiocratic idea of freedom, Foucault 
maintains, had developed in the context of a crisis that had resulted from grain 
shortages. The physiocrats had sought to address this problem by way of decontrolling 
grain prices. Scarcity, they argued, was ―a chimera‖ that could be avoided if only 
governments respected the spontaneous processes of production and trade (Foucault 
2009b, 40). The benefit of all, the physiocrats believed, could only be achieved through 
the pursuit of the private interest of each. The accomplishment of this kind of liberty 
required that government intervention be limited to the introduction of security 
mechanisms. By way of a security apparatus the government should create conditions 
conducive to the free play of individual interests without jeopardizing social order. 
Although edicts issued in 1763 and 1764 had established almost complete 
freedom of the price of grain, they did not result in the elimination of scarcity (Ibid., 
35). Even after the fall of the monarchy and the execution of the king, scarcity plagued 
the Parisians and led to periodic riots. In order to stop these disturbances a stable 
government was needed that established true freedom by putting an end to the growing 
wealth of a few grain merchants at the expense of large parts of the population. When 
Robespierre took to power in 1793, the contours of his concept of freedom came into 
sharp view in the solution he proposed to the problem of scarcity.
38
 
Scarcity, Robespierre was convinced, was an artificial problem in a rich and 
fertile country like France. In the absence of natural disasters, he surmised, scarcity 
could not possibly result from natural circumstances. Rather, Robespierre argued, ―it 
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 The hypothesis of what follows is that Robespierre articulates his conception of freedom in distinction 
from the physiocratic as well as the monarchical idea of freedom. For the opposite, in my opinion less 
plausible, argument that physiocracy provided the basis on which Robespierre could develop his vision of 
―natural republicanism‖ see Edelstein, Dan. The Terror of Natural Right. Chicago and London: The 
University of Chicago Press, 2009. 
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can only be imputed to defects of administration or of the laws themselves; bad laws 
and bad administration have their origins in false principles and bad morals. It is a fact 
generally recognized that the soil of France produces a great deal more than is needed 
to feed her inhabitants and that the present scarcity is an artificial one‖ (Robespierre 
2007b, 49). In other words, bad government regulation and high prices rather than the 
allegedly natural ―reality of fluctuations between abundance/scarcity‖ assumed by the 
physiocrats seemed to be the cause of grain shortages (Foucault 2009b, 37). Instead of 
responding to scarcity by working within its natural conditions and allowing for a 
certain, unavoidable number of deaths, Robespierre sought to prevent scarcity before it 
happened. 
According to Foucault, the physiocratic model required that the death of some 
people be tolerated as necessary for the disappearance of scarcity as a scourge (Ibid., 
42). Robespierre, however, was not prepared to accept this view. ―Common sense 
indicates,‖ he contended, ―that foodstuffs that are in no way essential to life can be left 
to untrammelled speculation by the merchant; any momentary scarcity that might be felt 
is always a bearable inconvenience; and it is acceptable in general that the unlimited 
freedom of such a market should turn to the greater profit of the state and some 
individuals; but the lives of men cannot be subjected to the same uncertainty. … No 
man has the right to amass piles of wheat, when his neighbour is dying of hunger‖ 
(Robespierre 2007b, 51). As a consequence, Robespierre considered it as the 
government‘s duty to issue good laws that appropriately and effectively regulated the 
circulation of grain. It was clear for him that freedom of grain could not be achieved by 
decontrolling its price. On the contrary, only government intervention could ensure its 
free circulation. ―Let the circulation of goods be protected throughout the whole 
Republic,‖ Robespierre therefore demanded, ―but let the necessary measures be taken to 
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ensure that circulation takes place. It is precisely the lack of circulation that I am 
complaining about. For the scourge of the people, the source of scarcity, is the obstacles 
placed in the way of circulation, under the pretext of rendering it unlimited‖ (Ibid., 52). 
In short, for Robespierre the freedom advocated by the physiocrats could in no way be 
regarded as real freedom. If it was a case of freedom at all, it was a very particular and 
limited kind of freedom that implied substantial unfreedom for the majority of the 
population. For instead of having created conditions in which grain could circulate and 
people could be fed, the lack of government intervention in the trade and distribution of 
grain demanded by the physiocrats had resulted in inequality, injustice and the 
unfreedom of the masses. Moreover, the physiocratic notion of freedom was achieved 
through ―secrecy, undefined freedom, and the certainty of impunity‖ (Ibid., 53). 
In order to really be free, Robespierre believed, the threat of starvation had to be 
preempted. This, however, could only be realized by restricting the private freedom of 
individuals to trade as they pleased. As a result, Robespierre attributed an active role to 
government in order to achieve what for him was real freedom. Against secrecy, the 
government had to ―take the necessary steps to record the quantity of grain that each 
area has produced, and that each landowner has harvested‖ in order to avoid that 
―anyone can hide a quantity of public subsistence‖ or ―fraudulently cause it to vanish 
and transport it either to foreign countries or to inland warehouses‖ (Ibid.). For this 
purpose, the government needed a certain kind of knowledge, a ―knowledge of things 
rather than a knowledge of the law‖ (Foucault 2009b, 273). Against undefined freedom, 
a kind of freedom which was defined negatively as the absence of interference, and 
against the impunity of actions which benefitted the private interests of some at the 
expense of the masses, the government had to prevent monopolies. For Robespierre it 
was clear that the free pursuit of private interest as a way of ensuring order had failed. 
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Rather, it had led to unfreedom and chaos and a condition where ―everything is against 
society‖ and ―everything favours the grain merchants‖ (Robespierre 2007b, 54). In 
contrast, Robespierre was convinced that ―The source of order is justice; … the surest 
guarantor of public peace is the well-being of the citizens, and … the long convulsions 
that tear states apart are only the combat of prejudice against principle, egoism against 
the general interest, the arrogance and passions of powerful men against the rights, and 
the needs, of the weak‖ (Ibid., 54-56). 
Robespierre‘s conceptualization of freedom can therefore be described as the 
outcome of good government that required a certain technical knowledge as to when 
and how intervention was necessary for the common good. To anticipate a point 
discussed in more detail in the second part of this chapter, it could be argued that 
Robespierre‘s claims represent a variation of raison d‟État in which the purpose of 
government and the necessity of active and prompt intervention was not the wealth of 
the state but the prosperity and freedom of the people. 
The safeguarding of freedom in the true sense of the word, Robespierre 
therefore contended, depended on the foundation of a legitimate form of political 
authority. For this purpose, the old order had to be eliminated thoroughly and 
unconditionally. It is in this light that Robespierre‘s repudiation of the trial of Louis 
XVI has to be read. For Robespierre, putting the king on trial was not just absurd but 
simply impossible. ―There is no trial to be held here,‖ he proclaimed. 
Louis is not a defendant. You are not judges. You are not, you cannot be anything but statesmen 
and representatives of the nation. You have no sentence to pronounce for or against a man, but a 
measure of public salvation to implement, an act of national providence to perform. Louis was 
king, and the Republic is founded: the famous question you are considering is settled by those 
words alone. … Louis cannot be judged; either he is already condemned or the Republic is not 
acquitted (Robespierre 2007e, 57-59). 
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On Robespierre‘s view, it was obvious that the king could not be tried according 
to the laws of the republic. Louis belonged to a different order; he was in fact the 
embodiment of the previous order, the personification of absolute monarchy. The 
revolution had founded a new law while the king represented an old legal order. The 
laws of the republic did not apply to him. 
In this sense, Robespierre could be taken to anticipate an important maxim of 
legal theory and practice according to which there is no crime without law (nullum 
crimen sine lege). The purpose of this principle is the prevention of ex post facto law 
that amounts to victor‘s justice and enables the unfair punishment of the vanquished in 
accordance with the law of the victor.
39
 Robespierre‘s motives, however, were not 
inspired by these considerations. His actions were driven by what one might call a more 
primordial necessity to execute Louis XVI as a matter of national salvation. The 
foundation of a new order was not to be achieved by way of an appeal to law but 
through the use of violence. “If the mainspring of popular government in peacetime is 
virtue,‖ Robespierre claimed, ―the mainspring of popular government in revolution is 
virtue and terror both: virtue, without which terror is disastrous; terror, without which 
virtue is powerless.‖ 
Terror is nothing but prompt, severe, inflexible justice; it is therefore an emanation of virtue; it is 
not so much a specific principle as a consequence of the general principle of democracy applied to 
the homeland‘s most pressing needs (Robespierre 2007c, 115). 
In a situation of necessity, the state‘s foundation, which is virtue, had to 
manifest itself in terror. The revolutionary violence of Robespierre‘s coup d‟État was 
the foundational act of the republic and was supposed to institutionalize virtue in the 
form of a legitimate law that ostensibly would have led to true freedom for the people. 
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Revolutionary government, according to Robespierre, ―is supported by the holiest of all 
laws: the salvation of the people; by the most indisputable of all entitlements: 
necessity‖ (Robespierre 2007d, 100). The goal of revolutionary government, i.e. the 
foundation of the republic, is continued by constitutional government, whose goal is ―to 
preserve the Republic‖ (Ibid., 99). 
The upshot of the foundation of the republic in revolutionary violence was a 
radical separation of legality and legitimacy. For Robespierre, legitimacy was not 
commensurate with the law. In the first instance, he maintained, ―the law can only 
forbid what is damaging to society: it can only order what is useful to it― (Robespierre 
2007a, 70). In other words, law here appears not as a system of rules whose observance 
guarantees the legitimacy of political authority. In the true meaning of the word, law is 
an ensemble of rational precepts concerned with and conducive to the common good. A 
law that commands what is harmful for society is not a law, and its execution is not 
legitimate. To borrow from Foucault, in the context of Robespierre‘s elaboration of a 
revolutionary political program the idea of politics as government connected with 
legality is replaced with what might be identified as republican reason connected with 
necessity.
40 
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 In his analysis of raison d‟État in his lectures on ―Security, Territory, Population,‖ Foucault maintains 
that politics is ―not something that has to fall within a form of legality or a system of laws. Politics is 
concerned with something else, although at times, when it needs them, it uses law as an instrument. 
Politics is concerned with necessity. … So, we do not have government connected with legality, but 
raison d‟État connected with necessity‖ (Foucault 2009b, 263). In this regard, it might be argued that 
Foucault‘s understanding of politics is remarkably close to Schmitt. The general trajectory of Schmitt‘s 
work can be summarized as an appraisal of the essentially extra-legal nature of the political and a critique 
of the liberal-democratic constitutional experience of the Weimar Republic as a fundamentally apolitical 
system. When Schmitt argues that ―The exception is more interesting than the rule‖ because ―the rule 
proves nothing; the exception proves everything,‖ he does so in order to show that the legal order 
depends on a decision which is itself irreducible to the law (2005b, 15). The exception, Schmitt claims, 
―confirms not only the rule but also its existence, which derives only from the exception. In the exception 
the power of real life breaks through the crust of a mechanism that has become torpid by repetition‖ 
(Ibid.). Transposed to the mechanisms of raison d‟État, the coup d État would seem to be the violent 
manifestation of the political in which it transcends the law, founds it and guarantees its applicability by 
breaking through the crust of the law in an emergency. I will return to this point in the second part of this 
chapter (see infra note 78). For the moment, the reader is referred to Foucault, Security, Territory, 
Population, Schmitt, Carl. Der Begriff des Politischen. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2002, Ibid., 
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In addition, the fundamental gulf that, for Robespierre, separates legality and 
legitimacy results in the impossibility to exhaustively define justice in terms of the law. 
Rather, justice is the – sometimes murderous – judgment of the general will. ―Peoples 
do not judge in the same way as courts of law,‖ Robespierre maintained; ―they do not 
hand down sentences, they throw thunderbolts; they do not condemn kings, they drop 
them back into the void; and this justice is worth just as much as that of the courts‖ 
(Robespierre 2007e, 59). 
In the last instance, the incommensurability of legality and legitimacy requires 
that freedom be wrested from the province of the law. For Robespierre, freedom is not – 
or at least not only – the result of a law that shields the individual from interference. 
Instead, ―Liberty is the power that man has to exercise all his faculties at will. Justice is 
its rule, the rights of others are its borders, nature is its principle and law its safeguard‖ 
(Robespierre 2007a, 69). These issues will be taken up in the second part of this 
chapter. Without wanting to anticipate those arguments here, it might be mentioned that 
Robespierre seemed to be aware of a constitutive component of any legal order: if 
political authority originates in an act of revolutionary violence, its constitution has to 
preserve the possibility for a violent manifestation of justice in case of emergency. 
Entrusted with the preservation of the republic, constitutional government requires the 
power to repeat the foundational act of violence in times of necessity. In such 
circumstances, the law must yield to a violence which restores the state. For reasons to 
be analyzed in due course, the awareness that the legal order was founded in violence 
                                                                                                                                               
Politische Theologie. Vier Kapitel zur Lehre von der Souveränität. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2004a 
and Ibid., Römischer Katholizismus und politische Form. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2008. Schmitt‘s works 
have been translated into English as The Concept of the Political, Political Theology: Four Chapters on 
the Concept of Sovereignty. Translated by George Schwab. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005b 
and Roman Catholicism and Political Form. Translated by Gary L. Ulmen. Westport: Greenwood Press, 
1996a. For a concise analysis of Schmitt‘s critique of liberalism see Scheuerman, William E. ―Carl 
Schmitt‘s Critique of Liberal Constitutionalism.‖ The Review of Politics 58, no. 2 (1996): 299-322. 
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was displaced by the postulation of the law as the institutionalization of universal 
values. 
For the present analysis of the emergence of terrorism in the French Revolution, 
it should be noted that it was the Jacobin constellation of positive freedom, 
revolutionary justice, lawless yet legitimate violence and a legitimate because virtuous 
form of law that the Thermidorians identified with terrorism and which they dislodged 
and realigned in what they claimed to be the bedrock of legitimate government. To 
examine this process, we will now analyze the collapse of the distinction between 
legality and legitimacy in the wake of Robespierre‘s execution and the subsequent 
institutionalization of a legal form of legitimacy in the form of negative freedom, 
punitive justice and legal and thus legitimate violence.
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1.6.3 The Thermidorian rhetoric of terrorism 
The most obvious objections to Robespierre‘s conceptions of freedom, legality 
and legitimacy would seem to be, on the one hand, that a prioritization of freedom and 
justice over the law predisposes to a seemingly arbitrary and in any case illegal use of 
force whenever the common good is under threat. On the other hand, in absence of a 
Rousseauian legislator, the determination of the common good amounts to an 
ideological decision made by whoever is in a position of sufficient power.
42
 As a 
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 The terminology here echoes Walter Benjamin‘s ―Critique of Violence‖ (1921) as well as Darrow 
Schecter‘s analysis of Benjamin‘s text. See Benjamin, Walter. ―Zur Kritik der Gewalt.‖ In Zur Kritik der 
Gewalt und andere Aufsätze, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1965 (translated as ―Critique of Violence.‖ 
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 For Rousseau, the necessity of a legislator derives from practical problems resulting from the 
determination of the general will. While Rousseau trusts the people to always want the common good, he 
is less convinced that they can recognize it without the guide of a truly exceptional individual, a ―great 
soul‖ who has access to the ―sublime reason, which transcends the grasp of ordinary men‖ (Rousseau 
1987, 41). It is with this passage in mind that Heinrich Heine describes Robespierre as ―the hand of Jean 
Jacques Rousseau, the bloody hand, which, from the womb of his time, pulled out a body for the soul 
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consequence, from the point of view of liberal democracy and a belief in the benefits of 
the constitutional state and the rule of law (Rechtsstaat), Robespierre‘s notion of 
freedom would seem to be no less than a despotic and dogmatic understanding of 
liberty reduced to the submission to the general will and policed by the use of terror and 
violence.
43 
Indeed, Tallien maintained in a very similar vein that the necessary result of 
Robespierre‘s view of freedom was the exercise of arbitrary and unlimited violence. 
The goal of the terreur, he contended, was the creation of an atmosphere of insecurity 
and suspicion among the people with the intention of making everyone submit to 
whatever was decided to be the general will by the Jacobin government. It was only 
through the spreading of fear that the Jacobins could ensure compliance with their 
political views. ―There are, for a government, two ways of making itself feared,‖ 
Tallien argued. 
[O]ne is to make do with surveillance of bad actions, to threaten them and to punish them with 
proportionate pains; the other consists in threatening people, threatening them always and for 
everything, threatening them with all cruelties one can imagine. … One is an optional fear, the 
                                                                                                                                               
which Rousseau made. That restless anxiety which haunted the life of Jean Jacques, did it perhaps arise 
because he sensed in spirit what sort of midwife his thoughts needed to come bodily into the world?‖ 
(Heine 2007, 77). For a contrary assessment of the relation between Robespierre and Rousseau see 
Levine, Andrew. ―Robespierre: Critic of Rousseau.‖ Canadian Journal of Philosophy 8, no. 3 (1978): 
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burdensome to him. And in viewing the moral person which constitutes the state as a being of reason 
because it is not a man, he would enjoy the rights of a citizen without wanting to fulfill the duties of a 
subject, an injustice whose growth would bring about the ruin of the body politic. Thus in order for the 
social compact to avoid being an empty formula, it tacitly entails the commitment – which alone can give 
force to the others – that whoever refuses to obey the general will will be forced to do so by the entire 
body. This means merely that he will be forced to be free‖ (Rousseau 1987, 26). It is because of this 
passage in particular that some commentators have suggested that Rousseau be regarded as a proto-
totalitarian thinker. See for example Arendt, Hannah. On Revolution. London: Penguin Books, 1990 and 
Talmon, Jacob L. The Rise of Totalitarian Democracy. Boston: Beacon Press, 1952. 
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other is incessant agony; one is an apprehension of terror that follows crime, the other is terror 
itself, which installs itself in the soul despite a feeling of innocence; one is a fear based on the 
law, the other is a stupid fear of people (Tallien 1847, 613).
44 
Faced with the choice between punitive justice and arbitrary violence, Tallien 
intimates, the Jacobins had clearly chosen the second option. In an early precedent of a 
critique of what might anachronistically be called a politics of fear,
45
 Tallien 
condemned the instrumentalization of fear which ―makes insensitive to freedom and 
makes it look like a good trade-off to exchange death for servitude‖ (Ibid., 615).46 The 
permanent exercise of terror, he continued, ―throws man onto himself, and onto the 
lowest part of himself, that is onto his physical existence; it breaks all bonds, it cuts all 
sympathy; it de-fraternizes, desocializes, demoralizes‖ (Ibid.).47 
As a consequence, the Thermidorians emphasized the need for the new 
government to guarantee freedom by protecting individuals from violence and 
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 Il y a, pour un gouvernement, deux manières de se faire craindre; l‟une qui se borne à surveiller les 
mauvaises actions, à les menacer et à les punir de peines proportionnées; l‟autre consiste à menacer les 
personnes, à les menacer toujours et pour tout, à les menacer de tout ce que l‟imagination peut concevoir 
de plus cruel. Les impressions que produisent ces deux méthodes sont différentes; l‟une est une crainte 
éventuelle, l‟autre est un tourment sans relâche; l‟une est un pressentiment de la terreur qui suivrait le 
crime, l‟autre est la terreur même qui s‟établit dans l‟âme malgré le sentiment de l‟innocence; l‟une est 
une crainte raisonnée des lois, l‟autre est une crainte stupide des personnes. 
45
 For a discussion of the phenomena and practices subsumed under the rubric ―the politics of fear,‖ the 
reader is referred to Ahmed, Sara. ―The Politics of Fear in The Making of Worlds.‖ International Journal 
of Qualitative Studies in Education 16, no. 3 (2003): 377-398, Barber, Benjamin R. Fear‟s Empire: War, 
Terrorism, and Democracy. New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company, 2003, Evrigenis, Ioannis 
D. Fear of Enemies and Collective Action. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008, Furedi, Frank. 
Politics of Fear. Beyond Left and Right. London and New York: Continuum, 2005, Gregory, Derek and 
Allan Pred, (eds.) Violent Geographies: Fear, Terror, and Political Violence. New York: Routledge, 
2007, Hamm, Mark S. ―The USA Patriot Act and the Politics of Fear.‖ In Cultural Criminology 
Unleashed, edited by Jeff Ferrell, Keith Hayward, Wayne Morrison and Mike Presdee, 287-300. London: 
Glass House Press, 2004, Massumi, Brian. ―Fear (The Spectrum Said).‖ positions: east asia cultures 
critique 13, no. 1 (2005): 31-48, Ibid., (ed.) The Politics of Everyday Fear. Minneapolis and London: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1993, Prewitt, Kenneth, Alterman, Eric, Arato, Andrew, Pyszczynski, 
Tom, Robin, Corey and Stern, Jessica. ―The Politics of Fear after 9/11.‖ Social Research 71, no. 4 
(2004): 1129-1146, Skrimshire, Stefan. Politics of Fear, Practices of Hope. London and New York: 
Continuum, 2008, Sparks, Chris. ―Liberalism, Terrorism, and the Politics of Fear.‖ Politics 23, no. 3 
(2003): 200-206 and Waters, Hazel. ―Editorial: The Politics of Fear: Civil Society and the Security 
State.‖ Race & Class 46, no. 1 (2004): 1-2. 
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 À force de rendre l‟existence incertaine, elle rend insensible à la liberté, et fait regarder comme un bon 
marché de se racheter de la mort par la servitude. 
47
 La terreur, quand elle est devenue l‟état habituel de l‟âme, concentre l‟homme dans lui-même et dans 
la moindre partie de lui-même, je veux dire son existence physique; elle rompt tous les liens, éteint toutes 
les affections; elle défraternise, désocialise, démoralise. 
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interference in their private matters while at the same time facing the difficult task of 
reconciling individual liberty with the welfare of each and all. Once again, a 
government was searching for a way of exercising legitimate political authority. ―It is 
agreed that we want liberty,‖ Tallien claimed, ― that we want justice, but we are not in 
agreement on what is revolutionary without being tyrannical, and what is terrible 
without being unjust: therefore, everything depends on the determination of what is to 
be understood by revolutionary government‖ (Ibid., 612).48 
The political rationality laid out by Tallien‘s speech as a guideline for the 
Thermidorian government constituted a decisive break with the ideas of Robespierre. In 
order to ensure the freedom of individuals, the Thermidorians relied on a conception of 
freedom and justice akin to the kind of freedom demanded by the economic theories of 
the physiocrats. In analogy to the physiocratic premise that the market had its own 
reality and needed to be left alone in order to function, the Thermidorians advocated an 
understanding of freedom as a sphere of individual interests that had to be protected 
from interference by way of drawing its boundaries in terms of rights. In this way, 
freedom eschewed its dependence on an ideological and dogmatic view of the common 
good. Instead, liberty came into view as the result of certain natural or universal rights 
of individuals that were best ensured by an equally universal and purely formal legal 
order. 
Because it steered clear of any positive content, negative freedom and its 
corresponding legal form seemed to avoid the totalitarian consequences of 
Robespierre‘s concept of liberty. The latter was regarded by the Thermidorians as the 
outcome of a forced unity of individual interest and Jacobin political dogma. In 
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 On convient en même temps qu‟on veut la liberté, qu‟on veut la justice, mais on n‟est pas d‟accord sur 
la question de savoir ce qui est révolutionnaire sans être tyrannique, et terrible sans être injuste; tout 
consiste donc à déterminer nettement ce qu‟on entend par gouvernement révolutionnaire. 
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contrast, individual rights advocated by Tallien and his followers formed the basis of a 
legal framework for legitimate political authority, determined the boundaries of 
government intervention and limited the rightful use of force to cases where the law 
was violated. In short, the Jacobin configuration of positive freedom, revolutionary 
justice, just violence beyond the law and a legitimate form of law as the manifestation 
of reason had been forced apart by the Thermidorian emphasis on individual rights. The 
outcome was a notion of legitimacy as the outcome of actions in accordance with the 
law and a rearticulation of freedom as negative, justice as punitive, and violence as 
permitted for the preservation of the law. The immediate practical result in the context 
of the French Revolution was an eruption of law-preserving violence against those 
social and political forces that were opposed to the Thermidorian idea of political rule. 
 
1.6.4 Babeuf’s subversive discourse of terrorism 
Because of the disastrous consequences the Jacobin terreur had entailed for its 
adversaries, the initial stage of the Thermidorian rule immediately after 9 Thermidor 
was greeted with popular support. Even early socialists such as François-Noël Babeuf,
49
 
political journalist and fiery supporter of the Revolution, chimed in with Tallien‘s 
denunciation of terrorism as ―the government of blood, the government of Robespierre, 
the tyranny of Robespierre, the despotism of the committees, and all the subsequent 
atrocities, the guillotining, the shootings, the drownings, oppression, despair, all forms 
of squalor, deprivation and misery‖ (Babeuf 1966b, 4).50 For the pamphleteer Babeuf, 
                                                 
49
 For an account of Babeuf in the context of the rise of socialism after the Jacobin reign see Michelet, 
Jules. Histoire du XIXe Siècle. Vol. 1: Directoire. Origine des Bonaparte, Paris: C. Marpon et E. 
Flammarion, 1880. 
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 Pour moi je comprends que c‟est le terrorisme, le gouvernement de sang, le gouvernement de 
Robespierre, la tyrannie de Robespierre, le despotisme des comités, et tout ce qui en fut les atroces 
résultats, les guillotinades, les fusillades, les nozades, la compression, le désespoir, tous le genres de 
pénurie, de privations et de misère. 
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the terrorists were, above all, opponents of the freedom of opinion. While Babeuf 
praised the true revolutionaries of 1789 to 1792 for having fought for the unrestricted 
freedom of the press, he accused the Jacobins of turning against these principles and 
establishing a restrictive system in the name of some kind of higher freedom (Babeuf 
1966a).
51
 Echoing Tallien‘s insistence on freedom as a sphere demarcated by the rights 
of the individual, Babeuf hoped that Robespierre‘s execution and the establishment of a 
new government would lead to the restoration of those rights and liberties which the 
constitution of 1791 had granted and which had been curtailed by the Jacobins under 
the pretext of (a different kind of) freedom. 
In the Thermidorian effort to reestablish and consolidate a system of laws and 
rights, the concept of terrorism played a critical role and became a powerful weapon in 
the fight against political opponents. By November 1794, the Thermidorians had shut 
down the Jacobin Clubs and reclaimed the radical sections of Paris. ―With the sectional 
militants out of the way,‖ Albert Soboul maintains, ―no popular force remained which 
could offer resistance to the moderate bourgeoisie and stand out against the reaction, 
which now trained its fire away from institutions to individuals: the White Terror was in 
sight.‖ 
Anti-terrorism and the extirpation of militant sans-culottes from the sections – which together 
comprised an embryonic version of the White Terror – progressed throughout the winter of 1794-
1795, from Frimaire to Ventôse Year III. No longer a question of purges in the true sense of the 
term, like that which had followed directly after 9 Thermidor – for the terrorist cadres had already 
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 See for example Babeuf‘s complaint that ―The periodicals L‟Orateur du Peuple and Ami des Citoyens 
[which were edited by the Thermidorians Tallien and Fréron and advocated unrestricted freedom of the 
press], constantly appreciated by the patriots of the good old times, that is, of the first, second, third and 
fourth years of freedom, will not be liked today by the terrorist patriots of Year Two of the Republic (the 
French love variety, this expression will come into fashion)‖ (Babeuf 1966a, 3). [L‟Orateur du Peuple, 
l‟Ami des Citoyens, ouvrages périodiques constamment goûtés par les patriotes du bon vieux temps, 
c‟est-à-dire, des ans premier, deux, trois et quatre de la liberté, mais qu‟on ne répond pas qui plairont 
aujourd‟hui aux patriotes terroristes (les Français aiment toujours la variété, cette expression va venir à 
la mode) qu‟on ne répond pas, dis-je, qui plairont aux patriotes terroristes de l‟an deux de la 
République.] 
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been eradicated – the element of personal vengeance now predominated. After having first turned 
against the main terrorists, the repression widened its scope to include the whole of the former 
sectional personnel. As it did so, it acquired a social complexion, attacking in the former militants 
a whole system of republican values (Soboul 1989, 425-426). 
In other words, while Tallien had initially defined terrorism in terms of a 
political system sustained by the exercise of terror and the spreading of fear, the 
concept was soon extended to include republican principles and was used as an 
accusation of individuals who appeared to be enemies of the Thermidorian version of 
freedom. The Thermidorians strategically conjured up the specter of terrorism so as to 
denounce political opposition as an attempt to return to the bloody excesses of the 
Jacobin terror. As a consequence, allegations of terrorism were extended to aristocrats 
and royalists, who opposed the Thermidorian restoration of rights and liberties in favor 
of a reinstatement of the monarchy (Tallien 1847).
52
 Within a few months, the rhetoric 
of terrorism stretched from an accusation leveled at the radical left to a charge hurled 
against all kinds of opposition across the political spectrum.
53 
When the Thermidorians began to turn their political purges into mass 
liquidations of individuals under the pretext of terrorism and Robespierrism, they were 
soon accused of using terrorism as a ―trompe-l‟oeil,‖ a sham that allowed the 
Thermidorians to secure their power (Brunot 1937, 654).
54
 Early on, Babeuf drew 
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 See Tallien‘s demand that ―in this context where Capet‘s and Robespierre‘s plots against freedom have 
been discovered and punished, we also have to thwart the plans of aristocratic malice‖ (Tallien 1847, 
612). [… il faut, dans cette enceinte où les complots liberticides de Capet et de Robespierre ont été 
découverts et punis, déjouer aussi les projets de l‟aristocratique malveillance.] 
53
 Garrau, a Montagnard and member of the Council of 500, claims to have seen ―men accused of 
terrorism and vandalism‖ (des actes d‟accusation dressés contre des hommes pour cause de terrorisme et 
de vandalisme) (cited in Brunot 1937, 654). Barras, the executive leader of the Directory between 1795 
and 1799, reports that ―they have hunted down the best patriots with the help of a word as insignificant as 
terrorist‖ (ils en ont chasse les meilleurs patriotes, à l‟aide du mot insignifiant de terroriste) (cited in 
Ibid., 654). 
54
 Legot noted that ―I believed that it was the duty of the true friends of the homeland to take care that the 
hot and energetic patriots who had made and consolidated the Revolution were not sacrificed under the 
pretext of terrorism, of Robespierrism, etc.‖ (cited in Aulard 1951, 138). [J‟ai cru qu‟il était du devoir 
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attention to the problematic rhetoric of terrorism that was mobilized by the 
Thermidorians. On the one hand, Babeuf protested, the Thermidorians sought to present 
themselves as the champions of public liberty; on the other, however, they unleashed 
excessive violence against everyone who was opposed to the new political system and 
demanded a different form of political authority. While Babeuf had initially supported 
Tallien‘s coup against Robespierre, he became increasingly skeptical of Thermidorian 
politics. On 5 October 1794, three months after Robespierre‘s execution, a change in 
rhetoric manifested itself in Babeuf‘s writings and Babeuf used his pamphlets to openly 
attack Tallien and his followers. Babeuf‘s intention to use his journal to express 
political dissent was also reflected in the change of its title from ―Journal de la liberté 
de la presse” to ―Le tribun du peuple‖ in October 1794. 
Babeuf‘s initial strategy was marked by optimism and hope that the 
Thermidorians would recognize the contradictions between their rhetoric of freedom 
and their actual political practice. When the White Terror began in the early months of 
1795, Babeuf launched a full-blown attack on Tallien and his companions.
55
 The 
Thermidorians were trying to present themselves as champions of liberty, Babeuf 
claimed, but their words were at odds with their deeds (Babeuf 1966c).
56
 It had to be 
determined, Babeuf demanded, whether the Thermidorian Reaction had done anything 
for the people except aggravate their oppression (Ibid.).
57 
                                                                                                                                               
des vrais amis de la patrie de prendre garde que, sous prétexte de terrorisme, de robespierrisme, etc., on 
ne sacrifiât ces patriotes chauds et énergiques qui ont fait et consolideront la Révolution.] 
55
 On the White Terror see Soboul, Albert. The French Revolution 1787-1799. From the Storming of the 
Bastille to Napoleon. Translated by Alan Forrest and Colin Jones. Boston, Sydney and Wellington: 
Unwyn Hyman, 1989, 424-430. 
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 Babeuf argued that ―The thinkers, however, were surprised to see only words, only thunder, if you will, 
which, however, did not fell by reinstating eternal principles, which, however, did not seek to unmask the 
usurpers‖ (Babeuf 1966c, 220). [Les penseurs, au contraire, s'étonnaient de ne voir que des mots, du 
tonnerre, si l'on veut, mais qui ne foudroyait pas pour relever les principes eternels, mais qui ne visoit 
pas à confondre les usurpateurs.] 
57
 Babeuf accused Fréron and Tallien, claiming that ―you have not acquired the right that we say about 
you: they are the hope of the people; work afresh if you want to be worthy that we say it one day. But 
meanwhile we must not be fooled by your alleged popularity, it is necessary that the record of your 
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It is evident from Babeuf‘s writings that he recognized the Thermidorians‘ use 
of a discourse of terrorism as a means to justify political repression. The invocation of 
terrorism allowed for a representation of coercive measures as necessary for the 
preservation of freedom even though these measures appeared to be at odds with 
Tallien‘s insistence on individual liberty. In other words, under conditions of a terrorist 
threat, freedom could only be protected by its temporary limitation. The rhetoric of 
terrorism created a political imaginary that lent credibility to the Thermidorians‘ claims 
and allowed for the introduction of measures that were no less violent and, for Babeuf, 
no more legitimate than Robespierre‘s regime. It is in this sense that Babeuf rejected the 
Thermidorians‘ argument ―that the violation of all your rights, that the most audacious 
oppression that they cover under the name of necessarily strict measures, under the 
name of measures for the general security, are the only certain warrant of your liberty‖ 
(Ibid., 211).
58 
Eventually, the growing extent of violence deployed by the Thermidorians 
provoked Babeuf to turn allegations of terrorism back at the government. Denouncing 
Tallien as the ―terrorist from Bordeaux‖ (le terroriste de Bordeaux), and as ―a terrorist, 
a destroyer, an incendiary, who did not yield in any way to any revolutionary‖ (un 
terroriste, un destructeur, un incendiaire, qui ne le céda en rien à aucun 
révolutionnaire), Babeuf demanded that Tallien and his right hand Fréron had to be 
                                                                                                                                               
political history since Robespierre prove if you have served the people in anything, or if you have done 
nothing but help to enchain them‖ (Babeuf 1966c, 219). [Fréron et Tallien, vous n‟avez point acquis le 
droit que l‟on dise de vouz: ils sont l‟espoir du peuple; travaillez à nouveaux frais si vous voulez mériter 
qu‟on le dise un jour. Mais en attendant il faut qu‟on ne soit pas dupe de votre prétendue popularité, il 
faut que le précis de votre histoire politique depuis Robespierre, prouve si vous avez en quelque chose 
servi le peuple ou si vous n‟avez fait qu‟aider à l‟enchaîner.] 
58
 … que la violation de tous vos droits, que l‟oppression la plus audacieuse qu‟ils déguisent sous le nom 
des mesures utilement sévères, sous le nom de mesures de sûreté générale, sont les sûrs et uniques 
garants de votre liberté. 
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―guillotined. But how? Like a terrorist, too … guzzling on blood, destructive, 
incendiary‖ (Babeuf 1966d, 306, Babeuf 1966e, 332).59 
Taking the new government‘s definition of terrorism as the enemy of freedom at 
face value, Babeuf argued that the Thermidorian violence unleashed on the people 
meant that the Thermidorians were terrorists by their own standards. Babeuf left the 
content of the concept unchanged and simply extended it so as to include the 
Thermidorians themselves. In a sense, Babeuf could therefore not implausibly be 
described as a historical antecedent of those scholars who today seek to show that 
allegedly legitimate state violence in fact matches the dominant (state-imposed) 
understanding of terrorism and thus is itself an instance of terrorism.
60 
Babeuf‘s subversive use of the term terrorism as a name for the Thermidorian 
government, however, did not gain a foothold and Babeuf changed his approach. Given 
that the Thermidorian rhetoric failed to differentiate between terrorism as the real 
enemy of freedom and political opposition to the Thermidorian distortion of freedom, 
Babeuf argued that terrorism had, in fact, become just another word for patriotism. The 
terrorist, Babeuf argued, was ―synonymous with patriot and friend of the principles‖ 
(synonime de patriote & d‟ami des principes) (Babeuf 1966d, 304), and ―patriots and 
terrorists are all one‖ (patriotes et terroristes, c‟est tout un) (Babeuf 1966i, 217). In a 
staggering inversion of the Thermidorian understanding of terrorism, Babeuf declared 
that ―the convention has opened its eyes to the ferocious conduct of the furorists, and 
that it has repeatedly declared itself protector of the patriots who are oppressed under 
the name terrorists, which is given to all republicans, even to the soldiers of liberty.‖ 
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 ...guillotiné. Comment donc ? Eh ! comme terroriste aussi … buveur de sang, démolisseur, incendiaire. 
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 For present accounts that seek to portray state violence as terrorism see for example Jackson, Richard, 
Eamon Murphy and Scott Poynting, (eds.) Contemporary State Terrorism: Theory and Practice. 
Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2009 and Zolo, Danilo. Terrorismo umanitario. Dalla guerra del 
Golfo alla strage di Gaza. Reggio Emilia: Diabasis, 2009a. See also the critique of terrorism scholarship 
in chapter 1. 
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It has been proven that the furorists did not know anything but terrorists, anyone but those who 
have scared the emigrés, the kings, the royalists, the papists, the plungers, the wholesale buyers; 
eventually, all enemies of the people. … The convention feels and will feel that in order to govern 
justly, one must terrify the villains, the royalists, the papists and those who starve out the public, 
and that one cannot govern DEMOCRATICALLY without this terrorism which alone is permitted 
and legitimate; otherwise, there is nothing but injustice and famine; there is nothing but the most 
terrible tyranny and servitude for the good citizens, just like it has been exercised for too long 
(Babeuf 1966f, 49-50).
61 
Reevaluating the Thermidorian condemnation as terrorism of what for Babeuf 
was in reality patriotism, Babeuf accepted the Thermidorian accusations and endowed 
them with a positive valence. If terrorism meant the demand for freedom, real 
democratic government, legitimate violence and justice for the people, then terrorism 
indeed appeared to be the appropriate and legitimate means against those who stood in 
the way of freedom and justice. The prevention of injustice and the protection of the 
people from those who threatened their well-being with the selfish pursuit of private 
interests required that terrorism be used for a genuine democracy to function. 
Yet again, Babeuf‘s subversive efforts failed to result in an effective 
oppositional political strategy that could bring to a halt the Thermidorians‘ legal but 
nonetheless illegitimate use of force. Despite this failure, it has become clear that 
Babeuf‘s crucial contribution to a critical evaluation of allegedly illegitimate terrorism 
and ostensibly legitimate state violence is that his pamphlet literature registers the 
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 Amis, vous savez que la convention a ouvert les yeux sur la conduite féroce des furoristes, et qu‟elle 
s‟est déclarée, à plusieurs reprises, la protectrice des patriotes opprimés sous le nom de terroristes, 
donné à tous les républicains, même aux soldats de la liberté. Il est démontré que les furoristes ne 
connoissoient pour terroristes, que ceux qui avoient terrifié les émigrés, les rois, les royalistes, les 
papistes, les agioteurs, les accapareurs; enfin, tous les ennemis du peuple. … La convention sent et 
sentira que pour gouverner judicieusement, il faut terrifier les méchants, les royalistes, les papistes et les 
affameurs publics, et que l‟on ne peut gouverner DÉMOCRATIQUEMENT, sans ce terrorisme seul 
permis et légitime: autrement, il n‟y a qu‟injustice et famine; il n‟y a que tyrannie et esclavage les plus 
terribles pour les bons citoyens, tels qu‟on les exerce depuis trop long-tems. 
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instrumentalization of the rhetoric of terrorism and its abuse as a justification for the 
preservation and extension of state power. 
 
1.6.5 Thermidorian counter-terrorism 
In the context of vilifying political adversaries, terrorism was eventually drained 
of its original meaning and used as a denunciation of political opponents from the 
radical left to the reactionary and royalist right. The function of terrorism as a floating 
signifier made it a ―mot magique,‖ a magic word and an expedient instrument for the 
silencing and elimination of critics of the regime (Aulard 1951, 567). The White Terror 
of the Thermidorian government manifested itself in massacres of terrorist suspects, 
individual murders, and the organization of murder gangs: ―the Companies of Jesus, of 
Jehu and of the Sun, all of which hunted down terrorists, Jacobins and eventually the 
‗Patriots of ‘89‘, especially those who had purchased national lands. … Massacres 
proliferated‖ (Soboul 1989, 428). 
On 21 July 1795, the main Parisian newspaper, ―Le Moniteur Universel,‖ 
reported that ―the assassins of the counter-revolutionary regime have stabbed those 
whom they call terrorists in the prisons, in the streets, even in their homes, and the men 
without passion assure that more than one good citizen has died in these massacres‖ 
(Panckoucke 1847, 258).
62
 Babeuf himself experienced the disastrous consequences of 
being identified as a terrorist. Due to the influence of the ―Tribun du Peuple,‖ he was 
imprisoned on several occasions, most notably in 1794 when the Thermidorian 
government ordered the police to arrest Babeuf for promoting revolutionary opposition. 
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 Les assassins du régime contre-révolutionnaire ont égorgé dans les prisons, dans les rues, dans les 
maisons mêmes ce qu‟ils appellent des terroristes, et des hommes sans passion assurent qu‟il a péri dans 
ces massacres plus d‟un bon citoyen. 
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Babeuf was held in exile in a prison at Arras in extremely poor conditions (Rose 
1978).
63
 ―What you are doing to me,‖ Babeuf protested, ―is declaring me an outlaw.‖ 
In your spirit and your actions, you have already judged and condemned me in advance. If I am 
unfortunate and come into your hands, I believe that, by dint of your authority, you will mock my 
good reasons and hand me over to those judges that you were determined to choose (Babeuf 
1966h, 160).
64 
Being identified as a terrorist effectively turned Babeuf into an outlaw without 
any claim to legal protection. In this ―hors la loi‖ otherwise illegal measures were 
suddenly regarded as legitimate.
65
 Babeuf was well aware that his sentence was formed 
before he was even allowed to appear before a court. And his case was no exception. 
Whoever was associated with terrorism, Babeuf noted, was exiled from Paris, arrested 
and thrown into dungeons. ―Not only did you condemn them to bread and water,‖ he 
denounced the harsh treatment of alleged terrorists, ―to rotten straw, to the most 
despicable darkness, to the horror of having to exist for a number of months in this 
subterranean place where the floor was covered a foot deep in putrid and infected water, 
                                                 
63
 After being moved to a prison for Sansculottes and ex-terrorists in Paris and later being released, 
Babeuf was again arrested in February 1795. After his release, Babeuf and his followers, the Societé des 
Egaux, openly turned to revolutionary terrorism. In May, Babeuf was arrested and sentenced to death for 
leading an anarchist conspiracy. He was guillotined on 27 May 1797. For a detailed biography of Babeuf 
see Rose, Robert B. Gracchus Babeuf. The First Revolutionary Communist. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1978. 
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 C‟est un hors la loi que vous avez lancé sur ma personne. Dans votre esprit et d‟après la lettre de vos 
actes, je suis jugé et condamné d‟avance. Si j‟avois le malheur d‟être sous votre main, je crois bien qu‟en 
vertu de votre pleine autorité, vous pourriez vous moquer de toutes mes bonnes raisons et me livrer à des 
juges tels qu‟il vous plairoit de choisir. 
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 Dan Edelstein stresses the significance of the ―hors la loi‖ in his account of what he claims to be the 
Jacobin project of restoring the Republic of Nature, that is a fusion of republicanism with natural rights 
theory (see supra note 38). Edelstein argues that the pivot of this enterprise was a ―radical kind of 
enemy‖ that allowed the Jacobins to explain their need for unbridled violence (Edelstein 2009, 26). The 
figure of this enemy of the human race (hostis humani generis), he maintains, has a long history and 
appears in the form of the savage in early modern natural right theory, as the brigand, as the devil in 
medieval theology, and as the pirate in Renaissance law. Eventually the tyrant becomes the ultimate 
enemy, and it is in these terms that Robespierre framed his attack on Louis XVI. While Edelstein‘s 
narrative correctly points out the important political function of the enemy and its legal status as an 
outlaw, his analysis remains confined to the period of the Jacobin Reign of Terror. As this chapter as well 
as the following ones demonstrate, the history of the ―hors la loi‖ and the hostis humani generis 
continues after 9 Thermidor. If anything, their function is intensified and exacerbated due to the political 
repercussions of historical, social and economic developments that will be discussed shortly. 
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… but where they stayed several days without food; and, instead of consolation, they 
received nothing but abuse and death threats from the soldiers of Jesus‖ (Babeuf 1966h, 
159).
66 
In the name of freedom and under the pretext of terrorism, the Thermidorians 
were exercising large-scale violence against the enemies of freedom. Their attempt to 
topple the Jacobin Reign of Terror and to restore individual liberty had given rise to a 
government that appeared identical to the kind of rule it claimed to have overthrown. 
But whereas Robespierre could justify violence through his affirmation of the extra-
legal foundation of the republic and its laws in a more authentic kind of freedom and 
legitimacy, the Thermidorians faced a major difficulty in legitimating their White 
Terror. 
―The Thermidorian notables‘ fear of royalism and of democracy,‖ Soboul 
explains the impasse at which the government found itself, ―had led them to increase 
the number of safeguards against the omnipotence of the State‖ (Soboul 1989, 477). 
The outcome, according to Soboul, was a choice between an impotent government and 
a resort to violence. To invoke Benjamin‘s analysis in his 1921 essay ―Critique of 
Violence,‖ the reemergence of violence within the Thermidorian legal order appears as 
the result of a denial and concealment of the law‘s extra-legal grounds. The act of 
foundational violence that established the Thermidorian order on the dead body of 
Robespierre returned as a law-preserving White Terror that was as rampant as 
Robespierre‘s terreur. 
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 … non-seulement vous les condamnâtes au pain, à l‟eau, à la paille pourris, à l‟obscurité la plus 
affreuse, à l‟horreur d‟exister pendant plusieurs mois dans ce lieu souterrein dont le plancher étoit 
couvert d‟un pied d‟eaux croupissantes et infectes, … mais où ils restèrent plusieurs journées de suite 
sans manger; et, au lieu de consolations, ne recevoient que les outrages et des menaces de mort que 
venoient leur apporter des soldats de Jésus. 
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By way of a rhetorical move that was as ingenious as it was injurious, the 
Thermidorians had succeeded in asserting an understanding of terrorism that collapsed 
definition with condemnation.
67
 Whoever was identified as a terrorist was at the same 
time pronounced guilty. Contrary to the alleged rule of law which the Thermidorians 
had claimed to restore, the guilt of a supposed terrorist was established by definition 
rather than by legal trial and judgment. For unlike ordinary criminals who were tried in 
accordance with a general law that was applied to their particular case and proscribed a 
legitimate judgment and punishment for their crime, there was no universal law and, 
hence, no predetermined sentence for terrorism. In short, terrorism could not in any way 
be regarded as a crime in any conventional legal sense. The solution to the deficiency of 
the law with regard to terrorism was not, however, the criminalization of terrorism. 
Instead of outright making any action associated with terrorism illegal, the government 
decided to suspend the law with regard to those individuals identified as terrorists.
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The legal void into which the terrorist was dropped amounted to a situation of 
lawlessness in which neither the terrorist nor the government was subject to the legal 
order. But while the terrorist lost any legal status and protection of the law, the state 
was unbound by the restraints imposed on it by the law. Terrorism and state violence 
appeared as diametrically opposed, yet equally anomic phenomena. In the lawlessness 
of the ―hors la loi,‖ an absolutely vulnerable subject without rights faced as its exact 
inverse an absolutely boundless violence. 
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 This is not dissimilar from the conflation of description and judgment in contemporary definitions of 
terrorism. See chapter 1 for a more in-depth critique of this tendency. 
68
 We will see in subsequent chapters that this suspension of the law becomes the standard operating 
procedure in response to terrorism. 
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1.7 Terrorism and the legitimation of state violence 
1.7.1 Bourgeois universality and state totality 
So far, this chapter has explored historical archives to chart the contestations 
over the meaning and use of the term terrorism. We have seen that the successful 
imposition of a discourse of terrorism played a crucial role in the Thermidorians‘ efforts 
to silence their political opponents. In the remainder of this chapter, I engage the work 
of Foucault in order to identify the political rationality and the particular configurations 
of power which gave rise to the Thermidorians‘ portrayal of terrorists as the enemies of 
freedom. In this context, Foucault‘s genealogy of liberal governmentality serves as an 
important theoretical framework in which to analyze the relationship between the 
instrumentalism of the rhetoric of terrorism and the emergence of a modern economy of 
power. The significance of Foucault‘s critical intervention lies in his attempt to explain 
how the exercise of an absolute power over life and death can be reconciled with an 
evolving political concern with the health, protection, defense and security of the 
nation. It is as an episode in this development, I argue, that the emergence of a certain 
understanding of terrorism in the French Revolution has to be comprehended. 
To be sure, the point here is not to show that liberalism was inaugurated as a 
complete and comprehensive political rationality in the French Revolution as the 
starting point of bourgeois civilization.
69
 While the revolution can certainly be seen as a 
                                                 
69
 Even the most Marxist of commentators acknowledge that the rise of the bourgeoisie is not an 
unbroken development. See for example Lefebvre, Georges. Les Paysans du Nord pendant la Révolution 
française. Paris: Armand Colin, 1972, Ibid., The Great Fear of 1789: Rural Panic in Revolutionary 
France. Translated by Joan White. New York: Schocken Books, 1973, Ibid., Quatre-vingt neuf. Paris: 
Maison du livre français, 1939, Soboul, The French Revolution 1787-1799 and Ibid., Les sans-culottes 
Parisiens en l‟an II. Mouvement populaire et gouvernement révolutionnaire. 2 juin 1793 - 9 Thermidor 
An II. Paris: Libraire Clavreuil, 1958. 
72 
 
bourgeois revolution that included episodes of liberal stabilization, these processes were 
interrupted (by Napoleon‘s coup on 18 Brumaire 1799 and his establishment of a 
military dictatorship), resumed (in the revolutions of 1848), reversed (by Louis-
Napoleon‘s coup in 1851 and his self-proclamation as the emperor of France) and 
revived (in the Paris Commune of 1871). One might even suggest that contestations 
over the meaning of liberalism and its appropriate realization are ongoing to date. The 
political debates over the right balance between freedom and security are only one of its 
manifestations.
70
 Nevertheless, Foucault registers important social, historical and 
political transformations that, I contend, created the conditions of possibility for a 
particular definition of terrorism to emerge in opposition to legitimate but by no means 
less gruesome forms of violence. 
Although Foucault‘s oeuvre might as a whole be described as an attempt to 
think power beyond the juridico-institutional model of sovereignty dominant in 
conventional politico-philosophical discourse, it is not until the publication of 
―Discipline and Punish‖ in 1975 and the lecture series ―Society Must Be Defended‖ 
given at the Collège de France in the same year that an explicit concern with a 
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microphysics of power crystallizes in his work.
71
 This engagement with power and its 
manifold operations culminates in Foucault‘s reflections on the development of 
liberalism and governmentality in his lecture series ―Security, Territory, Population‖ 
(1977/78) and ―The Birth of Biopolitics‖ (1978/79) after which Foucault turns from an 
investigation of transformations in what he calls an economy of power to a 
consideration of practices of the self in ancient Greek and Roman philosophy.
72 
The general theme of Foucault‘s work in the second half of the 1970s can be 
summarized as an appraisal of the emergence of forms of power that cannot 
exhaustively be explained with the traditional theory of sovereignty. To briefly 
recapitulate Foucault‘s argument, he intimates that the philosophico-juridical theory of 
sovereignty rests on a model of power with a single center that is institutionalized in the 
state. Its main purpose is to establish an explanation that is at the same time a 
justification of a unitary sovereign power over subjects within the bounds of legitimacy. 
The problem with this account, Foucault contends, is that it assumes as preexisting all 
those elements that are in fact founded by the theory itself. In other words, Foucault 
hints that the traditional juridico-philosophical theory of sovereignty represents a self-
referential and circular justification of sovereign power that fails to explain how power 
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really works. It is for this reason that, in political theory, ―We need to cut off the king‘s 
head‖ (Foucault 1994, 122). 
As a consequence, Foucault seeks to present an alternative framework for 
analyzing power relations in his 1975 lecture series ―Society Must Be Defended.‖ In 
contrast to the duality of peace within the state and war outside its borders postulated by 
classical theories of sovereignty such as Hobbes‘ ―Leviathan‖ (1651), Foucault asks if 
war might not be a more appropriate ―grid of intelligibility‖ of politics as a field of 
essentially warlike relations (Foucault 2004a, 171). In fact, Foucault argues that the 
seventeenth century witnessed the emergence of a certain political historicism that 
regarded history as a series of battles. Against the traditional discourse of the historian 
which justified and reinforced the sovereign‘s power by demonstrating its right and 
praising its glory, this new politico-historical discourse of war sought to reveal that the 
state, its laws and its power were born out of real struggles and at the expense of the 
vanquished. Foucault charts this counter-history in attempts of the nobles to reveal the 
king‘s power as the result of abuses, violence and injustice and to denounce it as the 
illegitimate outcome of conquest and invasion. 
The aim of this historical discourse of politics as the continuation of a war 
between nations was, of course, not only the demonstration of the illegitimacy of the 
king but also an assertion of the nobility‘s legitimate rights and the restoration of a 
rightful state of affairs. Its upshot was a rift that opened up between the sovereign‘s 
claim to represent each and every one of his subjects and the nobility‘s demand for the 
recognition of particular rights that had been wrongfully confiscated by an illegitimate 
king. Because history was no longer a history of power‘s right but instead a weapon 
against the state, political historicism gave rise to a new subject of history. ―This new 
subject of history,‖ Foucault maintains, ―which is both the subject that speaks in the 
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historical narrative and what the historical narrative is talking about, this new subject 
that appears when we get away from the State‘s juridical or administrative discourse 
about the State … is what the vocabulary of the day called a ‗nation‘‖ (Ibid., 134). At 
that time, Foucault explains, nation simply meant ―a society made up of a certain 
number of individuals, and which has its own manners, customs, and even its own law‖ 
(Ibid.). 
The decisive transformation of the idea of the nation occurred in the late 
eighteenth century in France where the grounds for a politically consequential 
rearticulation of the interpretation of history as a series of battles between warring 
nations had been prepared since the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century. Things 
came to a head when in the course of the eighteenth century the discourse of politics as 
war and the strategic use of excluded histories became generalized as a tactical 
instrument that allowed various social groups to lay claim to their historically legitimate 
rights. The bourgeoisie, however, faced the greatest difficulty in constituting itself as a 
subject of history.
73
 Consequently, Foucault argues that the antihistoricism of the 
bourgeoisie that manifested itself in an endorsement of enlightened despotism in the 
first half of the eighteenth century and in a demand for a constitution founded in natural 
rights, has to be understood as a reaction to and rejection of the claims made by other 
social forces on the basis of political historicism. 
When the Estates General were summoned for the first time in 175 years in 
1789, the bourgeoisie made its decisive move. It countered the nobility‘s claims that 
were justified as historical rights of a nation by inverting this historical discourse and 
asserting that it was the Third Estate who in reality constituted the only complete nation 
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in the state. For Foucault, Sieyès‘ famous essay ―Qu‟est-ce que le tiers état?‖ (1789) 
figures as the epitome of the bourgeois reworking of the idea of the nation. According 
to this text, the Third Estate performs all the functions that are necessary to maintain a 
nation, such as agriculture, handicrafts and military duties, and yet it has not been given 
the status of a nation. Because, for Sieyès, the Third Estate is a complete nation and in 
fact the only complete nation in France, the State has to coincide with it as its juridical 
manifestation. 
For Foucault, the tactical use of history by the bourgeoisie in a continuous war 
between nations resulted in a transformation of the idea of the nation that dealt the 
death blow to an understanding of politics as the continuation of war (Ibid., 216). For if 
only the bourgeoisie represents a nation in the sense that it alone can guarantee the 
continuous existence of the State, then the bourgeoisie has to be given a juridical status 
that recognizes and corresponds to its national totality. In short, the bourgeoisie 
demanded nothing less than the translation of its national totality into the universality of 
the state (Ibid., 222-224). On this account, the French Revolution achieved, at least 
provisionally, a universalization of the bourgeoisie and its values as the basis of the 
legal edifice of the state. This new political form that reconciled state and nation 
marked the end of a war between victorious and conquered nations that had previously 
been raging beneath the state and its institutions. Or so it seemed. 
Under the pretext of terrorism, the Thermidorians excluded their political 
opponents from a supposedly universal legal order. Those who rejected the bourgeois 
idea of negative freedom and political legitimacy derived from its institutionalization in 
the form of a supposedly universal, neutral and objective form of law were prosecuted 
and proscribed as terrorists. Stripped of their legal status as political subjects, terrorists 
were exposed to the unbridled violence of the White Terror. While a truly universal 
77 
 
order would have even had to apply to those who denied its universality or legitimacy, 
the enemies of bourgeois values could not expect to be included in a system whose 
universal character they refused to acknowledge. In other words, the rhetoric of 
terrorism was a ruse that helped the Thermidorians to conceal the fact that their values 
as well as their laws fell short of being universally valid and applicable. We can see that 
terrorism fulfilled a crucial role in the reconciliation of the totalizing power of a state 
that claimed to represent universal values applicable to everyone and the 
individualizing powers that singled out groups of individuals and excluded them from 
national totality. The rhetoric of terrorism was a strategic response to the demand to 
justify the extra-legal use of force and to uphold the semblance of legitimacy of the 
state and state violence. 
Even though the Thermidorians‘ attempts to suppress political opposition might 
be understandable, one nevertheless wonders why it seemed impossible or undesirable 
to respond to terrorism by way of more moderate but therefore not necessarily less 
effective legal measures. In short, why were acts of terrorism not simply criminalized 
and punished like murder, assault or treason? Considering in particular the 
Thermidorians‘ aspirations to restrict interference with individual liberty and to limit 
violence to legal violence, i.e. to violence necessary for the execution of the law, the 
suspension of the law and the unleashing of state violence against political opponents 
seem surprising at least. To shed light on the reasons why terrorism warranted such a 
violent response, we will now examine Foucault‘s interpretation of the French 
Revolution as a historical conjuncture in which political historicism intersected with a 
different political rationality, namely raison d‟ État. We will see that the key to 
understanding terrorism in the context of the French Revolution lies in the need to 
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reconcile strategically useful elements of both political historicism and raison d‟ État, 
and to integrate them into the fabric of the nation-state. 
 
1.7.2 The right to kill in defense of the nation 
When political historicism was honed as the weapon of a dispossessed nobility 
and an ascendant bourgeoisie against the totalizing power of the state, the state was 
crafting its own reason that spoke of its strength and power and how to increase them. 
When these two discourses, the counter-history of nations at war and raison d‟État, 
clashed on the eve of the French Revolution, the bourgeois state reworked the idea of 
the nation that allowed it to retain and redeploy a crucial mechanism of raison d‟État, 
the coup d‟État.74 Before we can investigate the articulation of a concept of terrorism 
and its role in the integration of different forms of power, we have to examine the role 
of the coup d‟État and the processes by which it became adapted for the purposes of a 
bourgeois nation-state. 
For Foucault, the coup d‟État constitutes a remnant of an old form of sovereign 
power whose displacement had begun in sixteenth-century Europe. It is this 
transformation that Foucault seeks to reconstruct genealogically in his lecture series 
―Security, Territory, Population.‖ Foucault argues that until the sixteenth century, the 
position of the sovereign had been understood along a ―theological-cosmological 
continuum‖ that authorized him to govern and also provided the model according to 
which he had to govern (Foucault 2009b, 234). A king was considered a good king 
insofar as he imitated God‘s government on earth, personified the kingdom‘s vital 
force, and ensured the common good in the same way that a shepherd cared for his 
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flock, or a father for his family. In other words, traditional sovereignty was formulated 
along a ―continuum from God to men in the – in inverted commas – ‗political‘ order‖ 
(Ibid.). 
The breakup of this continuum in the late sixteenth century resulted in the loss 
of God as the paragon of sovereign authority and a sovereign who could no longer 
derive the principles of his power in analogy with divine rule.
75
 Between a transcendent 
God and immutable and universal laws of nature, between an omnipotent God-figure 
and a completely regular natural order, the sovereign had to find his own ―art of 
government‖ (Ibid., 236). It became the sovereign‘s task to determine universal laws 
that applied in general, that is to a multitude of subjects, but at the same time he had to 
arrange individuals and things in their relations so as to increase his wealth. To put this 
point slightly differently, the sovereign had to find a way of governing his subjects in a 
manner that was different from God‘s sovereign rule over nature. He had to find a new 
―ratio gubernatoria‖ (Ibid., 232). 
Without going into the intricacies of Foucault‘s analysis, the sovereign found 
this governmental reason in an essentially religious form of power, namely in the 
Christian pastorate.
76
 Its disintegration roughly around the same time made available a 
repository of techniques of governing people that the sovereign took up, integrated into 
and made to work in his new political rationality. The result of the intersection of 
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classical sovereignty and pastoral power was a first form of governmentality that 
responded to the challenges of the classical episteme with a specific art of governing 
people tied to the structures of sovereignty and facilitated by the detachment of the 
question of conduct from the Church. Government of men within the horizon of 
sovereignty; ―This,‖ Foucault declares, ―is raison d‟État‖ (Ibid., 206). In the sixteenth 
and seventeenth century, Foucault explains, raison d‟État means ―that which is 
necessary and sufficient for the republic to preserve its integrity‖ as well as the 
knowledge of the means for obtaining it (Ibid., 257). Consequently, raison d‟État is 
concerned with nothing but the state itself. It comprises ―the very essence of the state, 
and it is equally the knowledge (connaissance) that enables us to follow, as it were, the 
weave of this raison d‟État, and comply with it‖ (Ibid.). 
When the nobility began to use history and historical knowledge in an attempt to 
reveal the state as the outcome of conquest and invasion, raison d‟État was 
fundamentally and exclusively concerned with the state. For raison d‟État the state had 
―no prior, external purpose, or even a purpose subsequent to the state itself‖ (Ibid., 
258). The state was the beginning and the goal of politics. As a result, government was 
concerned with the preservation of the state. Government, Foucault claims, becomes the 
―continuous act of creation of the republic‖ (Ibid., 259). The purest expression of raison 
d‟État thus occurred in situations of political crisis when government had to come to the 
defense of a state whose very existence was threatened. In the sixteenth century, this 
was called coup d‟État. In times of emergency, raison d‟État must suspend the law and 
―must command, not by ‗sticking to the laws,‘ but, if necessary, it must command ‗the 
laws themselves, which must adapt to the present state of the republic‘‖ (Ibid., 261). 
In a time when political thought and practice had not yet achieved their full 
emancipation from the model of an omnipotent God who intervened when he 
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considered it necessary, the transition from a form of sovereignty corresponding to 
God‘s rule to a system of universal laws without divine intervention was initiated by the 
concept of coup d‟État. It allowed for the integration of an art of governing men into 
the familiar fabric of sovereignty. In a situation where the law could no longer be the 
expression of a sovereign will but could not yet be framed in terms of a universal 
principle independent of the king‘s power, raison d‟État situated the law in between 
and turned it into a strategic element. The law remained in force as a general rule for as 
long as it was useful, but it was suspended when it was deemed necessary for the 
preservation of the state. ―The usual, habitual exercise of raison d‟État is not violent,‖ 
Foucault states, ―precisely because it readily avails itself of laws as its framework and 
form. But when necessity demands it, raison d‟État becomes coup d‟État, and then it is 
violent‖ (Ibid., 263). For Foucault, ―All of this means that the coup d‟État is a particular 
way for the sovereign to demonstrate in the most striking way possible the irruption of 
raison d‟État and its prevalence over [legality]‖ (Ibid., 265).77 
For raison d‟État, legitimacy was not defined by legality but by what was 
necessary for the salvation of the state. The abandonment of legality in favor of 
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necessity allowed for the justification of an absolute power that exceeded the 
boundaries of the law. While this particular relationship between legality and legitimacy 
was explicitly endorsed by Robespierre, the end of the Jacobin reign and the bourgeois 
revolution led by the Thermidorians inverted the hierarchy of legitimacy over legality.
78
 
The bourgeois leadership immediately began to work toward the establishment of a 
liberal bourgeois government.
79
 On their view, legitimacy derived from the law which 
was conceived as the manifestation of bourgeois values. The law staked out the sphere 
of individual freedom with which no one was authorized to interfere. As a purely 
formal and therefore ostensibly non-ideological legal order, the boundaries of 
government intervention were objectively determined and universally valid. By the 
Thermidorians‘ very own legal standards, the abrogation of rights of political opponents 
thus amounted to a fundamental violation of individual freedom. Because legality and 
legitimacy were, for the Thermidorians, coterminous, the lack of legality compromised 
the violence unleashed against the Jacobins and created a deficit of legitimacy. It was in 
an attempt to restore legitimacy that the Thermidorians elaborated a conception of 
terrorism that allowed them to justify extra-legal state violence by representing political 
opposition as a threat to the state. Because the state was, however, coterminous with 
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 It might even be argued that the irreducibility of legality and legitimacy and the uncompromising 
prioritization of legitimacy culminated in Robespierre‘s Reign of Terror. It was indicated earlier that by 
justifying terror for the sake of the people‘s freedom, Robespierre gave a twist to the reasoning of raison 
d‟État that permitted him to exploit the rationality of the king against the institution of absolute monarchy 
itself. On Robespierre‘s account, the state was not a supply of wealth to be used by the king but the 
institutional manifestation of virtue and the safeguard of people‘s freedom. The ―holiest of all laws,‖ that 
is the ―salvation of the people,‖ demanded nothing less than the codification and, hence, the continuation 
of revolutionary government in the constitution of the republic (Robespierre 2007d, 99). In exemplary 
clarity, Robespierre proclaimed that real justice, the justice of the people, cannot be contained in law: 
―Peoples do not judge in the same way as courts of law; they do not hand down sentences, they throw 
thunderbolts; they do not condemn kings, they drop them back into the void; and this justice is worth just 
as much as that of the courts‖ (Robespierre 2007e, 59). 
79 
According to Soboul, the constitution of 1795 prepared the grounds for a bourgeois state. He argues 
that the constitution formalized the liberal republic by rearticulating the principles of 1789 in terms 
favorable to bourgeois interests and abandoning those articles of the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of 
Citizens that stood in the way of the bourgeoisie‘s political and economic leadership, most notably article 
1 that postulated the equality of individuals (Soboul 1989). 
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national universality, a particular concept of terrorism emerged that allowed to 
represent political opposition as a threat to the nation. 
 
1.7.3 The terrorist as political opponent and existential threat 
As we have seen, the implementation of coup d‟État as an expression of raison 
d‟État within the framework of the bourgeois state allowed the Thermidorians to 
preserve the sovereign right to kill political subjects and to exercise it in a political 
order that claimed the safeguarding of individual liberty and the protection from 
interference as its supreme task. To legitimate their actions, the Thermidorians 
reactivated a line of reasoning that had originated in raison d‟État and that had been 
preserved in Robespierre‘s political program in order to turn it back against the 
Jacobins in modified form. While raison d‟État had defined legitimacy as whatever 
means necessary for the salvation of the state and Robespierre had adjusted this 
understanding in terms of the public good and the freedom of the people, the 
Thermidorians justified state violence in the name of the universality of their values 
expressed in the law. Since for coup d‟État the use of extra-legal violence is required 
and legitimate under conditions of an imminent threat to the existence of the state, the 
appropriation and reworking of raison d‟État permitted the Thermidorians to justify the 
suspension of the law and the exercise of violence against those who rejected ostensibly 
universal bourgeois values. As Babeuf had trenchantly pointed out, the curtailing of 
rights and the implementation of repressive measures were justified for the cause of 
freedom and security. In the face of a terrorist threat, freedom could ultimately only be 
preserved by way of its limitation (Babeuf 1966c). 
Given the abrogation of any legal status for alleged terrorists, one might not 
unreasonably compare the terrorists of revolutionary France to the figure of homo 
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sacer. For Agamben, homo sacer constitutes the paradigmatic figure of an individual 
―hors la loi.‖ Similar to the terrorist in revolutionary France, the legal status of homo 
sacer is characterized by the fact that ―life is included in the juridical order 
[ordinamento] solely in the form of its exclusion (that is, of its capacity to be killed)‖ 
(Agamben 1998, 8). Since Agamben is concerned with the mechanism by which law is 
suspended and gives way to unprecedented violence exercised by the state and directed 
against people‘s very lives, the figure of homo sacer might indeed seem to prove useful 
for an investigation of the processes by which the terrorist became an outlaw in 
revolutionary France. Inasmuch as Agamben claims to have identified the peculiar legal 
standing of homo sacer as a constitutive element of Western politics, it would follow 
that the emergence of the terrorist in the late eighteenth century constitutes no more 
than another example in the long history of homines sacri. 
To be sure, this approach would certainly bring into view a specific mode of 
exercising power, namely the excess of power with regard to the law revealed in a state 
of exception or, to speak with Foucault, the resurgence of sovereignty in a coup d‟État. 
The curious legal status of the terrorists in revolutionary France might even substantiate 
Agamben‘s claim regarding the structural continuity that underpins the ways in which 
power is and has been exercised ever since the foundation of Western politics in the 
Greek polis. What this account fails to register, however, is the significance of the 
underlying reasons, the changing interests and the multiple justifications that preserve, 
reactivate, transform and redeploy seemingly identical operations of power. In short, 
Agamben fails to provide an adequate explanation of how and according to what 
criteria ostensibly identical techniques of power are colonized, repositioned and 
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exploited for different political purposes.
80
 Even though Agamben is able to show that 
the ways in which power is exercised in modern societies do not emerge in a historical 
vacuum, he cannot explain why some people become homines sacri and others do not. 
Agamben‘s analysis therefore leaves little room for the significance of historical events 
and political struggles that create the conditions of possibility for particular subjects to 
become the target of certain techniques of power. 
In particular, the emergence of terrorism in late eighteenth century France stands 
testament to the shortsightedness of reducing the structural analogy of practices of 
power to their continuity or even identity. This is to say that even though the terrorists 
in revolutionary France appear as identical to the figure of homo sacer with regard to 
the law, the processes and developments giving rise to their particular legal status are 
much more complex than their analogous legal treatment would have us believe. What 
lies behind the structural similarity of terrorists and other homines sacri is not the 
continuity of legal practices but a messy web of a multiplicity of political rationalities 
that intersect with and adapt to actual historical developments and newly emerging 
political forces and interests. Shifting the focus from the form power takes to the 
rationality through which it is deployed reveals that techniques of power that are to all 
appearances identical take on new meanings and new functions depending on the 
various contexts and purposes in and for which they become useful. 
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 Judith Butler makes a similar criticism of Agamben in her attempt to theorize power relations in post-
9/11 America that culminate in spaces such as the detention camp in Guantanamo Bay. Butler suggests 
that Agamben‘s account is too general to explain ―how this power functions differentially, to target and 
manage certain populations, to derealize the humanity of subjects who might potentially belong to a 
community bound by commonly recognized laws‖ (Butler 2004a, 68). In the same vein, Andrew 
Benjamin has repeatedly argued that Agamben‘s account fails to recognize that the bare life that is killed 
is always already determined (e.g. as the Jew, the terrorist, Islamic militants, etc.). Because bareness, for 
Benjamin, is therefore ―always a determination as an after-effect,‖ it is ―never completely bare. 
Discrimination will have always left its mark‖ (Benjamin 2010, 123-124).  
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We have seen in this chapter that the outlawing of particular individuals 
involved a political decision that was determined by a historically specific context.
81
 
Therefore, an adequate understanding of the beginning of terrorism as a historico-
political phenomenon in the French Revolution has to start from an analysis of 
terrorism as the effect of the ascendancy of the bourgeoisie as the universal subject of 
the nation state.
82
 The clash of raison d‟État and the reconciliation of bourgeois 
national totality and the universality of the state gave rise to a political rationality and 
its concomitant political form whose consolidation over the course of the following 
centuries had far-reaching and serious consequences. As Andrew Neal perspicuously 
observes, ―The question is not simply one of who is or is being constructed either as 
‗the enemy of the state‘ or ‗the enemy of the nation/society/people,‘ but a frightening 
union of the two. The challenge we face is that the potentially bellicose and oppressive 
state seeks to claim legitimacy not simply by acting according to security imperatives or 
on behalf of a people, but in the name of a national ideal‖ (Neal 2004, 394). Put 
differently, the coincidence of the bourgeois nation and the state provisionally achieved 
in the period of Thermidorian stabilization during the French Revolution involved the 
representation of political opposition as an existential threat to the nation. The absolute 
and totalizing power of the state became an instrument of defending the nation. The 
state‘s recourse to violence, which had been held out since the sixteenth century by way 
of a continuous repositioning of sovereign power in a new economy of power in the 
making, was given a new meaning, a new function and a new purpose in the modern 
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 To come back to the previous point regarding the difference between Schmitt‘s and Foucault‘s analysis 
(see supra note 40 and 78), it has now become clear that while Schmitt derides liberalism for its apolitical 
nature, Foucault shows that the ascendancy of liberalism as an institutionalized form of universal 
bourgeois values depends on and simultaneously ensures the possibility of a political decision about who 
is or is not part of this universality. In other words, the emergence of terrorism in the French Revolution 
plays a critical role in the constitution of a liberal order as the political. 
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 For a different account of terrorism in the French Revolution as a phenomenon that emerged in 1789 
and lasted continuously until 1799 see Lerat, Bernard. Le Terrorisme Révolutionnaire 1789-1799. Paris: 
Éditions France-Empire, 1989. 
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nation state. Even though the state retained the power to kill, this old sovereign ―right to 
take life or let live‖ had to find a new justification in a state that claimed to represent 
national universality (Foucault 2004a, 241). For Tallien, the ―external character of this 
exercise of the sovereignty of the people‖ was ―an act of violence and of national right 
in an open war against tyranny and its henchmen‖ (Tallien 1847, 612).83 
Following Foucault‘s analysis in ―Society Must Be Defended,‖ one might argue 
that the identification of nation and state concludes the discourse of nations at war but 
inscribes it in a different form at the limits of the state. This is to say that the new state, 
whose function is the representation and preservation of national totality, projects its 
old right to kill onto its outside and justifies it in the name of the survival of the 
nation.
84
 The enemies of the nation have to be killed not because they are ―adversaries 
in the political sense of the term; they are threats, either external or internal, to the 
population and for the population‖ (Foucault 2004a, 256). Killing, Foucault hastens to 
add, is not only and not necessarily the physical elimination of the enemy but ―also 
every form of indirect murder: the fact of exposing someone to death, increasing the 
risk of death for some people, or, quite simply, political death, expulsion, rejection, and 
so on‖ (Ibid.). 
The figure of the terrorist, the enemy par excellence, was born at the precise 
moment when the bourgeoisie assumed the state as the juridical expression of its 
totality as a nation. The terrorist appeared in the interstices of absolute state power and 
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 Quel est le caractère extérieur de cet exercice de la souveraineté du peuple? C‟est d‟être un acte de sa 
force et du droit national en guerre ouverte contre la tyrannie et ses suppôts. 
84
 It is in this sense that Foucault claims that racism – here understood in the broad sense of 
discrimination between nations as social groups with their own customs and manners – becomes the 
precondition for and the means of ―introducing a break into the domain of life that is under power‘s 
control: the break between what must live and what must die‖ (Foucault 2004a, 254). Racism thus 
rearticulates the relationship of war in a biological sense within the terms of a ―‗biopolitics‘ of the human 
race‖ (Ibid., 243). On Foucault‘s understanding of racism see the essays in Stingelin, Martin, (ed.) 
Biopolitik und Rassismus. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2003, in particular Philipp Sarasin‘s 
contribution ―Zweierlei Rassismus? Die Selektion des Fremden als Problem in Michel Foucaults 
Verbingung von Biopolitik und Rassismus,‖ 55-80. 
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universal laws, in the space that separated ostensibly universal values and the problem 
of how to respond to those who rejected them. For Tallien, the terrorist was the 
―declared enemy of the freedom of his country‖ (cet ennemi déclaré de la liberté de son 
pays) (Tallien 1847, 612). ―It is time,‖ he proclaimed on that fateful day in August of 
1794, ―that we relieve the enemies of the revolution of their last hope, that of destroying 
national representation‖ (Ibid.). 85  In the midst of political struggles for liberty and 
against the backdrop of a beginning identification of nation and state, political 
opponents became terrorists, the enemies of the nation. 
                                                 
85
 Il est temps que nous enlevions aux ennemis de la révolution leur dernier espoir, celui de détruire la 
représentation nationale. 
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The terrorist as the enemy of the state 
 
1.8 A new Reign of Terror 
1.8.1 The rhetorical conflation of terrorism and anarchism 
In the previous chapter, we have explored the emergence of terrorism as an 
important instrument for liberal stabilization in the course of the French Revolution. We 
have found that the Thermidorian Reaction against the Jacobins constituted a return to 
the rights and liberties established by the constitution of 1791. While the Thermidorian 
rhetoric of terrorism was at first used to denounce the Jacobin Reign of Terror, it soon 
became a useful weapon against political opponents of all stripes who objected to the 
new liberal bourgeois state. This chapter investigates the rearticulation of terrorism as a 
political concept in late imperial Russia. We will see that in contrast to revolutionary 
France, Russia witnessed the mobilization of a rhetoric of terrorism by an autocratic 
regime that sought to prevent the development of a liberal political system. Before 
turning to the developments in Russia, however, we first have to chart the 
transformations in terrorism discourse after the French Revolution. This will allow us to 
understand better how a particular conception of terrorism could develop in late 
nineteenth century Russia that identified terrorism with anarchism and nihilism. 
We saw in the previous chapter that in the midst of the White Terror, the 
Thermidorians faced increasing opposition from the remaining Jacobins and from the 
royalists who wanted a return to the Ancien Régime. In response to the radical ideas of 
the political left, exemplified by Babeuf, Fourier or Saint-Simon, conservative political 
forces, above all the royalists, began to revitalize anarchism as a political term that had 
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already been used in the past to denounce advocates of chaos and disorder.
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Anarchism, Babeuf observed, had been ―used under Lafayette, used under Louis XVI, 
used under the Gironde‖ and it was ―propagated now with disgraceful appeal‖ (Babeuf 
1966g, 115).
87
 In the same vein, a report of the Central Bureau of Paris issued on April 
29, 1799, cautioned that under the given circumstances, the real danger posed by 
anarchy could not be appreciated because of the inflation of the term caused by the 
royalists.
88
 ―The parties which the force and above all the agreement of the 
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 For a detailed analysis of anarchism in the French Revolution see Guérin, Daniel. Class Struggle in the 
First French Republic: bourgeois and bras nus, 1793-1795. Translated by Ian Patterson. London: Pluto 
Press, 1977. A perhaps surprising account of anarchism influenced by the ideas of Saint-Simon and 
Fourier can be found in the work of Proudhon. Proudhon‘s reflections are interesting because they 
explicitly relate anarchism to liberalism. He developed an account of anarchism which, Franz Neumann 
explains, posited ―Solidarity instead of state authority, this means further: solidarity on the basis of free 
contracts and not state authority on the basis of laws‖ (Neumann 1996, 177). Retaining Robespierre‘s 
distinction between legality and legitimacy as well as the liberal concept of individual freedom, 
Proudhon‘s influential text ―What Is Property?‖ (1840) represents an attempt to outline an alternative 
position in response to the question ―What is to be the form of government in the future?‖ (Proudhon 
2002, 204). ―I have just given you my serious and well considered profession of faith,‖ Proudhon 
answered. ―Although a firm friend of order, I am, in every sense of the term, an anarchist‖ (Ibid., 205). 
For Proudhon, mutuality, reciprocity and solidarity rather than the political authority of the state were the 
appropriate mechanisms to create social order. State authority, he maintained, did nothing but stifle 
freedom. ―To be GOVERNED,‖ Proudhon objected, ―is to be kept under surveillance, inspected, spied 
upon, bossed, law-ridden, regulated, penned in, indoctrinated, spied upon, registered, evaluated, 
appraised, censured, ordered about, by creatures who have neither the right, nor the knowledge, nor the 
virtue to do so. To be GOVERNED is to be at each operation, at each transaction, at each movement, 
marked down, recorded, inventoried, priced, stamped, measured, numbered, assessed, licensed, 
authorized, sanctioned, endorsed, reprimanded, obstructed, reformed, rebuked, chastised. It is, under the 
pretense of public benefit and in the name of the general interest, to be requisitioned, drilled, fleeced, 
exploited, monopolized, extorted, squeezed, hoaxed, robbed; then, at the slightest resistance, the first 
word of complaint, to be squelched, corrected, vilified, bullied, hounded, tormented, bludgeoned, 
disarmed, strangled, imprisoned, shot down, judged, condemned, deported, sacrificed, sold, betrayed, and 
to top it off, ridiculed, made a fool of, outraged, dishonored. That‘s government, that‘s its justice, that‘s 
its morality!‖ (Proudhon 2010, 15-16). Proudhon‘s emphasis on individual freedom brought him in close 
proximity to classical liberal ideas. Indeed, Proudhon himself saw anarchism as ―a variety of the liberal 
regime … the government of each by himself, self-government. Since the phrase anarchic government 
involves a kind of contradiction, the thing seems impossible and the idea absurd. However, there is 
nothing to find fault with here but language; politically, the idea of anarchy is quite as rational and 
concrete as any other. What it means is that political functions have been reduced to industrial functions, 
and that social order arises from nothing but transactions and exchanges. Each may then say that he is the 
absolute ruler of himself, the polar opposite of monarchical absolutism‖ (Proudhon 1979, 11). In a similar 
vein, George Crowder argues that anarchism was couched between liberalism with its belief in property 
as the guarantor of personal freedom but the serious disadvantage of lacking moral content, and 
communism which retained morality but was irreconcilable with the anarchist conception of freedom as 
self-direction (Crowder 1991). 
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 Ce mot d‟anarchistes, usé sous Lafayette, usé sous Louis XVI, usé sous la Gironde, se reproduit 
maintenant avec une scandaleuse allectation. 
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 The Buraeu Central was an unelected municipal institution established in the big cities Paris, 
Bordeaux, Lyon and Marseille and entrusted with the coordination of the municipalities. The reason for 
this reorganization under the constitution of 1795 was that the ―bourgeois republicans of the year III 
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constitutional powers have been depriving of all means of open revolt,‖ the report 
stated, ―seem today to wake up, gain hope and prepare new troubles.‖ 
The impotence to act, the profound memory that the disastrous epochs had left in the mind, the 
only idea of disorganization, of troubles and of murders that presents the horrifying word anarchy, 
reduce for the moment to silence and to inactivity the followers of this horrible party. It is certain 
that, if there was only the hatred of the true friends of the Constitution of the Year III [the 
Thermidorians and liberal bourgeoisie], it [anarchy] would be better appreciated and consequently 
more fearsome; but unfortunately, the horror that it instills in the sincere republicans is 
accompanied by that which it causes in the crowd of royalists; in the eyes of these latter, all those 
who cling to republican institutions, all those who embrace with interest the principles of 
maintaining the existing order of things, or who ardently intercede for the defense and prosperity 
of the Republic are anarchists. For a partisan of the old regime, patriot is equally synonymous 
with anarchist and terrorist and, by dint of reverberations, a certain class of incorrigible 
reactionaries grows and extends this illustrious and often misunderstood word anarchy (Aulard 
1902, 490).
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In other words, the royalists‘ synonymous use of the terms anarchism and 
terrorism resulted in a reductive and undifferentiated understanding that allowed them 
to extend the concepts to anyone who did not share their reactionary politics. As a 
consequence, anyone who supported the Thermidorian Republic was lumped in with the 
                                                                                                                                               
regarded these cities as breeding-places of the democratic spirit, nests of ‗anarchy‘ and ‗Terrorism‘‖ 
(Aulard 1910, 306). 
89
 Les partis auxquels la force et surtout l‟accord des pouvoirs constitutionnels ôtent depuis longtemps 
tout moyen de révolte ouverte paraissent aujourd‟hui se réveiller, concevoir de l‟espérance de preparer 
de nouveaux troubles; mais les observations les plus suivies et les plus exactes autorisent à dire que celui 
qui, en ce moment, fait prevue d‟une étonnante activité est le royalisme. Avant de démontrer la hardiesse 
de ce monstre, il convient de donner une idée de la veritable situation de l‟anarchie. L‟impuissance 
d‟agir, le souvenir profond que laissèrent dans les esprits des époques très désastreuses, la seule idée de 
désorganisation, de troubles et de meurtres que présente le mot épouvantable d‟anarchie, réduisent pour 
l‟instant au silence et à l‟inactivité les suppôts de cet affreux parti. Il est certain que, s‟il n‟avait que la 
haine des vrais amis de la Constitution de l‟an III, il serait mieux apprécié et conséquemment moins 
redoutable; mais malheureusement, à l‟horreur qu‟il inspire aux républicains sincères se joint celle 
qu‟affecte envers lui la foule des royalistes; aux yeux de ces derniers, tous ceux qui tiennent aux 
institutions républicaines, tous ceux qui embrassent avec intérêt les principes conservateurs de l‟ordre 
actuel des choses, ou qui plaident avec chaleur pour la défense et la prospérité de la République sont des 
anarchistes. Pour un partisan du vieux régime, patriote est également synonyme ou d‟anarchist ou de 
terroriste, et, à force d‟échos, une certaine classe d‟incorrigibles réactionnaires grossit et prolonge ce 
mot sonore et souvent mal entendu d‟anarchie. 
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partisans of Jacobin republicanism who, for the Thermidorians, were the real adherents 
of disorder and terror. This inflationary discourse propagated by the royalists used the 
concepts of terrorism and anarchy in ways that leveled important differences between 
liberals and Jacobins, thereby actually obscuring the real threat of anarchy. 
Even though both anarchism and terrorism gained their effectiveness as 
denunciations from their strong association with the terreur of the Jacobin regime, the 
conflation as well as the increasing circulation of the terms in situations of political 
strife was not limited to France. In Germany, Christoph Martin Wieland, poet and 
pioneer of the literary genre of the Bildungsroman, was convinced that without 
Napoleon‘s coup in September 1797, France would have been ―thrown back into all the 
horrors of anarchy, terrorism and the most ferocious civil war‖ (cited in Walther 1990, 
359; my translation).
90
 A leading German Jacobin, Matthias Metternich, on the other 
hand, objected to the abuse of the words anarchism and terrorism to vilify and denounce 
political opponents. Metternich lamented that ―whenever a republican plucked up the 
courage to show the abyss toward which this anarchic system would lead, he was 
branded a Jacobin, a terrorist, an anarchist – and proscribed‖ (Metternich 1975, 575-
576; my translation).
91
 In other words, in France as well as in Germany, the terms 
terrorism and anarchism had retained a significant part of their initial use for what was 
regarded as a dangerous republican ideology that rejected the legitimate political rule 
established by the bourgeoisie. At the same time, however, the meaning of the concepts 
had become displaced just enough to extend them to other political contexts. 
In the social and political conflicts leading up to the revolutions of 1848, a 
certain generalization of terrorism discourse took place that eventually wrested it from 
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 … ohne ihn würde Frankreich in alle Greuel der Anarchie, des Terrorism und des wütendsten 
Bürgerkriegs zurückgeworfen worden sein. 
91
 Wenn irgendein Republikaner den Mut faßte, den Abgrund zu zeigen, wo dies anarchische System 
hinführe, so ward er als Jakobiner, als Terrorist, als Anarchist gebrandmarkt – und geächtet. 
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its association with Jacobinism. According to Walther, until the mid-eighteenth century 
―Only here and there had the term ‗terror‘ been detached from the French Revolution 
and applied to other events and constellations.‖ 
This was to change in situations of political and social crisis when the political enemy and his 
praxis could be described with the term. … ‗Terrorism‘ now served to qualify every political 
opponent who advocated radical claims – independent of his history, his praxis and his other 
aims. … Whenever the term appears in the political sphere, it carries negative connotations 
(Walther 1990, 379-380; my translation).
92 
For Walther, 1848 constituted the end of ―the epoch in which terror occurred 
blatantly and practically exclusively in the cloak of statehood, or openly as an 
instrument of state power‖ (Ibid., 385).93 Undergoing a ―process of irrationalization‖ 
(Prozeß der Irrationalisierung), the motives of the terrorist became increasingly 
obscure and it became ever more difficult to comprehend violence in a framework of 
means and ends (Ibid.).
94
 Because the force used by oppositional political movements 
could not be explained in terms of means and ends, terrorists and anarchists appeared to 
appreciate violence as valuable in itself. In the absence of realistically attainable 
objectives, the violence exercised by non-state social and political groups took on the 
quality of a pure manifestation of political opposition. The exercise of violence seemed 
to be uncoupled from any real prospect of overthrowing political authority and tied to a 
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 Nur punktuell wurde der Begriff „Terror‟ von der Französischen Revolution abgelöst und auf andere 
Ereignisse und Konstellationen übertragen. Das änderte sich in politischen und gesellschaftlichen 
Krisenlagen. In solchen konnte der politische Gegner und seine Praxis mit dem Begriff bezeichnet 
werden. … „Terrorismus‟ diente von nun an regelmäßig dazu, jeden politischen Gegner mit radikalen 
Ansprüchen – unabhängig von seiner Geschichte, seiner Praxis und seinen sonstigen Zielen – zu 
qualifizieren. 
93
 1848/49 endet die Epoche, in der Terror unverhohlen und prakisch ausschließlich im Habit von 
Staatlichkeit oder offen als Instrument staatlicher Gewalt auftrat. 
94
 On this view, violence is irrational when it jettisons its mediate and instrumental function. Walther‘s 
narrative thus seems to register the growing political influence of instrumental reason. According to 
Walter Benjamin, instrumentally rational thinking manifests itself in an evaluation of violence in terms of 
means and ends. In this view, violence is legitimate if it is the necessary means to a just end (codified in 
natural law) or if it was the outcome of rational legal procedures (described by positive law). See 
Benjamin, Critique of Violence. 
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striving for maximal public impact. Individual assassinations and attacks on high-
ranking state officials and political representatives became more and more common. As 
a consequence, diverse movements such as nihilism, anarchism, socialism and 
Blanquism were suspected of seeking to establish a new Reign of Terror regardless of 
their divergent political aims. The association of terrorism with general irrationality and 
supposedly random violence allowed for the denunciation of all sorts of oppositional 
political and social movements. At the same time, it leveled and concealed the different 
political objectives among those who were condemned as terrorists (Ibid.). 
 
1.8.2 The Russian revolutionary movement 
The rhetorical association of terrorism and anarchism that had developed since 
the French Revolution produced particularly problematic results in late imperial Russia. 
The derogatory use of anarchism and its identification with terrorism clashed with a 
philosophical understanding of anarchism that bore little to no relation to the violent 
actions of radical revolutionaries. The result was a conflation of anarchism and 
terrorism and a belief in an international anarchist conspiracy that threatened political 
regimes throughout Europe. 
Philosophical anarchism held out the possibility of ensuring order without state 
authority. As a politico-philosophical approach to the nature and form of appropriate 
and legitimate government, anarchism became increasingly influential under conditions 
of struggles over the legitimacy of established political rule.
95
 For Peter Kropotkin, a 
leading Russian anarchist, anarchism meant ―a principle or theory of life and conduct 
under which society is conceived without government … – harmony in such a society 
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being obtained, not by submission to law, or by obedience to any authority, but by free 
agreements concluded between the various groups, territorial and professional, freely 
constituted for the sake of production and consumption, as also for the satisfaction of 
the infinite variety of needs and aspirations of a civilized being‖ (cited in Jensen 2004, 
118). 
Given Russia‘s long history of autocratic rulers, a strictly hierarchical social 
order and a backward economic system, this emphasis on freedom and the conviction 
that order was possible without authority made anarchism especially popular among 
Russian intellectual circles. Their demands for social and political change were echoed 
by a growing revolutionary movement who appropriated anarchist ideas to instigate a 
mass rebellion. For anarchists like Kropotkin it was clear, however, that ―a structure 
built on centuries of history‖ could not be taken down ―with a few kilos of explosives‖ 
(cited in Ibid., 126). The Italian anarchist Errico Malatesta even criticized the 
revolutionaries because, he contended, true anarchists would ―rather kill chickens than 
kill kings‖ (cited in Ibid.). Malatesta claimed that ―It‘s no longer love for the human 
race that guides them, but the feeling of vendetta joined to the cult of an abstract idea, 
of a theoretical phantasm‖ (cited in Ibid.). 
In the eyes of the revolutionaries, however, things looked rather different. The 
Narodnaya Volya (People‘s Will), Russia‘s leading revolutionary organization, claimed 
to be driven by a concern for the common good and criticized that Russia lacked ―a real 
Government in the true sense of that word. A Government, in the very nature of things, 
should only give outward form to the aspirations of the people and effect to the people‘s 
will‖ (The Executive Committee 2006, 85). 
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When a number of reforms were implemented in the 1860 under Tsar Alexander 
II, it seemed as if the regime had finally responded to the demands of its people.
96
 The 
so-called Great Reforms comprised the emancipation of the serfs, reforms of local 
governments, more leniency in practices of punishment, a reform of the military and of 
public education, as well as major juridical reform (Venturi 1964, Zakharova 2006). 
However, the protracted and ultimately unsuccessful execution of these reforms and 
slow social progress led to disappointment among the peasants and the more radical 
parts of the intelligentsia. At first, the revolutionaries were hopeful that propaganda 
would suffice to realize their aims of mobilizing political opposition and promoting 
social reform. The radicals of the 1860s were not yet ready to turn to violence. For 
Sergei Kravchinski, known in revolutionary circles by his pseudonym Stepniak and 
exiled in London for the assassination of the head of the Tsarist police in 1878, the 
propagandists of the 1860s lived for the people and ―wished nothing for themselves. 
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They were the purest personification of self-denial‖ (Stepniak 1883, 30). Their protest 
against the political order did not translate into a violent revolution. Instead, the 
propagandist was ―religious rather than revolutionary.‖ 
His faith was Socialism. His god the people. Notwithstanding all the evidence to the contrary, he 
firmly believed that, from one day to the other, the revolution was about to break out; as in the 
Middle Ages people believed at certain periods in the approach of the day of judgment. … He was 
as ready for sacrifice as ever. But he had neither the impetuosity nor the ardour of the struggle. … 
He was full of love, and had no hatred for anyone, not even his executioners. Such was the 
propagandist of 1872-75 (Ibid., 30-32). 
When the regime did not respond to the demands of the propagandists, 
opposition became more radical and led to peasant riots and student tumults. An 
assassination attempt on Alexander II in 1866 was met with increased police force and 
the abandonment of plans for further reform. Moreover, the regime began to rescind 
some of the rights won for the people. Most importantly, ―in its struggle against 
radicalism and revolution it began to withdraw whole categories of legal cases from the 
normal procedure of 1864 and to subject them to various forms of the court-martial‖ 
(Riasanovsky 2000, 377). By 1868, a full-fledged system of surveillance had been 
established and the era of the White Terror began (Venturi 1964). 
As a consequence, the revolutionary movement responded with increased 
violence to heightened repression. Elements of utilitarianism, individualism, 
materialism and realism formed the basis of nihilism, the new ideology of the 
revolutionaries (Riasanovsky 2000, Venturi 1964). With its contempt for tradition and 
conventional morality, nihilism represented the ―absolute negation of authority of all 
kinds, and … the most exaggerated tendency towards liberty‖ (Tikhomirov 2006, 118). 
Its supreme value was individualism. For Stepniak, nihilism was ―the negation, in the 
name of individual liberty, of all the obligations imposed upon the individual by 
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society, by family life, and by religion‖ (Stepniak 1883, 4). In the hands of Sergei 
Nechaev, nihilism became the leading principle of the revolutionary movement. His 
―Catechism of the Revolutionist‖ (1869) constituted the guideline for revolutionaries. 
For the success of the revolution, Nechaev contended, the revolutionary ―knows of only 
one science, the science of destruction.‖ 
The revolutionary passion, which in him becomes a habitual state of mind, must at every moment 
be combined with cold calculation. … The extent of his friendship, devotion, and other 
obligations towards his comrade is determined only by their degree of usefulness in the practical 
work of total revolutionary destruction. … Aiming at merciless destruction the revolutionary can 
and sometimes even must live within society while pretending to be quite other than what he is 
(Nechaev 2004, 71-73).
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By balancing Nechaev‘s nihilistic program with populist ideas derived from 
philosophical anarchism, radical intellectuals like Bakunin and Herzen hoped to finally 
incite a peasant uprising. In the summer of 1874, the radicals moved to the countryside 
and went among the people to live with the peasants and to educate them in order to 
initiate mass opposition against the regime. ―We will go further not only than the poor 
revolutionaries of 1848,― Herzen therefore declared, ―but also than the great terrorists of 
the 1790s‖ (cited in Venturi 1964, 293). However, the peasants did not revolt. The 
government feared a conspiracy and reacted with more repression. A law passed in June 
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1874 allowed for the indefinite detention of persons who were investigated for 
membership in secret societies (Daly 1995, 606). Hundreds of peasant sympathizers 
were arrested and tried. Faced with increased suppression, all populist ideals were 
abandoned and those committed to political opposition went underground (Daly 2006). 
In short, ―If the peasants would not act, it remained up to the revolutionaries themselves 
to fight and defeat the government‖ (Riasanovsky 2000, 383). 
For this purpose, a new force was necessary because the propagandists were 
―too ideal for the terrible struggle which was about to commence‖ (Stepniak 1883, 30). 
―The awful repressive measures of the Government,‖ the Executive Committee of 
Narodnaya Volya therefore claimed, ―called upon the stage the terrorists of 1878 and 
1879‖ (The Executive Committee 2006, 64).98 When the propagandist disappeared in 
the summer of 1874, ―Already another was arising.‖ 
Upon the horizon there appeared a gloomy form, illuminated by a light as of hell, who, with lofty 
bearing, and a look breathing forth hatred and defiance, made his way through the terrified crowd 
to enter with a firm step upon the scene of history. It was the Terrorist (Stepniak 1883, 31). 
Out of Russian populism a new kind of terrorism was born, a ―Russian 
Jacobinism‖ that Herzen saw in the ideological tradition of the ―great terrorists‖ of the 
French Revolution (Venturi 1964, 293-296). 
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1.8.3 Russian terrorism 
The invocation of the Jacobins framed the self-understanding of the Russian 
revolutionary movement‘s radical section. What had become a label for enemies across 
the political spectrum and a derogatory and denunciative name for political adversaries 
under the Thermidorian government and over the course of the eighteenth century, now 
became the name for the heroic protagonists of a dissident and subversive discourse.
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From Morozov to Stepniak, from Tarnovski to Narodnaya Volya, Russian 
revolutionaries reactivated an understanding of terrorism that had been circulating 
beneath official state discourse. A tradition of a positive valuation of terrorism as the 
name for patriots and champions of true freedom stretched from Babeuf and Saint-
Simon to Blanqui and was taken up, reformulated and reapplied in late nineteenth-
century Russia. 
The terrorists understood themselves in a tradition with Blanqui, whom Heine 
had described as ―incarnate terrorism, and the honestest [sic!] (bravste) fellow under the 
sun,‖ and with the idolized revolutionary of Nechaev‘s Catechism (Heine 1893, 394). 
Among the boldest descriptions of terrorism was Stepniak‘s, for whom the terrorist of 
the late 1870s was ―noble, terrible, irresistibly fascinating, for he combines in himself 
the two sublimities of human grandeur: the martyr and the hero.‖ 
He is a martyr. From the day when he swears in the depths of his heart to free the people and the 
country, he knows he is consecrated to Death. ... He is a wrestler, all bone and muscle, and has 
nothing in common with the dreamy idealist of the previous lustre. He is a mature man, and the 
unreal dreams of his youth have disappeared with years. He is a Socialist fatally convinced, but he 
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understands that a Social Revolution requires long preparatory labour, which cannot be given 
until political liberty is acquired. ... He has no other object than to overthrow this abhorred 
despotism, and to give to his country, what all civilised nations possess, political liberty, to enable 
it to advance with a firm step towards its own redemption. … He fights not only for the people, to 
render them the arbiters of their own destinies, not only for the whole nation stifling in this 
pestiferous atmosphere, but also for himself; for the dear ones whom he loves, whom he adores 
with all the enthusiasm which animates his soul; for his friends, who languish in the horrid cells 
of the central prisons, and who stretch forth to him their skinny hands imploring aid. He fights for 
himself. He has sworn to be free and he will be free, in defiance of everything. He bends his 
haughty head before no idol. He has devoted his sturdy arms to the cause of the people. But he no 
longer deifies them. And if the people, ill-counselled, say to him ‗Be a slave,‘ he will exclaim 
‗No;‘ and he will march onward, defying their imprecations and their fury, certain that justice will 
be rendered to him in his tomb. Such is the terrorist (Stepniak 1883, 42-45). 
While Stepniak glorified the terrorist as a selfless hero and martyr for the 
people, there was another, more strategic way of thinking about terrorism. On this 
account, terrorism appeared as an advantageous tactic of revolutionary struggle. Given 
the highly bureaucratic and centralized institutional structure of the Russian state, 
systematic terrorism in the form of individual assassinations of political representatives 
appeared as an effective strategy of combat (Riasanovsky 2000). The rationality 
underlying this approach was fleshed out by Nicholas Morozov, Stepniak‘s friend and 
co-editor of the propaganda pamphlets of the Russian revolutionary organization 
Zemlya i volya (Land and Liberty). The ―anti-government terrorists‖ of the Russian 
revolutionary movement, Morozov explained, attacked ―the all-powerful government 
with its spies, prisons and guns, with its millions of soldiers and voluntary government 
servants who either knew or were ignorant of what they represented‖ (Morozov 1972, 
104-105). And while the internal causes of revolutions are always the same, that is 
―freedom of thought and press and real safety from oppression‖ as well as ―change not 
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only of the political, but also of the economic system, without which complete political 
freedom for the working people is inconceivable,‖ revolutionary terrorism nevertheless 
had a crucial advantage compared to peasant uprisings and proletarian rebellions in 
taking on the massive state apparatus of the tsarist regime (Ibid., 108). ―Terroristic 
struggle,‖ Morozov contended, ―has exactly this advantage that it can act unexpectedly 
and find means and ways which no one anticipated.‖ 
All that the terroristic struggle really needs is a small number of people and large material means. 
This presents really a new form of struggle. It replaces by a series of individual political 
assassination, which always hit their target, the massive revolutionary movements, where people 
often rise against each other because of misunderstanding and where a nation kills off its own 
children, while the enemy of the people watches from a secure shelter and sees to it that the 
people of the organization are destroyed. The movement punishes only those who are really 
responsible for the evil deed. Because of this the terroristic revolution is the only just form of a 
revolution (Ibid., 106). 
For Morozov, terrorism was an instrument of the revolution and the decisive 
instrument for the ―final disorganization, demoralization and weakening of government 
for its actions of violence against freedom‖ (Ibid., 112). For this purpose, Morozov 
demanded nothing less that the institutionalization of terror so that it would become 
―universally accepted in life‖ (Ibid., 111).100 
Yet even though a positive understanding of terrorism had been established and 
widely accepted by the revolutionaries themselves, it was not long before the 
government appropriated the term and rearticulated it for its own purposes. To this end, 
the government made use of the similar political demands of terrorists and anarchists in 
order to create a public discourse that encompassed different ideological movements 
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and leveled the differences between them. In this manner, the tsarist regime succeeded 
in devising a powerful rhetorical weapon against all kinds of political opposition. 
Despite the fact that anarchists had little to do with revolutionary terrorism and even 
objected to the use of violence, their philosophical position against authority as such 
and the appropriation of their ideas by the revolutionaries made the anarchists easy prey 
for the government‘s counter-terrorist actions. 
In a detailed survey of anarchist terrorism in nineteenth-century Europe, Richard 
Jensen suggests that ―The wave of anarchist terror that swept through Europe during the 
eighties and nineties drew its growing strength from a curious combination of the acts 
of ideologically committed anarchists and of the violent deeds of a miscellany of 
perpetrators who shared dubious or no connections with anarchism‖ (Jensen 2004, 128). 
As a result, an understanding of terrorism had gained hold by the second half of the 
1880s that identified anarchism, revolutionary socialism and terrorism and portrayed 
them as virtually identical. In Russia in particular, the term terrorism had effectively 
become part of the regime‘s political vocabulary to denounce its opponents. 
The consequences of such an inflationary use of terms were noticed and even 
ridiculed by those deemed terrorists. In 1892, Lev Tikhomirov, member of the 
Executive Committee of Narodnaya Volya, reported that ―The militant section of the 
intelliguentia, that which I call the revolutionary has in Europe received the strange 
name of Nihilist‖ (Tikhomirov 2006, 116). Because of its widespread use in Russia, 
Tikhomirov claims, ―the word Nihilism, which in earlier times had some meaning, at 
least as caricature, a few years later lost all definitive significance. In Russia no serious 
writer, even though he were reactionary, would use it to designate the revolutionists. 
The word has passed for ever into the domain of pamphlets and insults‖ (Ibid., 119). In 
Europe, however, ―the word Nihilism has the greatest vogue.‖ 
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The strangest thing is, this caricature is believed in as something real. Assuredly the intellectual 
movement in Russia, as elsewhere, may in certain individual cases give rise to some ridiculous 
results, silly, lending themselves to caricature, sometimes perhaps even criminal. It is precisely 
from these special facts that the notion of nihilism has been built up, uniting them without any 
reason into one single idea, although they had no connection in reality. Thus in nature there are 
creatures who have tails, others that have the scales of lizards, others again with paws and claws 
like tigers, some finally with wings. When you combine all these attributes in a dragon, you have 
before you a creature of your imagination, and not a real being. But although the dragon plays a 
very useful part in stories with which to frighten children, it has no place in natural history. In a 
serious study of Russia, neither can nihilism as a doctrine or a special tendency have a place 
(Ibid., 119-121). 
What Tikhomirov seems to find bewildering is not that disparate ideological 
movements were presented as a coherent and unified terrorist campaign. After all, the 
idea of terrorism provided a useful tool to create a climate of fear in which an expansion 
of government power was required for the safeguarding of security. What is surprising 
for Tikhomirov is that a credulous public, like children scared of magic dragons, 
believe terrorism to be something real. While Tikhomirov might be right about the lack 
of meaning of the term nihilism in Russia, the regime‘s rhetoric of terrorism did not 
result in the insignificance or disappearance of the concept. On the contrary, we will see 
in the following section that a distorted image of the diverse revolutionary movement 
played a crucial role in the regime‘s efforts to implement exceptional measures. The 
government claimed that ―Those who carry out the ‗propaganda of action,‘ as it is 
called, have not adopted the profession of bomb-throwing from the abstract love of a 
cause, but because they are, almost without exception, criminals in esse or in posse, and 
often of the lowest and most determined type‖ (Z. 2006, 242). This, together with the 
difficulty to monitor terrorists because of their lack of organization, allowed the regime 
to portray the revolutionary movement as a danger for the state. The conflation of 
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anarchism, terrorism and a range of other ideological positions allowed the Russian 
government to create a belief in an international anarchist conspiracy which produced 
very real effects. Perhaps the most harmful, at least for anyone unlucky enough to be 
identified as a terrorist, were a plethora of serious and far-reaching anti-terrorist 
measures. Over and against the diverse and fragmented ideological alliances of the 
revolutionary movement of nineteenth-century Russia, which ranged from nihilism to 
populism and socialism, the government managed to prosecute a variety of oppositional 
groups by subsuming them under a single concept that bore little to no relation to actual 
political circumstances. 
 
1.8.4 Counter-terrorism, permanent emergency and the expansion of 
administrative power 
At first, the tsarist regime‘s response to terrorism was twofold. On the one hand, 
the government sought to eliminate what it saw as the cause of terrorism by continuing 
reforms to alleviate social discontent. The regime even replaced a number of 
reactionary ministers with more moderate and even liberal ministers (Riasanovsky 
2000). On the other hand, however, the surprising and undesired acquittal of Vera 
Zasulich after her attempted assassination of the governor of St. Petersburg, General 
Trepov, in 1878 led the regime to exempt certain cases from normal juridical procedure 
granted by the Great Reforms. This response set off cycles of more and ever increasing 
violence which in turn resulted in more emergency measures including the bypassing of 
courts and the trial of terrorists in courts-martial in the late 1870s (Daly 1995, 2006). 
After a number of failed attempts to kill Alexander II, a supreme executive commission 
for the preservation of the state was created and authorized to take any measures 
necessary for maintaining order (Daly 1995, 608). 
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The final straw came with the assassination of Alexander II on March 13, 1881, 
which galvanized an immense expansion of government power.
101
 Under Alexander‘s 
successor Alexander III, the ―Statute on measures to safeguard state security and public 
order,‖ or Security Law, was issued on August 14, 1881. Enacted as a temporary 
regulation limited to three years, this statute gave broad discretionary powers such as 
summary search, arrest, imprisonment, exile, and trial by courts-martial to government 
officials (Daly 1995, Riasanovsky 2000, Waldron 1995). 
The consequences were disastrous. The government, the executive committee of 
Narodnaya Volya claimed, ―hanged the innocent and guilty and filled prisons and 
remote provinces with exiles. Tens of so-called ‗leaders‘ were captured and hanged, and 
died with the courage and tranquility of martyrs‖ (The Executive Committee 2006, 82-
83). In the same vein, Stepniak registered the precarious legal status of the 
revolutionary terrorists and described the exceptional tribunals and secret orders of a 
judicial system that, instead of offering fair trial and investigation as well as protection 
from illegitimate state violence, was turned into an instrument for the assertion and 
expansion of state power. ―The merest suspicion led to arrest,‖ he maintained. 
An address; a letter from a friend who had gone ‗among the people‘; a word let fall by a lad of 
twelve who, from excess of fear, knew not what to reply, were sufficient to cast the suspected 
person into prison, where he languished for years and years, subjected to all the rigour of the 
Russian cellular system. … The sentences of the exceptional tribunal, which was simply a docile 
instrument in the hands of the Government, were of an incredible cruelty. Ten, twelve, fifteen 
years of hard labour were inflicted, for two or three speeches, made in private to a handful of 
working men, or for a single book read or lent. Thus what is freely done in every country in 
Europe was punished among us like murder. But not satisfied with these judicial atrocities, the 
Government, by infamous secret orders, augmented still more the sufferings of the political 
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prisoners, so that in the House of Horrors – the central prison of Karkoff – several ‗revolts‘ took 
place among them in order to obtain equality of treatment with those condemned for common 
crimes (Stepniak 1883, 35-37). 
Those who were arrested on suspicion of being involved with terrorism, 
anarchism or revolutionary action were not treated as common criminals. In the absence 
of a formal legal procedure, the regime introduced exceptional tribunals and secret 
orders which in turn produced a climate of suspicion and uncertainty among the 
people.
102
 Nobody could be certain that a careless remark or a suspicious acquaintance 
would not lead to arrest and detention. Rather than keeping the government in check, 
the legal order had been turned into an instrument to reassert the regime‘s power. 
Moreover, after the initial three years of its application, the Security Laws were 
renewed every three years and applied ―to virtually anyone whom officials suspected or 
simply disliked‖ (Riasanovsky 2000, 392). 103  As Riasanovsky argues, ―the tsarist 
government relied on them during the rest of its existence, with the result that Russians 
lived under something like a partial state of martial law‖ (Ibid.). The state of exception 
seemed to have become the rule. 
The implementation of emergency legislation was justified with reference to the 
necessity to maintain public order and security. According to Peter Waldron‘s in-depth 
analysis of the significance of emergency legislation in late imperial Russia, the 1881 
statute provided two forms of exceptional measures. The first, reinforced protection, 
applied when ―public order in an area is disturbed by criminal infractions against the 
existing state structure or against the security of individuals and their property or by the 
preparation of such acts‖ (Waldron 1995, 2). The second form, extraordinary 
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protection, was reserved for situations in which ―these infractions have put the local 
population into a disturbed state, making it necessary to take exceptional measures to 
urgently restore order‖ (Ibid.). 
The standards by which the imposition of exceptional measures was allowed, 
Waldron further argues, were so loosely defined that a virtually universal application 
became possible. The concomitant increase of police arbitrariness was justified – and at 
the same time exacerbated – by the regime‘s reactivation of a condemnatory discourse 
of terrorism. To stop the excessive violence exerted by the terrorists, the police was 
authorized ―to beat up their quarters, know all their comings in and goings out, follow 
their movements, check, control, and, in all probability, forestall all their truculent 
intentions‖ (Z. 2006, 247). 
Whereas the final responsibility to declare a state of emergency lay with the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and depended on the approval of the Council of Ministers 
and the tsar, the driving forces were usually local governors. Once reinforced protection 
was authorized, provincial governors as well as police officers were granted additional 
powers with regard to the maintenance of public order and security.104 Extraordinary 
protection gave additional power to local authorities, designating a local official as 
commander who could then further delegate his power. The commander ―could transfer 
criminal cases from the normal court system to courts-martial or else could deal with 
them through administrative means.‖ 
The commander could dismiss civil servants and elected members of zemstva, municipal councils 
or estate organizations and could also suspend or close meetings of municipal councils or 
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zemstva. He could suspend the publication of periodicals and could also close educational 
establishments for up to one month (Waldron 1995, 3).
105 
Provincial governors used and abused the additional powers granted by 
emergency laws to increase and expand their own power. ―Central government was 
especially concerned that local authorities could exercise power without reference to St 
Petersburg,‖ Waldron maintains, ―and that this allowed provincial governors and their 
subordinates to utilise provisions of the statute contrary to the wishes of the imperial 
government‖ (Ibid., 12). 
The ease with which the 1881 statute could be abused and its ineffectiveness in 
dealing with public disorder was a matter of pressing concern for sections of Russian 
government and society. There was widespread unhappiness with the law because of 
the way in which it tipped the balance of authority in imperial Russia away from central 
government and toward local officials (Ibid., 13). The government had introduced 
emergency measures to suppress terrorism and to guarantee order and security, but local 
authorities abused the expansion of their power to target not just ―political 
undesirables,‖ i.e. terrorists, but ―anyone who breached the peace in its widest 
interpretation‖ (Ibid., 12). When the tsarist regime began to apprehend the 
consequential loss of its own power and called the local governments to order, Waldron 
argues, governors ―were able to exert considerable pressure on St Petersburg not to 
interfere in these matters by insisting that they could not guarantee the maintenance of 
order in their province if exclusion orders were not confirmed‖ (Ibid., 12). In other 
words, the anti-terrorism policies enacted by the tsarist regime had led to a situation in 
which a growing bureaucracy exploited emergency legislation to blackmail the 
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government and to transfer power from central to local administrative institutions. The 
result was that local officials were virtually autonomous and independent from the 
central government. The tsarist regime‘s efforts to subdue terrorism had created a 
situation in which the central government‘s attempts to preserve power had backfired 
and resulted in a shift of power from the government to a growing bureaucratic 
apparatus. Nevertheless, power was steadily expanded in the form of increased police 
repression which was justified in the name of public order and security. 
In early 1906, Sergei Witte, a high-ranking bureaucrat and chairman of the 
Council of Ministers under Tsar Nicholas II, lamented that these processes had ―led to 
an exceptional situation: there has been created on the initiative of local authorities, 
without permission from central government, a whole series of small independent 
governor-generalships, acting wholly independently from one another, outside proper 
supervision by central government and utilizing, with the force of law, the widest 
powers towards the local population which stands almost outside the law‖ (Ibid., 15).106 
Because increased repression seemed unable to put an end to terrorism, Witte tried to 
remind the government that ―the most direct and appropriate method of achieving this 
aim [i.e. quelling events that threatened public order] is not to take repressive measures 
against an existing evil, but to prevent this evil from arising at all‖ (cited in Ibid., 13). 
In other words, it was not police repression but liberal reform that, Witte believed, 
would address the people‘s demands and put an end to anti-government riots. 
To summarize this section, we have found that the rhetorical conflation of 
terrorism and anarchism that had developed since the French Revolution resulted in an 
understanding of terrorism in late imperial Russia which encompassed diverse and 
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disparate ideological, philosophical and political positions and movements. This 
discourse allowed the tsarist regime to demonize different types of political opposition 
by subsuming them under a single concept and to implement emergency measures in an 
effort to maintain power. We have also seen that while the rhetoric of terrorism 
facilitated an unprecedented expansion of power, it did not in fact succeed in 
strengthening the tsar‘s position. On the contrary, emergency legislation opened the 
way for an accumulation and abuse of power on the part of a growing bureaucratic 
apparatus. As the government foundered in its attempt to preserve power through a 
denunciatory discourse of terrorism, the measures taken for this purpose also failed to 
eliminate terrorism. It was in response to the failure of police repression and a return to 
despotic rule that liberalization came into view as an alternative and perhaps more 
productive way of ending terrorist violence. In the remainder of this chapter, we will 
therefore explore the role of terrorism in Russia in the context of the country‘s unsteady 
development toward a liberal political order which, for reasons to be explained shortly, 
was never realized. We will see that the rhetoric of terrorism was used by a regime that 
sought to resist the political consequences of necessary economic liberalization. 
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1.9  The rhetoric of terrorism and the preservation of despotism 
1.9.1 Invoking terrorism, resisting liberalism 
Witte‘s call for liberal reform as the appropriate response to terrorism tied in 
with a history of liberal thought that had surfaced in political reflections in Russia since 
at least the mid-nineteenth century. When in 1856 Tsar Alexander II responded to 
―rumours that I want to announce the emancipation of the peasants,‖ he declared that ―I 
will not say that I am completely against this. We live in such an age that this has to 
happen in time. I think that you agree with me. Therefore, it is much better that this 
business be carried out from above, rather than from below‖ (cited in Zakharova 2006, 
596). While many commentators have suggested that Alexander‘s willingness to 
implement reforms was a merely pragmatic response to increasing popular unrest, 
Zakharova interprets his actions as a considered response to the demands of the time 
(Ibid.).
107
 In other words, safeguarding the prestige and wealth of the state required 
major economic changes that involved larger social, political and judicial reform. The 
insufficient economic productivity of serfdom as well as the threat of rebellion posed by 
impoverished and exploited serfs resulted in a situation that made Alexander‘s Great 
Reforms unavoidable (Riasanovsky 2000). As a consequence, Alexander found himself 
in a situation where liberalization was necessary both in economic terms as well as with 
regard to the existence of the state, but at the same time threatened to undermine the 
absolute power of the emperor. His decision to enact liberal reforms was thus 
overshadowed by his attempt to retain power. While the government could not return to 
the old system, it could stop on its path of liberalization and try to counteract the 
practical political consequences of the reforms. On this account, the Russian regime‘s 
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use of terrorism discourse had a pivotal function in the tsar‘s attempt to retain power 
against processes of liberalization. 
Jonathan Daly‘s analysis of the Security Law substantiates this claim. Daly 
suggests that the partial state of martial law under which Russians lived since 1878 was 
by no means a symbol for Russia‘s development toward a police state. Instead, Daly 
argues, it indicated Russia‘s progression toward a modern constitutional state and the 
rule of law. The Security Law, Daly contends, has to be understood as the codification 
and, at least to a certain extent, limitation of the previous expansion of power through 
emergency measures. ―Late imperial Russia‘s emergency legislation,‖ he argues, ―was 
not a turning point on the path towards a modern ‗police state‘ but a sign of that 
country‘s uneasy transition form an absolutist to a constitutional order‖ (Daly 1995, 
602). The rhetoric of terrorism deployed by the Russian regime thus allowed for the 
reconciliation of a curious hybrid of autocracy, elements of the rule of law as well as 
the influence of liberal political forces. It enabled the tsar to harmonize the necessity of 
reform with his political interests and to maintain an autocratic rule on top of an 
economic system that slowly but steadily moved toward capitalism. 
To be sure, these processes were by no means peculiar to late imperial Russia. 
Resistances to liberal reform and setbacks on the path of liberalization occurred in other 
European states. As the power of European monarchs began to be limited, whether 
voluntarily or under duress, constitutional checks instituted for the protection of citizens 
occasionally hampered states‘ abilities to defend themselves against forces threatening 
their very existence. Prudence then dictated the temporary suspension of legal 
restraints. Ironically, such suspensions were the hallmark of a transition from absolutist 
to constitutional rule, from the early modern police state, or rationalized absolutism, to 
the rule of law (Ibid., 602-603). 
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One might therefore be inclined to argue that the political developments in late 
imperial Russia complement Foucault‘s account of the emergence of liberalism and 
modern governmentality in the West. In ―The Birth of Biopolitics‖ (1978/79), Foucault 
contends that the rule of law developed in German political and legal theory at the end 
of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century in opposition to despotism 
and the police state (Polizeistaat). While despotism constituted a system in which 
political obligation was oriented toward the will of the sovereign, Foucault argues that 
the police state made ―no difference of kind, origin, validity, and consequently of effect, 
between, on the one hand, the general and permanent prescriptions of the public 
authorities … and, on the other hand, the conjunctural, temporary, local, and individual 
decisions of the same public authorities‖ (Foucault 2010a, 168). Against despotism‘s 
proclivities for arbitrary and possibly illegal state action that was legitimate so long as it 
was in accordance with the will of the sovereign, and in opposition to the legal 
overregulation and overdetermination of the police state, the rule of law established a 
system of legality in which the legitimacy of state action corresponded to a law that 
limited it in advance. In other words, the separation of sovereignty and administrative 
action had its formal expression in the distinction between a general law and its 
particular application. 
On this view, late imperial Russia in fact appears as a country whose progress 
toward liberal constitutionalism was simply less steady and more tenuous because of 
Russia‘s particular historical, social and political context. The suspension of law and the 
concomitant expansion of administrative power here appear as instruments in the hands 
of a monarch who, due to the limits imposed on him by a progression toward 
constitutional rule, did not know how else to defend his country against terrorism. This 
account certainly presents a plausible explanation of the political situation in late 
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nineteenth and twentieth-century Russia. However, Foucault‘s account does not permit 
for an explanation of bureaucratization as an important effect of the country‘s 
development toward a more liberal political system that, ultimately, prevented the 
establishment of liberalism and the rule of law in Russia. It is in this context that 
terrorism has to be understood as a strategic discourse which, however, produced 
outcomes that were certainly unintended and undesired by the government yet therefore 
no less significant for the ultimate failure to introduce liberalism and the rule of law in 
Russia. In order to complement Foucault‘s analysis, we now turn to Max Weber‘s 
reflections on late nineteenth and early twentieth-century Russia to explore the political 
considerations driving anti-terrorist emergency legislation and the bureaucratization of 
the country. 
 
1.9.2 The collapse of imperial Russia 
In his journalistic reports on the Russian Revolution of 1905, most notably the 
essays ―Bourgeois Democracy in Russia‖ (1905) and ―Russia‘s Transition to Pseudo-
Constitutionalism‖ (1906), Weber is concerned with a description of ―the general social 
and political situation into which police absolutism, the political legacy of Alexander III 
(which was not repudiated soon enough) and, most recently, the work of Witte‘s 
Interim Ministry, has led the country, and out of which it must now – and who can say 
how? – find its way‖ (Weber 1995b, 229). For Weber, the decisive social, historical and 
political novelty of Russia‘s development was the bureaucratization of self-government 
effected by attempts to contain the revolutionary movement. For Weber, the ambivalent 
relation between the central government and a growing bureaucratic state apparatus that 
downshifted power to the lower levels of administration was an undesirable 
consequence of the deadlock in which the tsarist regime found itself. Trapped between 
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the need to reform in the name of economic progress and the necessity to retain power 
to suppress revolutionary action, the tsarist government found itself in a situation in 
which ‖the machine grinds as if nothing has happened.‖ 
And yet things have been done which cannot be undone. The insincerity by which liberties are 
officially granted, and at the moment when one is about to avail oneself of them, are taken away 
again with the other hand, must become the source of constantly repeated conflicts and fierce 
hatred, and be far more provocative than the old blatantly crushing system of repression‖ (Ibid., 
173). 
In other words, economic necessity for reform coupled with social 
fragmentation and the lack of a strong liberal alliance gave rise to a redistribution of 
power through massive bureaucratization and an expansion of administrative power 
under the pretext of terrorism which culminated in a system of pseudo-constitutionalism 
(Scheinkonstitutionalismus). Instead of putting an end to terrorism and limiting arbitrary 
state violence, the development of a massive autocratic bureaucracy perpetuated and 
aggravated the contradictory exercise of power and violence. ―So much can be said,‖ 
Weber maintained: ―the almost inevitable tendency and necessity of modern dynastic 
regimes to work for prestige domestically, as well as abroad, to ‗save face‘, led the 
government in Russia to fail to give what it had to give in time, and then when one 
concession after another was forced out of it, it tried and continues to try to restore its 
lost ‗prestige‘ by remorseless police tyranny‖ (Ibid., 229). 
As Weber was well aware, terrorism played an important role in these processes. 
The tsarist regime, he argued, ―blames the activities of terrorists for the police‘s insane 
rule of tyranny‖ (Ibid., 230). It was also clear for Weber that while this bureaucratic 
apparatus constituted the mechanism by which the autocratic regime secured its 
existence, it was destined to bring about the collapse of the regime in the long run. 
Weber predicted that the prevention of Russian radicalism and its concomitant terrorist 
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outrages through police action was highly doubtful. The outcome of increased police 
arbitrariness, he argued, was that ―the imposition of martial law, i.e. of a state of 
lawlessness, has caused these activities to increase and created sympathy for them. … It 
is by no means certain that today‘s regime or its like will succeed (for more than brief 
spells) in sapping the indefatigable energy of Russian radicalism … and certainly not 
before the total economic ruin of the country‖ (Ibid., 230). 
As we have seen earlier, Witte had called for liberal reform instead of increased 
repression in order to deal more effectively with terrorism. The only way to put an end 
to anti-government violence, Witte argued, was by eradicating the root causes that 
generated terrorist violence in the first place. The solution to social conflict and 
terrorism thus seemed to be a return to the liberal principles that had guided the Great 
Reforms. Weber, by contrast, was skeptical about Russia‘s potential for liberalization, 
and it seemed unlikely that liberalism was a possibility for the country. The reason for 
this, according to Weber, was the fragmentation of Russian liberalism and its lack of a 
broad social basis. Centuries of autocratic rule had prohibited the formation of a 
historically grounded social identity and social cohesion that, Weber argued, would 
have been necessary to support the liberal movement. This predicament was further 
exacerbated by the development of capitalism and the concomitant emergence of class 
consciousness which made the peasants in particular reluctant to side with those social 
groups that were the bearers of liberalism and constitutional reform (Weber 1995a). 
While Weber was convinced that, in the long run, Russia would go down the road of 
European development, he was doubtful of the chances of success of the liberal 
movement. It was clear that capitalism would result in a modernization of society but 
this did not mean, Weber pointed out, that Russia would undergo a liberal and 
democratic political development. ―In Russia,‖ Weber claimed, ―the imported 
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ultramodern forces of big capitalism run up against a subterranean world of archaic 
peasant communism, and unleash, for their part, such radically socialist feelings among 
their work-force (which they then meet with equally uncompromising ‗antifreedom‘ 
organizations of the most modern character) that one can scarcely imagine what kind of 
development is in store for Russia, even if – as is overwhelmingly probable – the 
‗sanctity of property‘ ultimately gains the ascendancy over the Socialist Revolutionary 
peasant ideology‖ (Ibid., 232). 
Eventually, Weber‘s prognosis that the bureaucratic apparatus, which had for a 
time preserved autocratic power, would turn into the cause of the regime‘s downfall 
was to be fulfilled, albeit in a way that Weber had not anticipated. Weber argued, 
perhaps most concisely in ―Politics as a Vocation‖ (1919), that politics is a struggle 
over the distribution of power, and political institutions constitute structures of 
domination that are then legitimated in historically variable ways. The specificity of the 
modern state is the legitimation of domination not by reference to traditional or 
charismatic authority, but in terms of its compatibility with rationally created legal 
rules. The administrative and technical functions of the state required by the 
rationalization of politics, Weber suggests, give rise to a highly specialized bureaucratic 
apparatus. In other words, Weber sees the modern state as ―a compulsory association 
which organizes domination.‖ 
It has been successful in seeking to monopolize the legitimate use of physical force as a means of 
domination within a territory. To this end the state has combined the material means of 
organization in the hands of its leaders, and it has expropriated all autonomous functionaries of 
estates who formerly controlled these means in their own right. The state has taken their positions 
and now stands in the top place (Weber 1991, 82-83). 
In short, Weber saw the development of the modern bureaucratic state as the 
culmination of processes of rationalization and as the end of traditional and charismatic 
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political authority. Yet while the expansion of power in the tsarist regime‘s fight against 
terrorism had certainly created a bureaucratic apparatus that sapped the tsar‘s power and 
eventually contributed a great deal to the collapse of autocracy in Russia, the outcome 
was by no means a rationalized administrative state modeled on the West. Instead, 
halfhearted attempts at economic liberalization and simultaneous efforts to maintain 
despotic power under the pretext of counter-terrorism and public security led to a 
situation that was fraught with tensions and that provided the conditions of possibility 
for the rise of a militant workers‘ movement. The outcome was neither dictatorship nor 
liberal constitutional parliamentarianism but, after an unsuccessful socialist revolution, 
a restoration of autocracy and renewed unrest, the final destruction of tsardom and the 
establishment of a Bolshevik regime in the revolutions of 1917. The rise to power of 
Lenin and Trotsky in the October Revolution of 1917 not only put a provisional end to 
prospects of establishing liberalism in Russia but also initiated the final stage of a 
political reworking of the concept of terrorism in early twentieth-century Russia. 
 
1.9.3 From terrorism to Red Terror 
We have seen that during most of the nineteenth century the term terrorism, both 
in its affirmative and condemnatory understanding, had largely been attributed to 
spontaneous individual acts of violence against prominent political figures. The October 
Revolution and the seizure of power of the Bolsheviks and the workers‘ councils in 
1917 gave rise to a new use of terrorism that was marked not so much by a 
transformation of its meaning as in a novel evaluation of its function. While the 
Bolsheviks denounced individual acts of terrorism, they endorsed a systematic use of 
terror. 
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Trotsky offers an analytic reflection on the distinction between individual and 
strategic terrorism in ―The Bankruptcy of Individual Terrorism‖ (1909) as well as in 
―Why Marxists Oppose Individual Terrorism‖ (1911).108  Trotsky accuses individual 
acts of terrorism as disparaging the revolutionary role of the masses. He implies that it 
is problematic to outright justify terrorism as a revolutionary strategy because it is 
unclear what terrorism means. If terrorism is understood in the bourgeois way ―as any 
action inspiring fear in, or doing harm to, the enemy, then of course the entire class 
struggle is nothing but terrorism‖ (Trotsky 1911). The question then becomes, Trotsky 
maintains, ―whether the bourgeois politicians have the right to pour out their flood of 
moral indignation about proletarian terrorism when their entire state apparatus with its 
laws, police and army is nothing but an apparatus for capitalist terror!‖ (Ibid.).109 If 
terrorism is, however, understood in a ―narrower, less indirect meaning‖ as individual 
acts of violence, then it is inappropriate as a revolutionary tactic (Ibid.). Against the 
revolutionaries of the 1870s, Trotsky asserts that ―In our eyes, individual terror is 
inadmissible precisely because it belittles the role of the masses in their own 
consciousness, reconciles them to their powerlessness, and turns their eyes and hopes 
towards a great avenger and liberator who some day will come and accomplish his 
mission.‖ 
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The anarchist prophets of the ‗propaganda of the deed‘ can argue all they want about the elevating 
and stimulating influence of terrorist acts on the masses. Theoretical considerations and political 
experience prove otherwise. The more ‗effective‘ the terrorist acts, the greater their impact, the 
more they reduce the interest of the masses in self-organisation and self-education. But the smoke 
from the confusion clears away, the panic disappears, the successor of the murdered minister 
makes his appearance, life again settles into the old rut, the wheel of capitalist exploitation turns 
as before; only the police repression grows more savage and brazen. And as a result, in place of 
the kindled hopes and artificially aroused excitement comes disillusionment and apathy (Ibid.). 
Individual terrorism denies the role of the masses for the revolutionary purpose, 
thereby effectively asserting the terrorists‘ status as representatives of the people‘s will. 
The targeting of political figures by the terrorists also smacks of revenge and does not 
grasp the systemic injustice that is largely independent of individual political 
representatives. ―If we oppose terrorist acts,‖ Trotsky asserts, ―it is only because 
individual revenge does not satisfy us.‖ 
The account we have to settle with the capitalist system is too great to be presented to some 
functionary called a minister. To learn to see all the crimes against humanity, all the indignities to 
which the human body and spirit are subjected, as the twisted outgrowths and expressions of the 
existing social system, in order to direct all our energies into a collective struggle against this 
system – that is the direction in which the burning desire for revenge can find its highest moral 
satisfaction (Ibid.). 
Trotsky‘s reflections indicate a shift in the political understanding and appraisal 
of terrorism. As a systematic ―method of revolutionary struggle‖ terrorism was most 
effective, but it was counterproductive as ―individual acts of revenge‖ (Ibid.). The 
consequence was an institutionalization of violence against counter-revolutionaries and 
class enemies. ―The question as to who is to rule the country,‖ Trotsky argues in 
―Terrorism and Communism. A Reply to Karl Kautsky‖ (1920), ―ie, of the life or death 
of the bourgeoisie, will be decided on either side, not by references to the paragraphs of 
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the constitution, but by the employment of all forms of violence. … The more ferocious 
and dangerous is the resistance of the class enemy who have been overthrown, the more 
inevitably does the system of repression take the form of a system of terror‖ (Trotsky 
2007, 55). 
The rejection of individual terrorism and the emphasis on the usefulness of 
systematic violence coincided with a gradual displacement of the term terrorism and a 
reactivation of the word terror. To be sure, there is no clearly identifiable and radical 
caesura that constitutes the end of a rhetoric of terrorism and the beginning of a 
discourse of terror.
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 However, there is a noticeable change in the rhetorical use of the 
terms. After all, it was terror rather than terrorism which, according to Mikkel Thorup, 
was put à l‟ordre du jour as a necessary means to stabilize the dictatorship of the 
proletariat (Thorup 2010, 107-111). The new system of terror was expressed by a 
decree issued on September 5, 1918, by the Soviet Council of the People‘s Commissars: 
The Council of the People‘s Commissars, having heard the report of the Chairman of the All-
Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution, Profiteering and 
Corruption on the activity of this commission, finds that in the current situation securing the back 
areas by terror is an absolute necessity; that to intensify the efforts of the All-Russian 
Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution, Profiteering and Corruption and 
to increase the planned element in this activity it is necessary to delegate to this commission as 
many responsible party comrades as possible; that it is necessary to secure the Soviet Republic 
from the class enemies by isolating them in concentration camps, that all persons participating in 
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the White Guard organizations, conspiracies and rebellions must be executed by shooting, that the 
names of the executed and the reasons of the execution must be made public (cited in Ibid., 108). 
The program outlined by the Soviet Council indicates the Bolsheviks‘ elective 
affinities with Robespierre. As a matter of fact, Trotsky himself appealed to the French 
Revolution as the model for the new regime. ―In not more than a month‘s time,‖ he 
predicted, ―terror will assume very violent forms, after the example of the great French 
Revolution; the guillotine, and not merely the gaol, will be ready for our enemies‖ 
(cited in Leggett 1981, 54). The legitimacy of this violence was not justified with 
reference to some kind of reason expressed in the general will, but was instead 
articulated in terms of the universality of the proletariat as a class. The necessity to use 
terror against counter-revolutionaries declared by the Soviet Council was expressed 
even more emphatically by Lenin. In a letter of June 1918 to Grigory Zinoviev, a high 
ranking Bolshevik in Petrograd, Lenin wrote that ―Only today did we hear in the 
Central Committee that the Petrograd workers wanted to reply to Volodarskii‘s murder 
by mass terror, and that you (not you personally, but members of the Petrograd Central 
Committee) restrained them.‖ 
I emphatically protest! We are compromising ourselves: even in resolutions of the Soviet we 
threaten mass terror, and when it comes to action, we obstruct the absolutely correct revolutionary 
initiative of the masses. This is in-ad-miss-ible! The terrorists will take us for milksops. The time 
is ultra-martial. It is necessary to encourage the energy and mass-character of the terror against 
counter-revolutionaries, and especially so in Petrograd, whose example is decisive (cited in Ibid., 
67). 
In contrast to Trotsky‘s invocation of French Jacobinism, Lenin‘s justification of 
the Red Terror against counter-revolutionaries and class enemies in the name of the 
workers seems closer to the Thermidorian defense of violence against the enemies of 
bourgeois values than to the Jacobin insistence on the necessity of force for the 
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preservation of the republic. As was seen in the previous chapter, the appeal of 
terrorism by the Thermidorians at the end of the Jacobin Reign of Terror played a 
crucial role in the articulation of the political model of the liberal nation state. The 
charge of terrorism against the enemies of bourgeois values here appeared as the effect 
of the universalization of national totality claimed by the bourgeoisie in the institutions 
of the state. Because of the ostensible universality of bourgeois values, the prosecution 
of their opponents required an elaborate justification. In other words, if freedom is 
granted by a universal law and government action is only legitimate as long as it is 
determined in advance by a law that applies equally to everyone, the illegal use of force 
against some individuals lacks legitimacy and demands legitimation. The sovereign 
right to kill or let live invested in the absolute power of the state thus became an 
instrument for the biopolitical protection of the nation against its enemies. 
By replacing the concept of the nation with the idea of class, Foucault argues, 
―Socialism has made no critique of the theme of biopower…; it has in fact taken it up, 
developed, reimplanted, and modified it in certain respects, but it has certainly not 
reexamined its basis or its modes of working‖ (Foucault 2004a, 261). The Red Terror of 
the Bolsheviks was justified as a necessary instrument against the class enemy. 
Violence no longer derived its legitimacy from its necessity for the protection of 
national universality but from the status of the proletariat as a universal class.
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outcome, Foucault maintains, was ―a socialist State which must exercise the right to kill 
or the right to eliminate, or the right to disqualify‖ (Ibid.). 
By way of conclusion, it is worth noting that a Soviet state deployed the same 
justification of state violence as an ostensibly neutral and rational liberal order. It might 
be argued that this fact brings into view the illusion of liberal neutrality and 
problematizes the identification of legality and legitimacy. The Bolshevik revolution 
forces one to reevaluate Foucault‘s claim that ―The most racist forms of socialism were, 
therefore, Blanquism of course, and then the Commune, and then anarchism – much 
more so than social democracy, much more so than the Second International, and much 
more so than Marxism itself. Socialist racism was liquidated in Europe only at the end 
of the nineteenth century, and only by the domination of social democracy‖ (Ibid., 262). 
While this might be true for France in particular and Western Europe more generally, 
the Russian Revolution of 1917 marks the beginning of a process in which the concept 
of terror is fixed to the state‘s use of force while the term terrorism is assigned to 
illegitimate violence exercised by non-state social or political actors who claim to speak 
for the people. The legitimacy of state violence and the illegitimacy of non-state 
terrorism appear as effects of the identification of the state with the postulated totality 
of a class or nation. The political developments through which the state has become not 
only formally representative of but essentially identical with the people, be it as a nation 
or as a class, coincide with the final verdict of the terrorist as the enemy of the state and, 
hence, the enemy of the people. 
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The terrorist as the enemy of humanity 
 
1.10 Terrorism as the subject of legal debate 
1.10.1 The criminalization of terrorism 
We have seen in chapter 2 that terrorism had initially emerged in the French 
Revolution as a label for a political system or regime of terror.
112
 After the 
Thermidorian Tallien had introduced the term as a name for the Jacobin Reign of Terror 
and attempts of the radical left to subvert the discourse of terrorism had failed, the 
concept was eventually turned into a rhetorical weapon against any form of political 
opposition to the Thermidorian order. In chapter 3, we found that the transformations in 
the meaning of terrorism over the course of the nineteenth century paved the way for an 
understanding that fixed terrorism to non-state or anti-state violence. As a consequence, 
non-state terrorism was distinguished from state terror. At the same time as terror 
became the term used to describe the totalitarian regimes of the twentieth century, there 
was a multiplication and standardization of terrorism discourse.
113
 This chapter will 
investigate the ways in which terrorism became the object of legal efforts to establish a 
universally accepted definition. While it is true that the successful appeal to terrorism 
discourse had previously had legal repercussions insofar as it allowed for a tactical use 
or suspension of the law with regard to terrorists – these procedures have been 
discussed in chapters 2 and 3 – there had been no effort to determine terrorism as a 
criminal offense with certain predetermined sanctions. The twentieth century, by 
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contrast, saw the emergence of a distinctively legal discourse of terrorism that sought to 
unambiguously define and criminalize it. As will become clear in what follows, this 
discourse broadly fixed the meaning of terrorism to anti-state violence aiming to 
terrorize the public in pursuit of political goals. 
Rather than treating the criminalization of terrorism in the twentieth century as 
accidental, this chapter charts legal debates about terrorism in order to relate them to 
more general developments in a wider economy of power. We will see how the 
emergence of a certain legal discourse of terrorism in the second half of the twentieth 
century allowed for its mobilization as a relay of power. We will explore how terrorism 
and its concomitant processes and practices function in the projection of power 
internationally and in the expansion of imperial sovereignty in a global economy of 
power in the making. 
 
1.10.2 Political violence as a legal problem in the interwar period 
We have seen in chapters 2 and 3 that the successful invocation of terrorism had 
previously had legal repercussions. The perceived threat of terrorism had not only 
allowed for the severe restriction of freedom of expression but had also exposed those 
accused of terrorism to all sorts of punishment not covered by the law. By successfully 
branding individuals as terrorists, the law could be altered or suspended altogether to 
avoid the legal strait jacket that regulated ordinary crime. Yet despite the use and abuse 
of law for political purposes, there had been no attempt to legally define terrorism and 
to classify it as a criminal act with certain predetermined sanctions.
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It was not until the late 1920s that a specifically legal discourse of terrorism 
emerged and an international effort was made to make terrorism illegal. For this 
purpose, states tried to formulate an unequivocal and universally acceptable definition 
of terrorism, in particular in the context of international law. Even though there has so 
far been little consensus on a legal concept of terrorism, a customary understanding 
nevertheless emerged and was formalized in the 1937 Convention of the League of 
Nations that fixed the term terrorism to ―criminal acts directed against a State and 
intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons or a 
group of persons or the general public‖ (reproduced in Bassiouni 2001, 71). 
An important historical point of reference in early legal debates about terrorism 
was the Belgian ―attentat clause‖ of 1856 and disagreement over the extradition of 
political criminals. The clause was proposed in opposition to the principle of non-
extradition of political criminals provided for by Belgian law. When France demanded 
the extradition of Jules Jacquin, a Belgian citizen who had fled to Belgium after an 
assassination attempt on Napoleon III, Belgium amended its extradition law and 
adopted the attentat clause which determined that assassinations of foreign heads of 
government as well as their families should not be considered a political crime and 
should not be covered by non-extradition (Oppenheim 1905, Saul 2008). 
The attempt to codify responses to terrorism in the new international legal 
system institutionalized in the League of Nations after the First World War harkened 
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back to the precedent of the attentat clause. At the same time as the League of Nations 
pondered the problem of terrorism, a series of International Conferences for the 
Unification of Penal Law focused on the streamlining of national legislation against 
terrorist acts and furnished international debates on terrorism with the perspective of 
criminal jurisprudence. In 1926, Romania put forward a proposal to the League of 
Nations to formulate a convention that would allow for the punishment of terrorism; yet 
no action was taken (Saul 2008). In 1934, France submitted a proposal to the League. 
At the same time, a draft convention, known as the Vienna Draft, was elaborated by the 
International Criminal Police Commission in Vienna. In this context, the distinction 
between political crimes and ordinary crimes staked out by the attentat clause 
resurfaced as both documents, the French proposal and the Vienna Draft, pushed for a 
legal conceptualization of terrorism as a list of ―offences punishable ‗as ordinary 
crimes‘‖ (Ibid., 171). However, no systematic effort was undertaken by the League to 
criminalize terrorism at the time. 
When Austrian chancellor Dollfuss, Romanian minister Duca, and King 
Alexander I of Yugoslavia were assassinated later the same year, the fear of a repetition 
of the 1914 assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo and its fatal 
consequences for peace in Europe finally forced the League to act. The decisive event 
for putting terrorism on the international legal agenda was the assassination of 
Alexander I of Yugoslavia, more specifically the legal problems it posed. In remarkable 
analogy to the situation of 1856, the Yugoslav king had been killed on a state visit to 
France, but the suspects had managed to flee to Italy. When France demanded their 
extradition, Saul explains, ―The Court of Appeal of Turin refused to surrender the 
accused on the grounds that the offences were politically motivated and thus non-
extraditable. The Court found that ‗the assassination of a sovereign is a political crime 
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if it is prompted by political motives ... and offends against a political interest of a 
foreign state‘, as are ‗crimes committed or attempted in the course of the said regicide‘‖ 
(Ibid.). The League of Nations declared that ―the rules of international law concerning 
the repression of terrorist activity are not at present sufficiently precise to guarantee 
efficiently international co-operation‖ and, in December 1934, established the 
Committee for the International Repression of Terrorism (CIRT) with the purpose of 
drafting a convention ―to assure the repression of conspiracies or crimes committed 
with a political and terrorist purpose‖ (Ibid., 172). 
In opposition to the Vienna Draft, which had defined terrorism by way of a list 
of ordinary crimes and punishable as such, the League made a decisive political move 
that opened the way for a critical rearticulation of terrorism. The League emphasized 
the necessity to introduce a distinction between political crimes that fell under the non-
extradition clause and political crimes that had a special character and should therefore 
not be covered by the clause. Even though this approach represented a break from the 
Vienna Draft as well as from the precedent of the Belgian attentat clause, it was in 
continuity with a draft proposed in 1935 by the fifth of the International Conferences 
for the Unification of Penal Law. This draft, also known as the Copenhagen Draft, 
maintained that ―It is necessary that certain acts should be punished as special offences 
apart from any general criminal character which they may have under the laws of the 
State, whenever such acts create a public danger or a state of terror, of a nature to cause 
a change in or impediment to the operation of the public authorities or to disturb 
international relations, more particularly by endangering peace‖ (Ibid., 170). In 
addition, the scope of CIRT‘s task was restricted by a resolution passed by the League 
Assembly in 1936. Affirming the old principles of the jus publicum Europaeum, the 
resolution not only insisted on the necessity of respecting the doctrine of non-
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intervention but also limited the notion of terrorism to attacks on ―the life or liberty of 
persons taking part in the work of foreign public authorities and services‖ (Ibid., 172). 
The definition of terrorism as a crime against state representatives suggested by 
the League would not, as such, imply that terrorism is a special crime not covered by 
the non-extradition clause. In fact, it is only in combination with the provision of the 
Copenhagen Draft regarding crimes creating public danger or a state of terror that 
terrorism can be determined as a special crime. Given the relative ambiguity of the 
Copenhagen Draft as to what constituted public danger, a state of terror, an impediment 
of the workings of national and international politics or a threat to peace, the 
establishment of an act of violence as terrorism depended on whether or not states 
thought a condition of terror had been caused. The understanding of terrorism as 
violence against state representatives and as causing a state of terror not only fixed the 
meaning of terrorism as anti-state violence but also created a significant amount of 
flexibility and discretion for states to identify terrorism on a case-by-case basis 
depending on whether or not they thought a state of terror or public danger had been 
caused. What is more important with regard to the effects of these processes on 
international law is that, as a special crime, terrorism was not covered by the non-
extradition clause. As a consequence, individuals guilty of the special political crime of 
terrorism appeared as subjects of international law. This inclusion of individuals in 
international law amounts to a new international legal paradigm, namely international 
criminal jurisdiction.
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Indeed, in November 1937, two conventions were adopted on the basis of a 
CIRT draft to define international terrorist offenses and to establish an international 
criminal court to prosecute and punish these offenses (Ibid., 172-173). As was seen 
above, the first article of the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of 
Terrorism defined terrorism as ―criminal acts directed against a State and intended or 
calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons, or a group of 
persons or the general public‖ (reproduced in Bassiouni 2001, 71). Article 2 called on 
the contracting states to criminalize the following acts committed on the state‘s territory 
―if they are directed against another High Contracting Party and if they constitute acts 
of terrorism within the meaning of Article 1:‖ 
Any willful act causing death or grievous bodily harm or loss of liberty to: 
a) Heads of State, persons exercising the prerogatives of the head of the State, their hereditary or 
designated successors; 
b) The wives or husbands of the above-mentioned persons; 
c) Persons charged with public functions or holding public positions when the act is directed 
against them in their public capacity. 
2. Willful destruction of, or damage to, public property or property devoted to a public purpose 
belonging to or subject to the authority of another High Contracting Party. 
3. Any willful act calculated to endanger the lives of members of the public. 
4. Any attempt to commit an offence falling within the foregoing provisions of the present article. 
5. The manufacture, obtaining, possession, or supplying of arms, ammunition, explosives or 
harmful substances with the view to the commission in any country whatsoever of an offence 
falling within the present article (Ibid., 71). 
The convention also demanded the criminalization of conspiracy, incitement, 
participation and assistance in acts of terrorism regardless of which country was the 
target of such an act (Ibid., 71-72). Yet while the outbreak of the Second World War 
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prevented the convention from being put into effect, international debates about the 
legal status of terrorism resumed in the second half of the twentieth century. 
 
1.10.3 Legal debates after World War Two 
In a recent survey of the political stakes of legal debates on terrorism, Jörg 
Friedrichs argues that the motivations and mechanisms resulting in the 1937 convention 
form a pattern that runs through the development of international law throughout the 
twentieth century. On the level of international law, institutionalized in the United 
Nations, the political interests of member states stifled an accepted legal definition of 
terrorism. As a consequence, international counter-terrorist legislation from the 1960s 
until the late 1990s focused on particular criminal acts such as the hijacking of 
airplanes, the taking of hostages, or the acquisition of nuclear materials. But while there 
might be little agreement in the way of actual legislation, the positions exchanged in 
debates among UN member states provide illuminating insights into the 
instrumentalization of the rhetoric of terrorism in international law (Friedrichs 2006). 
Friedrichs notes two distinct periods of defining terrorism. The first one is 
marked by the response to an increase in terrorist attacks in the 1970s and specifically 
the attack on Israeli athletes at the 1972 Olympic games in Munich. It led to a draft 
Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Certain Acts of International 
Terrorism submitted by the United States. Against this document, which did not include 
a legal definition of terrorism, the Non-Aligned Movement under the leadership of 
Algeria insisted on the necessity to identify the root causes of terrorism before 
repressive measures could be taken. The main argument against the US draft was that 
national liberation movements would be outlawed as terrorism, while the real danger of 
state terrorism would go unpunished. In order to settle the dispute, an Ad Hoc 
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Committee on International Terrorism was established in 1973 but suspended in 1979 
due to failure to reach consensus. As a consequence of the impossibility to reach 
agreement, Friedrichs argues, ―the international community had to limit itself to 
conventions against particular manifestations of terrorism.‖ 
The word ‗terrorism‘ normally did not even appear in the main text of these sector-specific 
conventions, although it was sometimes used in the title and preamble. In none of these early 
conventions was there any explicit attempt to define terrorism. The focus was on specific criminal 
acts, and the political intent of the perpetrators was set aside. Thereby it was possible to avoid 
conflicts over basic definitional principles, permitting textual agreement to be reached (Ibid., 
77).
116 
This ―piecemeal approach,‖ Friedrichs further suggests, has led to the 
establishment of a ―common understanding of terrorism‖ without solving the problem 
of formulating a legal definition (Ibid.). According to the principle that all definition in 
law is dangerous, the lack of legal definition had the convenient effect of putting states 
in a ―position to determine on a case-by-case basis who the international public enemy 
… happens to be‖ (Ibid., 89).117 
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The next genuine attempt to legally define terrorism began in the late 1990s with 
the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism in 1997. The aim 
of the committee was the identification of appropriate instruments to counter 
international terrorism. In 1999, the General Assembly called for a comprehensive 
convention that was to include a definition of international terrorism (Ibid., 74). 
Discussions were resumed and, based on Article 2 of the International Convention for 
the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, a new element was introduced into the 
framework of international law. It will be seen shortly that, at first sight, new legislation 
appeared to respond to the demands of Third World countries and the Organization of 
the Islamic Conference (OIC). These states had initially insisted on a distinction 
between terrorism and national liberation as well as on the inclusion of state terrorism 
in a comprehensive convention. When this approach was rejected by Western countries, 
the OIC changed its strategy and agreed that ―the exemption of state terrorism is 
acceptable but should be expanded to cover all parties during an armed conflict, 
whether regular forces or national liberation movements‖ (Ibid., 75). ―For the members 
of the OIC,‖ Friedrichs claims, ―maintaining the distinction between freedom fighters 
and terrorists was a strategic objective that superseded earlier efforts at delegitimizing 
so-called state terrorism‖ (Ibid., 76). Put differently, at the heart of the conflict over 
state terrorism and national liberation was a more fundamental question about the 
legitimacy of non-state violence. 
Both the demand to include state terrorism in a definition of international 
terrorism (as proposed by the Non-Aligned Group in the 1970s) and the insistence to 
exclude violence exercised in armed conflicts regardless of the status of the parties (as 
                                                                                                                                               
the United States and its allies in international debates over a legal definition of terrorism would certainly 
seem to be informed by this principle. The lack of a fixed definition of terrorism allows for the 
application of certain counter-terrorist measures independent of whether or not acts of violence meet a 
particular definition, thereby preserving and even extending discretionary powers in determining what 
counts as terrorist violence. 
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demanded by the OIC in the 2000s) might usefully be understood as efforts to 
undermine the state‘s monopoly on legitimate violence. Both positions suggest that the 
legitimacy of violence is separate from the political status of its perpetrator and lay 
claim to equal treatment for equal violence. In the terms of the Non-Aligned 
Movement, this amounts to the demand that when state violence looks like terrorist 
violence, it should be treated as such. Alternatively, as suggested by the OIC, this 
means that certain forms of violence hitherto regarded as terrorism have to be 
recognized as legitimate. 
On the face of it, it seemed that subsequent legislation in the context of terrorism 
acknowledged the demands of the Non-Aligned Group and the OIC. The International 
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999), for example, 
seemed to adopt an unbiased and inclusive view of terrorism in terms of a list of 
offenses considered to be criminal under international law without distinguishing 
between state or non-state perpetrators. However, the convention introduced a further 
provision that additionally defined terrorism as ―any other act intended to cause death 
or serious bodily injury to a civilian or to any other person not taking an active part in 
the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its 
nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an 
international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act‖ (United Nations 1999, 
my emphasis). The invocation of intention and purpose should grab our attention. By 
positing intention and purpose as constitutive elements of terrorism, the 1999 
Convention ushers in a subtle means by which terrorism can nevertheless be determined 
on a case-by-case basis and on ideological grounds. This also maintains an implicit 
identification of terrorism with non-state violence. For while state violence arguably 
kills civilians on a much larger scale than any terrorist attack, states justify the death of 
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non-combatants as an unfortunate side effect of war (Zolo 2009b, 128). In other words, 
the killing of innocents is not the intention and purpose of state violence but an 
unwelcome yet unavoidable corollary of a mission to end violence. In this context, 
Friedrichs regards the inability, or rather unwillingness, to reach a legal definition of 
terrorism as a tactical advantage for those powers that do not want to compromise their 
global hegemony by submitting to a legally binding definition (Friedrichs 2006, 85). 
That there still is a plethora of legal documents concerning terrorism without 
ever having defined its exact meaning points to the fact that a conventional 
understanding of terrorism has taken hold in international law and politics. This point is 
supported by Zolo‘s observation that ―in spite of the fact that no less than twelve 
international conventions have been signed in the attempt to establish a common 
approach to terrorism,‖ there is no legal definition but only an ―internationalist 
prevailing doctrine‖ (Zolo 2009b, 126). It is also illustrated by an all too familiar truism 
expressed by the British permanent UN representative Greenstock: ―There is common 
ground amongst us all,‖ he maintained, ―on what constitutes terrorism. What looks, 
smells and kills like terrorism is terrorism‖ (cited in Friedrichs 2006, 84). 
That the views of major powers prevailed over the demands of the OIC and the 
Non-Aligned Group in a commonly accepted doctrine of terrorism reflects the unequal 
relations of power in international institutions. The standard view of terrorism as 
―criminal acts directed against a State and intended or calculated to create a state of 
terror in the minds of particular persons, or a group of persons or the general public‖ is 
based on ideological and political motives and is, moreover, not legally binding 
(reproduced in Bassiouni 2011, 71). This conception of terrorism fails to account for the 
root causes of terrorism, something that has been repeatedly called for by the Non-
Aligned Group, Third World countries and the OIC. It allows for anti-terrorist measures 
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on a national and international level that have become standard practice and entail 
enormous consequences such as the suspension of constitutional rights or the waging of 
wars of aggression in the name of preemptive action and national self-defense. The lack 
of a customary doctrine of terrorism also facilitates the exclusion of state violence from 
being considered as terrorism. As Zolo has noted, ―Terrorists are exclusively members 
of organizations that operate privately and under cover, never military personnel or 
their commanders serving national armies‖ (Zolo 2009b, 128). In the rare cases that 
state terrorism is invoked, Zolo argues, just war theorists such as Walzer justify it ―in 
the name of his grotesque theory of the ‗supreme emergency‘‖ (Ibid., 129). ―In spite of 
all this,‖ Zolo continues, ―it now seems undeniable that, while the strategies of 
terrorism in its various forms are increasingly coming to resemble ‗global civil war‘ – 
to use Carl Schmitt‘s expression – ‗global war‘ has in its turn taken on the features of 
terrorism, if we agree to define terrorism, according to Western practice, as the 
indiscriminate use of violence against the civilian population of a country with the aim 
of spreading panic and pressurizing the political authorities‖ (Ibid., 130). 
Zolo is certainly correct in pointing out the similarities between state violence 
and terrorism, in particular with regard to the current war effort against international 
terrorism. Before we examine the parallels between state violence and terrorism, 
however, we first have to understand the political interests that require and make 
possible an understanding of terrorism as ideologically or religiously inspired political 
violence that poses an imminent threat to national sovereignty and global order. We will 
see that it is for the purpose of expanding power that states establish an understanding 
of terrorism as omnipresent and yet elusive in a process that Sheldon Wolin has aptly 
described as ―mimesis: the character of the enemy supplied the norm for the power 
demands that the democratic defender of the free world chose to impose on itself‖ 
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(Wolin 2008, 37). We therefore now turn to an examination of the function of a 
particular rhetoric of terrorism in these processes of expanding power. 
 
 
1.11 Terrorism and the making of a global governmental regime 
1.11.1 A just war against the new barbarians 
A possible answer to the question what political rationalities and changes of 
power require and promote the contemporary conception of terrorism can be found in 
the work of Carl Schmitt. In ―The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the 
Jus Publicum Europaeum‖ (1950), Schmitt built on his critique of liberalism to outline 
what he saw as the dangers inherent in an evolving liberal international system.
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 As 
opposed to the European public law of the sixteenth to twentieth century, which sought 
to ritualize warfare between states while safeguarding order within states, contemporary 
international law seeks to eliminate war by outlawing it. The consequence, according to 
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subsequently dominates politics. As a consequence, the parliament is reduced to an empty formalism and 
becomes instrumentalized as an arena in which powerful economic interests confront each other. See 
Schmitt, Political Theology, Ibid., The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy. Translated by Ellen 
Kennedy. Cambridge and London: The MIT Press, 1988, Ibid., The Concept of the Political, Ibid., 
Roman Catholicism and Political Form, Ibid., Legality and Legitimacy. See also McCormick, John P. 
Carl Schmitt‟s Critique of Liberalism: Against Politics as Technology. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999, the essays collected in Dyzenhaus, David, (ed.) Law as Politics. Carl Schmitt‟s Critique of 
Liberalism. Durham: Duke University Press, 1998 and Scheuerman, Carl Schmitt‟s Critique of Liberal 
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Schmitt, is a global civil war in which discriminatory violence is waged in the name of 
civilization against the new barbarians.
 
Schmitt sketches the justness and ordering of war in different periods of the 
historical development of international public law and the law of nations. For the jus 
gentium of the Christian Middle Ages, which rested on the legal authority of the 
Catholic Church, wars waged by order of the church were eo ipso just. ―Formally 
speaking,‖ Schmitt explains, ―the church‘s authority was decisive in the determination 
of just war. Accordingly, from the standpoint of substantive law, a just war was one 
waged ex justa causa … regardless of whether the war was aggressive or defensive, 
either strategically or tactically‖ (Schmitt 2003, 120). 
It was precisely this justification of war in terms of a just cause that the 
European public law of the sixteenth to the twentieth century sought to eliminate.
119
 
With the rise of the European state system, the organizing principle of international law 
was no longer the authority of the church but, Schmitt claims, ―the equal sovereignty of 
states.‖ 
Instead of justa causa, international law among states was based on justus hostis. Any war 
between states, between equal sovereigns, was legitimate. Given this juridical formalization, a 
rationalization and humanization – a bracketing – of war was achieved for 200 years (Ibid., 121). 
As opposed to the recognition of war as an occurrence between legitimate 
enemies grounded in the sovereignty of states, Schmitt further contends that modern 
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international law aims to eliminate war by criminalizing it.
120
 As ―essentially criminal,‖ 
contemporary international law demands that war ―cease to be simply a legally 
recognized matter…; it again should become just in the sense that the aggressor is 
declared to be a felon, meaning a criminal‖ (Ibid., 119). This means that war can only 
be justified as a response to an illegal war of aggression whose instigator is a criminal 
in the eyes of the law. The consequence, according to Schmitt, is a transformation of 
war into an effort to annihilate the opponent. Schmitt maintains that ―The victors 
consider their superiority in weaponry to be an indication of their justa causa, and 
declare the enemy to be a criminal, because it no longer is possible to realize the 
concept of justus hostis.‖ 
The discriminatory concept of the enemy as a criminal and the attendant implication of justa 
causa run parallel to the intensification of the means of destruction and the disorientation of 
theaters of war. Intensification of the technical means of destruction opens the abyss of an equally 
destructive legal and moral discrimination (Ibid., 321). 
The necessity to pronounce the enemy guilty of the crime of aggressive war in 
terms of international law, Schmitt further argues, requires justifications of retributive 
violence. These justifications amount to ―ideological phenomena‖ which must measure 
up to ―the industrial-technical development of modern means of destruction. … Given 
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the fact that war has been transformed into a police action against troublemakers, 
criminals, and pests, justification of the methods of this ‗police bombing‘ must be 
intensified. Thus, one is compelled to push the discrimination of the opponent into the 
abyss‖ (Ibid., 321). 
For Schmitt, in other words, contemporary developments constitute an inversion 
of the principles of the European public law. Whereas from the sixteenth to the 
twentieth century intervention was condemned and war was regulated, today war is 
condemned and intervention has become a standard procedure. It is in this context that a 
particular conception of terrorism must be situated and analyzed as a necessary element 
for the justification of aggressive violence authorized by major powers as preventive 
and defensive action against terrorism. Such an interpretation of terrorism will also help 
to address the factual errors and ideological undertones of Schmitt‘s account. Despite 
the normative flaws of Schmitt‘s account and the problematic explanations for 
contemporary law and politics, Schmitt nevertheless identified a number of worrisome 
developments in international law and politics. By way of an analysis of terrorism 
discourse as a critical instrument of imperial power, we will develop an alternative 
explanation for the developments Schmitt observed.
121
 
 
1.11.2 The “Bush doctrine” and the justification of the War on Terror 
The transformation of the justification of violence resulting from a 
criminalization of war and violence described by Schmitt underpins the ideological 
foundations of the current War on Terror. The legitimation of violence as punitive, 
retributive, preventive or in the name of (anticipatory) self-defense against war 
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criminals and troublemakers is most dramatically summed up in the ―Bush doctrine,‖ a 
commonly used expression named after American President George W. Bush to 
describe a number of foreign policy principles. These principles are based on the belief, 
stated most concisely by Bush in his second inaugural address, that ―The survival of 
liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands. The 
best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world‖ (Bush 
2005). A detailed elaboration of these principles had already been given three years 
before Bush‘s second inauguration, in the National Security Strategy of the United 
States (NSS), issued by the National Security Council a year after 9/11 in September 
2002.
122
 ―The great struggles of the twentieth century between liberty and 
totalitarianism,‖ then-President George W. Bush opens his introduction to the 
document, ―ended with a decisive victory for the forces of freedom – and a single 
sustainable model for national success: freedom, democracy, and free enterprise‖ 
(National Security Council 2002, 1). ―The United States will use this moment of 
opportunity,‖ Bush continues, ―to extend the benefits of freedom across the globe.‖ 
We will actively work to bring the hope of democracy, free markets, and free trade to every 
corner of the world. … The United States will stand beside any nation determined to build a better 
future by seeking the rewards of liberty for its people. Free trade and free markets have proven 
their ability to lift whole societies out of poverty – so the United States will work with individual 
nations, entire regions, and the entire global trading community to build a world that trades in 
freedom and therefore grows in prosperity (Ibid., 2-3). 
This export of freedom and democracy, however, is invoked in order to 
legitimize imperial ambitions and the expansion of power. Dressed up as an 
intervention that benefits a universal interest, the NSS is clear that freedom is not 
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granted unconditionally; rather, ―For freedom to thrive, accountability must be expected 
and required‖ (Ibid., 3). As the only nation powerful enough to deliver the globe from 
poverty, the United States is also the authority to which the rescued nations are 
accountable. As Sheldon Wolin has argued, the consequence is that the United States is 
at liberty to determine the kind of freedom that will be exported. ―The freedoms being 
dangled before the unfree,‖ he claims, ―are, in reality, disguised power.‖ 
Free trade and free markets in the hands of the already powerful are not symmetrical with free 
trade and markets in the hands of ‗weak‘ societies. Instead, the effect upon the poor nations of 
opting for them invariably turns simple weakness into dependence on those nations whose 
economies have made them dominant powers and who, accordingly, have the right to declare a 
state weak and call its performance to account. … Thus when the NSS document presents the ‗free 
market‘ as one of the three constituent elements of the ideal political system, the market is a 
surrogate, a stand-in for globalization/empire (Wolin 2008, 85). 
Indeed, the NSS explicitly promotes a version of freedom that is defined in 
economic terms. ―The concept of ‗free trade,‘‖ it is pointed out, ―arose as a moral 
principle even before it became a pillar of economics. If you can make something that 
others value, you should be able to sell it to them. If others make something that you 
value, you should be able to buy it. This is real freedom, the freedom for a person – or a 
nation – to make a living‖ (National Security Council 2002, 18). The importance of 
such freedom is anchored in a desire for security. In order to maintain global order, the 
NSS suggests, American grand strategy is designed according to a logic by which 
poverty results in failed states, which in turn present a high risk of terrorism and a threat 
to the security and prosperity of the United States. In an interdependent world, the 
economy is not a zero-sum game. Rather, the already powerful depend on the growth 
and progress of disadvantaged and less economically successful states for the 
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maintenance and expansion of their wealth.
123
 As a consequence, the freedom offered to 
failed, failing and weak states, is the freedom to participate in a system that is said to be 
the only way to prosperity. For those who are already successful – and of course, this 
success is measured by their own standards – freedom has no value in itself; it is useful 
insofar as it is instrumental for economic growth. In short, freedom appears as a 
necessary condition for the smooth functioning of the market. The expansion of 
freedom is not aimed at benefiting the poor and oppressed, but is driven by the 
exclusive self-interest of major powers.
 
According to Wolin, the argument propounded in the NSS has its roots in a 
political rationality that he identifies as reason of state. Echoing Foucault‘s analysis of 
raison d‟État discussed in chapter 2, Wolin explains that, according to this doctrine, 
―when issues of war and diplomacy were at stake, those who were responsible for the 
safety of the nation should be allowed a freer hand, greater discretionary power, to meet 
external threats without being hampered by the uncertainty attending the cumbersome 
and time-consuming legitimating processes of legislatures or courts‖ (Wolin 2008, 90). 
What the NSS ultimately represents, Wolin maintains, is an attempt to represent 
terrorism as a permanent and imminent threat, thereby rendering unfettered power 
temporally and spatially limitless. The myth production of the NSS is an endeavor to 
legitimize an inflation of power on a national and global level and justifies a global war 
                                                 
123
 The dependence of major powers on the economic progress of developing states is reminiscent of a 
principle of classic raison d‟État explained by Foucault in ―Security, Territory, Population.‖ Foucault 
maintains that the emergence of raison d‟État in the sixteenth century resulted in the establishment of a 
mercantilist economic system based on the recognition that states existed as a plurality of states that were 
in a precarious balance whose disturbance would impair the strength of each. The creation of a 
diplomatic-military apparatus aimed to preserve the European equilibrium by means of war, a new 
diplomacy of a physics of states, and the development of a jus gentium and a permanent military 
apparatus (Foucault 2009b, 300-306). In a similar way, one might argue that for Wolin, the economic 
logic outlined in the NSS 2002 amounts to an imperial version of raison d‟État and its adaptation to a 
globalized and interdependent economy. We will see in an instant that this is, in fact, what Wolin 
suggests. 
146 
 
as a liberating mission. According to the NSS, ―Freedom is the non-negotiable demand 
of human dignity; the birthright of every person – in every civilization.‖ 
Throughout history, freedom has been threatened by war and terror; it has been challenged by the 
clashing wills of powerful states and the evil design of tyrants; and it has been tested by 
widespread poverty and disease. Today humanity holds in its hands the opportunity to further 
freedom‘s triumph over all these foes. The United States welcomes our responsibility to lead in 
this great mission (National Security Council 2002, 3). 
The doctrine outlined in the NSS also substantiates Zolo‘s argument that global 
politics is marked by a legal paradigm in which ―Imperial universalism, the Catholic 
‗just war‘ doctrine and the biblical mystique of the ‗holy war‘ have come together in a 
discriminatory conception of the global space‖ (Zolo 2009b, 99). Zolo contends that the 
medieval doctrine of bellum iustum has transmogrified into a ―‗humanitarian claim‘ 
according to which the use of force – and the killing of innocents – is compatible with 
the defence of human rights‖ (Zolo 2002, 3).124 This new constellation of old and new 
elements gives rise to an imperial power that is, according to Zolo, legibus solutus at 
the international level, while ―in the domestic sphere its power is ‗non-representative‘‖ 
and opposed to the principles of the European Rechtsstaat (Zolo 2009b, 109-110).  This 
constellation is what Zolo identifies as a new imperial universalism in which the global 
expansion of power is justified in the name of freedom, humanity and security. Its effect 
is that the new emperors, i.e. the US and its ―coalition of the willing,‖ are getting away 
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with crimes against peace (as for example in the case of Vietnam, Afghanistan, 
Guatemala, Lebanon, Cuba, San Domingo, Grenada, Libya, Panama, Nicaragua or, 
most recently, in the NATO intervention in Kosovo and in the wars waged against 
Afghanistan and Iraq), while ―Whoever denies the hegemony of Western values, by 
recourse to terrorism, belongs to the horde of the new barbarians and the new infidels: 
the enemies of humanity against which it is necessary to wage a war that is global, just 
and holy all at the same time (Ibid., 99).
125
  
The NSS, however, not only justifies imperial power in the name of freedom 
and humanity but also invokes humanity differentially, justifying the War on Terror as a 
civilizing mission which will bring freedom and democracy to the oppressed and 
liberate the world from terrorism. This differential attribution of humanity gives lie to 
the universality of human rights and imperial universalism and reveals the latter‘s 
inconsistencies.
126
 It is this strategic invocation of humanity in support of a global War 
on Terror we will now examine. 
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1.11.3 Imperial universalism and the differential attribution of humanity 
As we have seen in our discussion of the NSS, US doctrine asserts that freedom 
is the birthright of every person in every civilization and is a demand of human dignity. 
If we were to take this claim at face value, we would have to conclude that the denial of 
freedom and human rights manifest in the current war effort against terrorism can only 
be justified if one is dealing with individuals or populations who are neither persons, 
nor civilized, nor fully human, or are at least not recognized as such.
127
 On this view, it 
would seem that a particular rhetoric of terrorism achieves the differential attribution of 
humanity, which in turn excludes those considered not fully human from the protective 
framework of international law and human rights. In fact, the argument that the War on 
Terror presupposes at the same time as it produces the selective allocation of humanity 
has most convincingly been developed by Judith Butler in her essay ―Indefinite 
Detention‖ (2004) as well as in her recent book ―Frames of War. When is Life 
Grievable?‖ (2009). 
In the earlier text, Butler argues that the practice of indefinite detention is 
rhetorically produced as the opportune response to beings who are represented, for 
example by government officials such as former Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld, as bestial and monstrous ―killing machines‖ who, as such, ―are something 
less than human, and yet – somehow – they assume a human form‖ (Butler 2004a, 
74).
128
 This bestialization of the detainees gives substance to Butler‘s claim that ―the 
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humans who are imprisoned in Guantánamo do not count as human; they are not 
subjects protected by international law. They are not subjects in any legal or normative 
sense. The dehumanization effected by ‗indefinite detention‘ makes use of an ethnic 
frame for conceiving who will be human, and who will not‖ (Butler 2004b, XVI). In 
this context, notions of humanity and civilization work ―to produce the human 
differentially by offering a culturally limited norm for what the human is supposed to 
be.‖ 
It is not just that some humans are treated as humans, and others are dehumanized; it is rather that 
dehumanization becomes the condition for the production of the human to the extent that a 
‗Western‘ civilization defines itself over and against a population understood as, by definition, 
illegitimate, if not dubiously human (Butler 2004a, 91). 
In this context, the lack of a legally binding definition of terrorism facilitates the 
expansion of Western power through means that increasingly come to resemble its own 
understanding of terrorism. A definitive and unambiguous legal definition of terrorism 
would either have to include certain forms of state violence, or it would have to 
explicitly exclude violence authorized by major powers, thereby revealing its 
ideological bias and its complicity in maintaining unequal positions of power. Because 
terrorism is, however, ―the catchword of a self-defined Western perspective that 
considers itself bound to certain versions of rationality and the claims that arise from 
them,‖ even the most inhumane acts of violence perpetrated by ―Western civilization‖ 
are excluded from terrorism (Ibid., 72). Moreover, measured against Western 
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conceptions of rationality, terrorists appear ―like the mentally ill because their mind-set 
is unfathomable, because they are outside of reason, because they are outside of 
‗civilization‘‖ (Ibid.). As a consequence, Butler maintains, ―one has to wonder whether 
it is not simply selected acts undertaken by Islamic extremists that are considered 
outside the bounds of rationality as established by a civilizational discourse of the West, 
but rather any and all beliefs and practices pertaining to Islam that become, effectively, 
tokens of mental illness to the extent that they depart from the hegemonic norms of 
Western rationality‖ (Ibid., 71).  
The frames that tie together ideas of humanity, civilization, and modernity 
according to the principles established by Western rationality also give way to a 
particular temporal and spatial ordering. Zolo has appropriately termed this strategy 
―imperial mapping‖ in his analysis of the calculations of Western powers in the Balkan 
wars (Zolo 2002, 11-15). In the War on Terror, imperial mapping comes back with a 
vengeance and is furnished with a temporal dimension that pitches the War on Terror 
not only as part of a military campaign that is retributive, preventive and self-defensive 
at the same time, but also as a humanizing, modernizing and civilizing effort with 
regard to populations considered to be premodern, not fully human and barbarian. ―If,‖ 
as Butler suggests, ―the Islamic populations destroyed in recent and current wars are 
considered less than human, or ‗outside‘ the cultural conditions for the emergence of 
the human, then they belong either to a time of cultural infancy or to a time that is 
outside time as we know it.‖ 
It follows from such a viewpoint that the destruction of such populations, their infrastructures, 
their housing, and their religious and community institutions, constitutes the destruction of what 
threatens the human, but not of the human itself. It is also precisely this particular conceit of a 
progressive history that positions ‗the West‘ as articulating the paradigmatic principles of the 
human (Butler 2009, 125). 
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With regard to the War on Terror this means that those populations that do not 
belong to the sphere of the modern are considered fair game in a war effort that claims 
to be an act of liberation. The criteria that determine the barbarian and uncivilized status 
of individuals and populations are measured against the essential tenets of liberal 
modernity that are supposedly lacking in its uncivilized enemy. Here one is forced to 
recall Zolo‘s claim that invoking humanity in the context of war functions as a means to 
―morally degrade their foe, singling him out as an ‗enemy of humankind‘, and to justify 
their own inhumanity in dealing with him‖ (Zolo 2002, 39). According to Butler, the 
scenes of torture in Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib show the double bind of torture in the 
assessment and production of the inhuman. ―Those who devised these schemes of 
torture,‖ she argues, ―sought to understand the specific vulnerabilities of a population 
formed within Islam, and developed their plans as a kind of sexual targeting that was at 
once a form of religious bigotry or hatred.‖ 
But what we have to remember is that the subject of Islam was also constructed through the 
torture… the torture was not merely an effort to find ways to shame an humiliate the prisoners of 
Abu Ghraib and Guantánamo on the basis of their presumptive cultural formation. The torture 
was also a way to coercively produce the Arab subject and the Arab mind. That means that 
regardless of the complex cultural formations of the prisoners, they were compelled to embody 
the cultural reduction described by the anthropological text (Butler 2009, 126). 
On this account, torture functions as a means to test and ratify assumptions 
about cultural and religious codes that the victim of torture is forced to break.
129
 The 
images from Abu Ghraib capture scenes in which sexual taboos are violated. The shame 
resulting from homosexual or misogynist acts is then read as a lack of civilization. In 
other words, the prisoners are uncivilized to the extent that they are assumed to embody 
certain prohibitions and inhibitions concerning sexuality that are considered backward 
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and barbarian by ostensibly progressive societies. Implicit in this argument seems to be 
the idea that sexual freedom here acts as a surrogate for liberal freedoms. Torture 
appears as the ―abbreviated form‖ of a project of secularization in which sexual 
freedom signifies the most advanced, most progressive position (Ibid., 130). ―In the 
case of sexual torture,‖ Butler maintains, ―a noxious deployment of the notion of sexual 
freedom is at work: ‗we embody that freedom, you do not; therefore, we are free to 
coerce you, and so to exercise our freedom, and you, you will manifest your unfreedom 
to us, and that spectacle will serve as the visual justification for our onslaught against 
you‘‖ (Ibid., 131). Feminism and progressive sexual politics have, as expressions of the 
liberal and modern project of secularization, become hijacked for a coercive and racist 
civilizing mission. The acts of torture are ―actions of a homophobic institution against a 
population that is both constructed and targeted for its own shame about homosexuality; 
the actions of a misogynist institution against a population in which women are cast in 
roles bound by codes of honor and shame, and so are not ‗equal‘ in the way that women 
ostensibly are in the West‖ (Ibid., 129). The paradoxical logic at work in these practices 
reveals, according to Butler, that ―the ‗civilization‘ at issue is part of a dubious secular 
politics that is no more enlightened or critical than are the worst forms of dogmatic and 
restrictive religion.‖ 
In fact, the historical, rhetorical, and logical alliances between them may be more profound than 
we think. The barbarism at issue here is the barbarism of the civilizational mission. … If the 
scenes of torture are the apotheosis of a certain conception of freedom, it is a conception free of 
all law and free of all constraint, precisely in order to impose law and to exercise coercion. That 
there are competing notions of freedom at stake is obvious, though it is probably worth noting that 
the freedom to be protected from coercion and violence is one of the meanings that has been lost 
from view (Ibid., 132). 
153 
 
In other words, torture is the most visible evidence that the civilization exported 
by the West is at least as barbarian as those populations it claims to civilize are made 
out to be. In a perverse twist of fate, torture as the technique, instrument and sign of the 
allegedly liberating mission of the US and its allies brings to light the coercion, 
repression, violence and unfreedom that lie at the heart of Western politics itself (Ibid., 
130-132). 
 
1.11.4 Reconfiguring the political in the War on Terror 
The processes analyzed by Butler appear to be an eerie confirmation of 
Schmitt‘s predictions about the development of international liberal legal frameworks. 
Half a decade before the United States declared a global War on Terror, Schmitt had 
argued that ―When a state fights its political enemy in the name of humanity, it is not a 
war for the sake of humanity, but a war wherein a particular state seeks to usurp a 
universal concept against its military opponent.‖ 
At the expense of its opponent, it tries to identify itself with humanity in the same way as one can 
misuse peace, justice, progress, and civilization in order to claim these as one‘s own and to deny 
the same to the enemy. The concept of humanity is an especially useful ideological instrument of 
imperialist expansion, and in its ethical-humanitarian form it is a specific vehicle of economic 
imperialism. Here one is reminded of a somewhat modified expression of Proudhon‘s: whoever 
invokes humanity wants to cheat. To confiscate the word humanity, to invoke and monopolize 
such a term probably has certain incalculable effects, such as denying the enemy the quality of 
being human and declaring him to be an outlaw of humanity; and a war can thereby be driven to 
the most extreme inhumanity (Schmitt 1996b, 54). 
While Schmitt sees this as the outcome of the depoliticization inherent in 
liberalism – after all, he (wrongly) assumed that ―The concept of humanity excludes the 
concept of the enemy‖ and is thus the anti-political concept par excellence and the 
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logical consequence of the global triumph of liberalism – it seems that what really is at 
stake in the invocation of humanity in the War on Terror is a repositioning of the 
political on a global scale (Ibid.). In fact, in ―The Concept of the Political‖ (1932), 
Schmitt himself argues that ―The concept of the state presupposes the concept of the 
political‖ (Ibid., 19). In other words, the political is prior to and superior over the state. 
Rather than being determined by the state, its relation with the state or party politics, the 
political is constituted and defined by the distinction between friend and enemy as the 
ultimate distinction in which all political action is rooted. On this account, the state 
appears as a particular institutional form resulting from and corresponding to a certain 
configuration of the political. 
Indeed, Schmitt further argues that ―Due to its orientation towards the possible 
case of emergency of the effective battle against an effective enemy, the political entity 
is necessarily either the decisive entity with regard to the grouping of friend and enemy, 
and in this (and not in any absolutist) sense it is sovereign, or it does not exist at all‖ 
(Schmitt 2002, 40, my translation).
130
 The political is thus determined by the decision 
on friend and enemy, and it is this distinction that makes the entity that decides 
sovereign. The political, therefore, is either sovereign in this sense, or it is not political 
and, hence, is not at all. In the Westphalian system of states, friendship and enmity are 
determined along the lines of national borders. Under conditions of a balance of states, 
sovereignty pertains to the state not as being a state, but as being the entity that 
distinguishes between friend and enemy. As Schmitt maintains, ―That the state is an 
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 The German original states that ―infolge der Orientierung an dem möglichen Ernstfall des effektiven 
Kampfes gegen einen effektiven Feind ist die politische Einheit notwendig entweder die für die Freund-
oder Feindgruppierung maßgebende Einheit und in diesem (nicht in irgendeinem absolutistischen) Sinne 
souverän, oder sie ist überhaupt nicht vorhanden‖ (Schmitt 2002, 40). I may suggest the translation given 
in the text as more accurate than Schwab‘s translation in his 1996 English edition, which reads as 
follows: ―in the orientation toward the possible extreme case of an actual battle against a real enemy, the 
political entity is essential, and it is the decisive entity for the friend-or-enemy grouping; and it is in this 
(and not in any kind of absolutist sense), it is sovereign. Otherwise the political entity is nonexistent‖ 
(Schmitt 1996b, 39). 
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entity and in fact the decisive entity rests upon its political character‖ (Schmitt 1996b, 
44). 
Under conditions of porous national borders and increased global 
interdependence, the old principles and structures of the Westphalian system 
increasingly appear out of joint. As Schmitt was well aware in 1963, the era of statism 
was rapidly coming to an end and the pivotal position of the state was significantly 
compromised by international and transnational political developments. Yet despite the 
demise of what Schmitt laments as the dethroning of the state as ―that gem of European 
form and occidental rationalism,‖ i.e. as the monopoly on political decision, he was 
convinced that its concepts will be conserved – ―and as classical concepts at that‖ 
(Schmitt 2002, 10, my translation).
131
 The traditional European state, Schmitt 
maintains, was characterized by internal peace and order, and the political only existed 
in the sphere of foreign politics between sovereign states. What Schmitt regards as 
intrinsically classical about this period is the possibility to clearly distinguish between 
inside and outside, war and peace, army and civilians, and neutrality and partiality. 
These classical concepts, appropriate in the heyday of the European state system, have 
lost their meaning in a time when traditional distinctions are becoming increasingly 
tenuous or have disintegrated entirely.
132
 As Frédéric Gros argues, the old distinctions 
analyzed by Schmitt have ―become confused, and they are replaced with a unique 
                                                 
131
 See Schmitt‘s preface of 1963 to the reprint of the original text of 1932 in Schmitt, Der Begriff des 
Politischen, 9-19. The original states: ―Der Staat als das Modell der politischen Einheit, der Staat als der 
Träger des erstaunlichsten aller Monopole, nämlich des Monopols der politischen Entscheidung, dieses 
Glanzstück europäischer Form und occidentalen Rationalismus, wird entthront. Aber seine Begriffe 
werden beibehalten und sogar noch als klassische Begriffe” (Schmitt 2002, 10). 
132
 This disintegration manifests itself quite literally in a globalized economy that does not permit for a 
clear-cut distinction between inside and outside. Economic demands, e.g. for cheap labor and the 
circulation of goods, result in an increasing porousness of borders. In this regard, Wendy Brown has 
offered an instructive analysis of the new walling projects as attempts to compensate for a loss of national 
sovereignty. See Brown, Wendy. Walled States, Waning Sovereignty. New York: Zone Books, 2010. 
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continuum of preoccupations and concerns‖ (Gros 2010, 282).133 The outcome, Schmitt 
claims, is a disastrous instrumentalization of traditional classical concepts ―as weapons 
in a revolutionary war which are used in a purely instrumental way, non-binding and 
without obligation to reciprocity‖ (Schmitt 2002, 12, my translation).134  He further 
predicts that the consequence is a ―war against war‖ that is ―considered to constitute the 
absolute last war of humanity.‖ 
Such a war is necessarily unusually intense and inhuman because, by transcending the limits of 
the political framework, it simultaneously degrades the enemy into moral and other categories and 
is forced to make of him a monster that must not only be defeated but also utterly destroyed 
(Schmitt 1996b, 36).
135 
The bracketing of war in accordance with the recognition of state sovereignty 
and the principles of the jus publicum Europaeum entail a limitation of enmity which, 
according to Schmitt, benefits humanity more than any war waged in its name.
136
 The 
                                                 
133
 Following Foucault, Gros further maintains that the replacement of clear distinctions with continuums 
results in ―a single community of integrated living beings: a continuum of security, from the police 
officer to the soldier, a continuum of threats, from the disruption of the food supply to the risk of 
terrorism, a continuum of violence, from natural catastrophes to civil war, a continuum of intervention, 
from armed aggression against an outlaw State to humanitarian aid, a continuum of victims, from 
distraught refugees to malnourished children‖ (Gros 2010, 283). On the notion of the continuum see also 
Foucault, Security, Territory, Population. 
134
 In the German original, Schmitt notes that ―die überkommenen klassischen Begriffe des gehegten 
Krieges als Waffen des revolutionären Krieges benutzt werden, deren man sich rein instrumental, 
freibleibend und ohne Verpflichtung zur Gegenseitigkeit bedient‖ (Schmitt 2002, 12). 
135
 Commenting on this point, Gros suggests that the representation of the enemy as social vermin that 
must be destroyed ―might even be a question of seeking an enemy that measures up to the horror of 
today‘s means of extermination‖ (Gros 2010, 247). Without wishing to discuss this claim in any more 
detail in the context of this thesis, Gros‘ contention that ―the destructive capabilities of technological 
wars seem to have produced the figure of the criminal enemy in order to justify their monstrous 
deployment‖ deserves serious attention (Ibid., 247, my emphasis). 
136
 Against Schmitt, Gros here argues that it is not at all clear that the regulation of warfare actually 
protects civilians and limits the risks and damages for all involved parties. This is because the juridical 
abstraction of the state as the enemy entails the extension of enmity to a state‘s population. Moreover, 
Gros maintains that Schmitt‘s argument is based on a series of identifications (punishment, 
criminalization, discrimination, annihilation, etc.) that are by no means logically necessary. See Gros, 
States of Violence and Schmitt, The Concept of the Political. In contrast to Gros, one might suggest, 
following Foucault, that what makes reality intelligible is not logical necessity but ―simply showing that 
it was possible; establishing the intelligibility of reality consists in showing its possibility‖ (Foucault 
2010a, 34). While the affinities between punitive justice, the criminalization of war, the (moral, political 
and legal) discrimination of the enemy and his annihilation postulated by Schmitt might not be logically 
necessary, they are nonetheless real. In other words, even though Schmitt‘s account for legal and political 
157 
 
production of global sovereignty by way of invoking humanity produces paradoxical 
effects – most importantly a war against war – that exploit the threshold between 
sovereign particularism and imperial universalism (Schmitt 1996b). These effects can 
only be legitimated in the guise of a concern for the safeguarding of lives at home and 
abroad. The portrayal of certain populations as not properly human gives lie to the 
universalistic claims of the humanitarian nature of the war effort and evokes Schmitt‘s 
variation on Proudhon that ―whoever invokes humanity wants to cheat‖ (Ibid., 54). 
While Schmitt correctly draws attention to the problematic consequences of 
imperial universalism dressed up as humanitarianism, he fails to recognize that 
humanity is not a given universal quality but the result of a fundamentally political 
distinction. As a form of distinguishing between friend and enemy, humanitarianism 
constitutes (a new configuration of) the political. The decisive political entity is no 
longer the state, but a new global sovereign who establishes imperial universalism as 
the new nomos – in the Schmittian sense of Landnahme as the spatial foundation of any 
order. For Schmitt, ―sovereign is who decides in and on the state of exception‖ (Schmitt 
2005b, 5, my translation).
137
 In this sense, as Zolo has remarked, ―the United States is 
                                                                                                                                               
developments certainly has to be challenged, we should not dismiss his arguably acute observations of 
legal and political developments. 
137
 The English translation of Schmitt‘s opening sentence of ―Political Theology‖ is ―Sovereign is he who 
decides on the exception‖ (Schmitt 2005b, 5). This translation is problematic because it fails to account 
for the polysemy of the German word ―über.‖ The German ―über den Ausnahmezustand entscheiden‖ 
means both to decide whether there is as well as what happens in a state of exception. The German 
original, ―Souverän ist, wer über den Ausnahmezustand entscheidet‖ should therefore be more 
appropriately translated as ―Sovereign is he who decides on and in the state of exception‖ (Schmitt 
2004a, 13). For noting the ambiguity of the German ―über‖ see McCormick, John P. ―The Dilemmas of 
Dictatorship: Carl Schmitt and Constitutional Emergency Powers.‖ In Law as Politics. Carl Schmitt‟s 
Critique of Liberalism, edited by David Dyzenhaus, 217-251. Durham: Duke University Press, 1998. For 
relevant secondary literature on the continued relevance of the concepts of politics, sovereignty and the 
state of exception in Schmitt‘s work see Agamben, Giorgio. Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare 
Life. Translated by Daniel Heller-Roazen. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998, Ibid., State of 
Exception. Homo Sacer II, 1. Translated by Kevin Attell. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005, 
Axtmann, Humanity or Enmity?, Brodocz, André. ―Die politische Theorie des Dezisionismus: Carl 
Schmitt.‖ In Politische Theorien der Gegenwart I, edited by André Brodocz and Gary S. Schaal, 
Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2002, Brown, Walled States, Waning Sovereignty, 
Huysmans, International Politics of Exception, Ibid., The Jargon of Exception, Kalyvas, Democracy and 
the Politics of the Extraordinary, McCormick, The Dilemmas of Dictatorship, McQuillan, Colin. ―The 
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the sovereign source of a new international law – a new ‗Nomos of the Earth‘ – in a 
situation which the threat of global terrorism enables it to present as a global and 
permanent ‗state of emergency‘‖ (Zolo 2009b, 123). 
In this chapter, we have examined the critical role of a legal discourse of 
terrorism in the emergence of a new global political regime. The challenges posed by 
processes of political and economic globalization have resulted in a shift from the old 
Westphalian system of nation states to imperial sovereignty under the aegis of the 
United States and its allies. The corollary of such a transformation is the emergence of a 
new legal paradigm of international criminal justice that substitutes the criminalization 
of war for the ordering of inter-state violence regulated by the European public law. 
This has led to a situation in which war is justified in the name of eliminating war. 
Under the pretext of terrorism, universal human rights and the claim to preventive self-
defense are used to legitimize illegal violence in aggressive wars waged by the West for 
the protection of its interests and the expansion of power. 
The justification of aggressive state violence against terrorism shows striking 
similarities to the rationality motivating the use of force fleshed out by Foucault and 
discussed in chapter 2. To recapitulate, Foucault argues that the reconciliation of the 
sovereign right to kill and the universal validity of the law as a framework designed to 
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limit violations of individual freedom depends on the representation of state violence as 
necessary for the defense of the nation. The War on Terror appears as the limit 
condition of this economy of power which justifies the exercise of the sovereign right to 
kill in the name of the salvation of one‘s race. While this race was articulated from the 
end of the eighteenth until the beginning of the twentieth century in terms of a nation or 
class that claimed universality, the contemporary context of financial, economic and 
cultural globalization and interdependence formally extends the universality of rights to 
include all of humanity. As a consequence, sovereignty is reconfigured as imperial 
sovereignty which legitimates the exercise of its capacity to kill in the name of the 
salvation of the human race. Its opposite, the monster that must and must not be utterly 
destroyed for power to play its game, is the terrorist, the new enemy of all.
138
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 The terrorist thus seems to be the true heir of the pirate as the hostis humani generis. See Heller-
Roazen, Daniel. The Enemy of All: Piracy and the Law of Nations. New York: Zone Books, 2009. 
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Conclusion: judging violence 
 
1.12 Understanding terrorism 
Before we revisit the main findings of the previous chapters, let us recall the 
problem this thesis sought to address. We have established in chapter 1 that there are 
two main ways to approach terrorism in contemporary academic discourse. The first is 
marked by an emphasis on empirical research and is policy-oriented in its objectives. It 
is predominant in scholarship known as Terrorism Studies and Critical Terrorism 
Studies and in much of the socio-psychological work undertaken to identify a terrorist 
profile. This approach attempts to understand terrorism by way of definition, that is, 
through the identification of certain constitutive elements such as the nature of the act, 
the immediate target of the attack or the larger aim of the tactical use of violence. 
Because these elements are regarded as historically constant and readily recognizable, 
this approach claims to have identified a long history of terrorism that dates back to the 
Zealots of ancient Judea. It fails to recognize, however, that searching for forms of 
violence that correspond to contemporary definitions of terrorism is an anachronistic 
transposition of current assumptions onto historical practices. Attempts to understand 
terrorism by definition therefore ignore the historical and contextual specificity of the 
violence examined. They present a one-dimensional, purely descriptive view of 
terrorism that does not take into account the different ways in which terrorism is 
discursively represented in order to achieve political goals. Moreover, definitional 
approaches purport to express objective statements about terrorism. By laying claim to 
scientific neutrality, many scholars of terrorism conceal their ideological allegiances 
which are manifest in the normative judgment of violence built into definitions of 
terrorism as illegitimate, morally wrong or evil. 
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In response to the problems posed by terrorism scholarship that seeks to define 
terrorism, a different approach emerged that is characterized by an understanding of 
terrorism by way of its function within a wider network of power relations. This view 
largely builds on the theoretical insights of critical theory as well as contemporary 
radical philosophy. We have seen that the most influential analyses of the problematic 
developments coming to light in response to terrorism – for instance the dismantling of 
legal norms, the suspension of rights and liberties or the justification of aggressive state 
violence – are either marked by a reductive and generalizing account of power that fails 
to consider practices peculiar to counter-terrorism (as in the case of Agamben) or by an 
almost exclusive focus on the post-9/11 era (as we have seen with regard to Butler). 
Recent theoretical scholarship has thus not succeeded in providing a satisfying 
corrective to traditional terrorism scholarship because it suffers from a reductive 
account of power that could be corrected by way of considering mechanisms of power 
in the fight against terrorism, or because it remains confined in its temporal focus on the 
twenty-first century. 
In order to respond to this deficit in terrorism scholarship, this thesis presented 
an account of terrorism as a relay of power in the historical development of terrorism 
discourse. Recognizing the importance of the historical manifestations discussed in 
traditional terrorism scholarship, but rejecting its anachronistic and reductive 
understanding of terrorism, we followed contemporary theoretical work in analyzing 
terrorism not as the cause but as the effect of certain practices of power. In other words, 
we sought to address the problematic treatment of history prevalent in traditional 
scholarship by approaching historical examples of terrorism through the methodological 
framework of recent theoretical work, thereby also responding to the latter‘s limited 
temporal perspective. This allowed us to explore the emergence of terrorism in the 
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context of historically specific political rationalities, thereby shedding light on the 
formation and the transformations of contemporary relations of power which require 
terrorism at the same time as they bring it into existence. In other words, the analysis of 
terrorism developed in this thesis sought to provide a new grid of intelligibility on the 
basis of contemporary theoretical work through which selected moments in the history 
of terrorism examined by empirical research were then passed. 
For this purpose, we started not from the status of a universal that is given to 
terrorism by traditional scholarship. Rather than considering concrete practices as 
deriving from or responding to terrorism, we examined the conditions under which 
something like terrorism could emerge. Following Foucault, ―instead of deducing 
concrete phenomena from universals, or instead of starting with universals as an 
obligatory grid of intelligibility for certain concrete practices,‖ we started ―with these 
concrete practices and, as it were, pass[ed] these universals through the grid of these 
practices‖ (Foucault 2010a, 3). In order to take a fresh look at historical examples of 
terrorism without imposing on it habitual assumptions, we followed Foucault in ―not, 
then, questioning universals by using history as a critical method, but starting from the 
decision that universals do not exist, asking what kind of history we can do‖ (Ibid.). For 
Foucault, the critical advantage of such an approach is that it allows one to show ―by 
what conjunctions a whole set of practices – from the moment they become coordinated 
with a regime of truth – was able to make what does not exist … nonetheless become 
something, something however that continues not to exist‖ (Ibid., 19). This does not 
mean that the object of such an inquiry is an error or an illusion; on the contrary, 
Foucault maintains that the point is ―to show how the coupling of a set of practices and 
a regime of truth form an apparatus (dispositif) of knowledge-power that effectively 
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marks out in reality that which does not exist and legitimately submits it to the division 
between true and false‖ (Ibid.). 
The methodological framework deployed in this thesis thus corresponds to 
Foucault‘s genealogies in which archival material is revisited in order to play ―local, 
discontinuous, disqualified, or nonlegitimized knowledges off against the unitary 
theoretical instance that claims to be able to filter them, organize them into a hierarchy, 
organize them in the name of a true body of knowledge, in the name of the rights of a 
science that is in the hands of the few‖ (Foucault 2004a, 9). We sought to chart the 
practices through which something like terrorism was brought into existence and 
continues to be rearticulated in relation to changing configurations of power and 
hegemonic political interests. We therefore explored three critical moments in the 
history of terrorism in order to highlight the differences, discontinuities and 
transformations in the rhetoric as well as in the function of terrorism in relation to a 
broader political context. 
 
1.13 The deployment of terrorism 
The starting point of our genealogical investigation was the emergence of 
terrorism as a political concept in the French Revolution. In chapter 2, we examined a 
number of archival sources such as the speeches of Robespierre and Tallien and the 
pamphlet literature of Babeuf in order to shed light on the articulation of terrorism in 
the context of conflicts between competing political factions. The decisive moment in 
the formation of a discourse of terrorism was Tallien‘s speech in the National 
Convention on August 3, 1794. Denouncing the Jacobin Reign of Terror as a system of 
terrorism, Tallien outlined the principles of the new Thermidorian government in 
opposition to the political rationality underpinning Robespierre‘s rule. While 
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Robespierre had claimed that terror was the manifestation of justice in times of 
revolution and necessary for the preservation of the republic, Tallien saw this 
invocation of justice as a way of justifying illegitimate violence. For Robespierre, there 
was no contradiction between the legitimacy of a political order and its foundation in 
violence. In fact, he claimed that ―If the mainspring of popular government in 
peacetime is virtue, the mainspring of popular government in revolution is virtue and 
terror both‖ (Robespierre 2007c, 115). On this view, terror was an expression of virtue 
in a revolutionary situation and was, thus, absolutely necessary for the establishment of 
a legitimate order. For Tallien, however, invoking virtue and the common good 
appeared as a carte blanche for random violence against anyone who disagreed with 
Jacobin ideology. In other words, he saw the violence of Robespierre‘s rule as the 
outcome of a dogmatic and arbitrary understanding of justice in the name of which the 
prosecution of political opponents could be justified as necessary for the common good. 
In contrast to Jacobin terrorism, Tallien‘s alternative consisted in a political 
system in which real freedom was not achieved through submission to an ideological 
view of justice and the common good but through the pursuit of individuals‘ private 
interests. The Thermidorian program therefore constituted a revitalization of the liberal 
principles that had guided the revolutionaries of 1789. Its main instrument was a legal 
order that was supposed to restrict the actions of government and protected individuals 
from violence and interference. In this system, violence was only legitimate if it was 
legal, that is, if it was exercised by state authorities for the preservation and execution 
the law. The task of legitimate government, Tallien maintained, was to ―monitor wrong 
actions, to threaten and punish them with proportionate penalties‖ (à surveiller les 
mauvaises actions, à les menacer et à les punir de peines proportionnées) and to 
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replace the fear of arbitrary terror by a ―fear of the laws for actions contrary to the 
laws‖ (la crainte des lois pour les actions contraires aux lois) (Tallien 1847, 613-615). 
Based on the resulting criminalization of violence in the hands of individuals 
and a monopolization of legitimate violence by the state, the Thermidorians extended 
their concept of terrorism as the name for Robespierre‘s system of government to 
include supporters of Jacobin ideology and eventually all forms of political opposition 
that challenged the fundamental premises of the Thermidorian regime. The rhetoric of 
terrorism was turned into a powerful weapon that allowed the new government to 
justify violence against political opponents of all stripes. Remaining Jacobins and other 
radical left factions as well as royalists were equally denounced as enemies of freedom. 
They were branded terrorists, outlawed and subjected to state violence exercised under 
the pretext of terrorism. 
Following Foucault‘s genealogy of modern power, it was argued that the 
articulation of terrorism in the French Revolution cannot be adequately understood 
without considering the emergence of the nation state and the period of liberal 
stabilization achieved by the Thermidorians. On this account, terrorism appeared as an 
effect of the rise of the bourgeoisie as the universal subject of politics. Under conditions 
of the codification of ostensibly universal bourgeois values in an equally universal legal 
order, the withdrawal of legal protection and the use of force against members of the 
state was achieved through the representation of political opposition as an existential 
threat to the nation. It is in this context that a rhetoric of terrorism allowed for the 
portrayal of political opponents as enemies of the nation and for the justification of their 
violent prosecution. 
The White Terror of the Thermidorians against political opponents under the 
pretext of terrorism led to attempts on the part of the radical left to subvert the dominant 
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understanding of terrorism. The pamphleteer Babeuf accused the Thermidorians of 
abusing the discourse of terrorism in order to justify political repression. Moreover, 
faced with ever increasing state violence, Babeuf argued that the Thermidorians were 
themselves guilty of terrorism. When his attempts to extend the term to the new 
government failed, Babeuf took a third attempt at reconceptualizing terrorism. He 
claimed that because terrorism had become a synonym for patriotism, it was in fact 
desirable to be a terrorist. 
We saw in chapter 3 that this affirmative understanding of terrorism resurfaced 
in late imperial Russia in the discourse of revolutionaries who attacked representatives 
of the autocratic tsarist regime. Russian terrorism had developed alongside a plethora of 
distinct ideological movements that opposed political authority in general and the tsar‘s 
despotism in particular. Even though economic necessity had forced the regime to 
implement a considerable number of liberal reforms with regard to serfdom, military 
organization or the judicial system, there was little social and political progress. After 
failed attempts to topple the regime by means of propaganda and education of the 
oppressed and impoverished masses, riots broke out and gave rise to a terrorist 
campaign that saw itself in continuation with the Jacobin terrorists of the French 
Revolution. However, this positive understanding of terrorism did not prevail. 
Threatened by terrorist violence and by widespread social discontent, the regime 
sought to assert its power and to restore order. It succeeded in establishing a rhetoric of 
terrorism that conflated a number of disparate ideological movements whose common 
denominator was opposition to the tsarist regime. Even though this discourse of 
terrorism failed to adequately account for the realities of the revolutionary struggle, it 
had powerful effects. Through a rearticulation of terrorism that allowed for the 
inclusion of all kinds of oppositional movements, the regime presented terrorists as 
167 
 
enemies of the state whose prosecution necessitated emergency measures that revoked 
earlier reforms and that resulted in increased repression rather than a more liberal 
political climate. These counter-terrorist measures were justified for the protection of 
―the existing state structure‖ and ―the security of individuals and their property‖ 
(Waldron 1995, 2). They consisted in the suspension of the new penal code, terrorist 
trials by martial law and exceptional tribunals, and the condemnation of terrorists to 
exile or execution. The entire country was plunged into a de facto state of exception for 
decades. 
The analysis developed in chapter 3 further showed that the rhetoric of terrorism 
established by the tsarist regime played an important role for the justification of the 
government‘s reversal of liberal reforms. Trapped between economically necessary 
liberalization and the tsar‘s unwillingness to concede power, the concept of terrorism 
was rearticulated and redeployed for the purpose of maintaining despotic power against 
economic demands for increased freedom. Yet the exceptional measures against 
terrorism introduced to restore the tsar‘s authority gave rise to a new distribution of 
power that further weakened rather than reinforced the tsar‘s position. In order to 
eliminate terrorism in his vast empire, the tsar was forced to shift power to lower levels 
of the administration if he wanted to restore order and preserve the state. The 
exceptional prerogatives given to local bureaucrats, however, gave way to a 
fragmentation and dissemination of sovereign power, to the emergence of new centers 
of political decision-making as well as to a strategic use of exceptional measures by 
local bureaucrats to expand their own power. In other words, the unintended 
consequences of measures introduced to strengthen the tsar‘s position against terrorism 
effectively eroded the tsar‘s authority and transferred sovereign power to the 
bureaucratic apparatus. Rather than achieving the restoration and stabilization of the 
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tsarist regime, the introduction of counter-terrorist measures shifted practices of 
sovereignty to lower administrative levels, produced new forms of power and created 
new centers of political decision-making. The outcome was a fragmented political 
system resulting from paradoxical effects and contradictory consequences of the tsar‘s 
desperate attempts to preserve his status against the consequences of necessary 
economic reforms and their political ramifications. 
The instrumentalization of terrorism discourse in late imperial Russia stands 
testament to the uneven and sometimes altogether unsuccessful development of modern 
politics from absolute monarchical rule to liberal democratic societies. External 
pressures and growing economic interdependence made it impossible for Russia to go 
back to its old ways but neither did the country develop into a liberal democracy of the 
Western type. The rhetoric of terrorism was situated at the point of intersection of the 
tsar‘s desire to hold onto traditional authority and the people‘s demand for 
liberalization. It made possible a course of history that was not the necessary result of a 
certain historical narrative but rather the outcome of ―haphazard conflicts,‖ a ―profusion 
of entangled events‖ and the ―singular randomness of events‖ (Foucault 1991b, 88). 
It is futile to speculate whether the acceptance of a more liberal political climate 
and a loss of power on the part of the tsar would have set Russia on the path toward 
liberalism. What is important to note is that terrorism played a critical role in the 
repression of liberal demands in late imperial Russia. In contrast to the developments in 
the French Revolution, terrorism here appears as a strategy of resistance to rather than a 
means of stabilizing a liberal political order. While the concept of terrorism put into 
circulation in the French Revolution was crucial for the stabilization of a liberal system 
that eliminated its political opponents by portraying them as an existential threat to the 
nation, the tsarist regime in late imperial Russia deployed terrorism discourse for the 
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purpose of preserving despotic power and repressing liberal political interests. Yet 
another function of terrorism discourse emerged over the course of the twentieth 
century and manifested itself most dramatically in legal debates over the definition and 
criminalization of terrorism. 
These debates constituted the point of departure for the exploration of terrorism 
in the twentieth and twenty-first century presented in chapter 4. We have seen that 
despite an intensification of efforts to establish a legal definition of terrorism, there is 
still no unequivocal and universally accepted legal concept. Moreover, many of the 
problems of terrorism scholarship outlined in chapter 1 resurface in the context of legal 
conceptions of terrorism. We have found that contemporary legal discourse has resorted 
to a relatively flexible understanding of terrorism that relies on conventional wisdom 
rather than legally binding criteria. As such, it is highly susceptible to ideological 
instrumentalization. It should therefore come as no surprise that in the absence of an 
unequivocal and universally valid legal concept of terrorism, international legal practice 
is based on a prevailing doctrine that identifies terrorism according to the problematic 
principle that ―one knows it when one sees it.‖ 
Given the political interests and transformations in global power relations which 
necessitate and make possible this particular view of terrorism, ―one knows it when one 
sees it‖ should be restated as ―one only sees what one wants to see.‖ In an international 
legal and political context that is characterized by the attempt to eliminate war, 
particularly aggressive war, terrorism is rearticulated as the ultimate international crime 
and warrants the exercise of aggressive and, therefore, formally illegal state violence in 
the name of preemptive self-defense and humanitarian intervention. While modern 
European public law regulated warfare through the principles of jus ad bellum and jus 
in bello, contemporary international law criminalizes the use of force but exempts those 
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acts of violence that are exercised for the safeguarding of universal human rights or in 
the name of national self-defense. The representation of terrorism as a threat to 
freedom, security and humanity serves to exempt the major powers from their own 
laws, enabling the pursuit of imperial interests in the guise of humanitarian motives and 
a concern with freedom, democracy and security. 
Legal standards regulating warfare and the legitimate use of violence are, 
however, not only suspended with regard to the self-proclaimed guardians of 
international law and global peace, but also with respect to the terrorists who violate 
them. Against the universalist claims of human rights and the regulation of the 
treatment of enemy combatants, today‘s terrorists are declared unlawful combatants and 
excluded from the legal procedures determined by the law of war. It was argued that the 
denial of ostensibly universal rights to certain populations is achieved through an 
insidious association of terrorism with barbarity and monstrosity. If terrorists are 
successfully represented as less than human, they can be excluded from the protective 
framework of human rights. As the enemies of humanity, terrorists are subjected to the 
most inhumane forms of violence which are justified as necessary for the defense of 
humanity. This humanity, however, is an exclusionary concept and is distributed 
differentially according to the interests of imperial sovereignty. 
 
1.14 A critique of violence 
By showing how apparently similar forms of violence fulfill very different 
historical functions and how different practices of violence are all classified as 
terrorism, the genealogy developed in this thesis challenges and corrects the reductive 
and anachronistic accounts of terrorism presented by traditional terrorism scholarship. It 
also demands a more complex engagement with questions of power that does not 
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deduce political practices and mechanisms of power from the seemingly stable 
institutional structure of the state. Instead of examining the state and identifying the 
possible responses to a phenomenon like terrorism given within its institutional 
framework, we tried to chart the ways in which the realization of political interests 
requires certain practices of power that are reconciled through particular discourses of 
terrorism. As Foucault points out, ―There is no question of deducing this set of practices 
from a supposed essence of the state in and for itself.‖ 
We must refrain from this kind of analysis first of all because, quite simply, history is not a 
deductive science, and secondly, for another no doubt more important and serious reason: the 
state does not have an essence. The state is not a universal nor in itself an autonomous source of 
power. The state is nothing else but the effect, the profile, the mobile shape of a perpetual 
statification (étatisation) or statifications, in the sense of incessant transactions which modify, or 
move, or drastically change, or insidiously shift sources of finance, modes of investment, 
decision-making centers, forms and types of control, relationships between local powers, the 
central authority, and so on. In short, the state has no heart, as we well know, but not just in the 
sense that it has no feelings, either good or bad, but it has no heart in the sense that it has no 
interior. The state is nothing else but the mobile effect of a regime of multiple governmentalities 
(Foucault 2010a, 77). 
In these continuous processes of statification, terrorism constitutes one 
mechanism through which an ensemble of disparate and often contradictory political 
practices and technologies of power is integrated and reconciled in the institutional 
framework that we call the state. It is in opposition to terrorism that the state claims the 
monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. 
As has become obvious in previous chapters, however, the ostensible legitimacy 
of state violence is not as self-evident as dominant discourse makes us believe. The 
strength of genealogy thus not only lies in its ability to highlight the discontinuous 
development of terrorism as the product of changing relations of power, but also in the 
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uncovering of those frameworks through which we distinguish between legitimate and 
illegitimate forms of violence. As an essentially critical project, a genealogy of 
terrorism is therefore tied to a larger project of a critique of violence as such. Following 
Foucault, I understand critique not as a ―demolition job, one of rejection or refusal, but 
a work of examination that consists of suspending as far as possible the system of 
values to which one refers when testing and assessing it‖ (Foucault 1990a, 107).139 This 
does not mean that we should try to deliver judgment on when violence in and for itself 
is legitimate and when it is not, or by which criteria this distinction ought to be made. 
To begin with, such judgments cannot be passed independent of context. They also 
become all the more difficult since context itself undergoes change. However, if we 
want to stop cycles of preemptive, reactive and retaliatory violence, then we have to 
rethink terrorism in terms other than those of criminal or moral judgment. Instead, by 
way of showing the historicity of those ways of seeing and evaluating that have become 
habitual, genealogy challenges ―what we take to be ‗real‘‖ and shows that ―what we 
invoke as … naturalized knowledge … is, in fact, a changeable and revisable reality‖ 
(Butler 2007, xxiv). 
Elaborating on this point, Butler has argued for an examination of the violence 
of the normative frameworks through which we understand violence. In order to steer 
clear of the vicious cycle of pronouncing judgments while describing the acts of 
violence we are witnessing, she insists that we have to stand ―to the side of the ‗for and 
against‘ arguments in order to change the framework in which we think about these 
kinds of events or, rather, to understand how such phenomena are seized upon by 
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certain moral and cultural frameworks and instrumentalized for the purpose of 
strengthening the hold of those frameworks on our thinking‖ (Butler 2009, 152). Butler 
further argues that once we abandon habitual ways of perceiving violence and ―once we 
are able to think comparatively about these forms of violence – which means 
understanding them as part of a contemporary spectrum of death-dealing – we will see 
that the disruptions and invasions caused by state violence far exceed those caused by 
acts falling under the category of ‗terrorism‘‖ (Ibid., 157). In other words, the 
disruption of normalized frameworks of judging violence brings into sharp view the 
moral undecidability of violence as such. Violence here appears as if in an ―anomic 
zone‖ in which the relation between violence and law is suspended and violence is 
nothing but a ―cipher for human action‖ (Agamben 2005, 59). 
While genealogy certainly is a useful method to uncover the problematic 
assumptions underpinning our ways of perceiving and evaluating violence, the 
normative undecidability of violence as such does not always require laborious and 
meticulous genealogical research. Sometimes the impossibility of judging violence 
becomes painfully obvious when we lack the context which provides points of reference 
for the evaluation of violence. The events of 9/11 present a particularly instructive 
example of the undecidability of violence in a situation where habitual moral and legal 
standards were inoperable. When a plane crashed into the North Tower of the World 
Trade Center in New York City at 8.46AM on September 11, 2001, there was talk on 
the news about an incident, a fire, an explosion, even disaster. Twenty minutes later, 
while people were following the unraveling of events on live television, a second plane 
struck the South Tower. Still, there was no word of terrorism. The media reported a 
second explosion and ascribed the crash of both planes to failing navigation systems. 
Only after Chief of Staff Andrew Card informed President George W. Bush that 
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―America is under attack,‖ reporters started to speculate whether they might be 
witnessing a terrorist attack, while Bush continued with his photo op (National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States 2004, 38). It is in these 
moments of undecidability that a change of apprehension becomes possible. When our 
perceptions fail, one possible response is to change the categories through which we 
perceive. And ―although this insight does not in itself constitute a political revolution, 
no political revolution is possible without a radical shift in one‘s notion of the possible 
and the real‖ (Butler 2007, xxiv). In contrast to Butler‘s call for political change, many 
commentators have argued for an intensification of military responses to terrorism and a 
reform of international legal frameworks to facilitate aggressive intervention. This view 
is further buttressed by allegedly objective counter-terrorism policies recommended by 
conventional terrorism and security studies (see chapter 1).
140
 As we will see in the next 
section, it is the disastrous political results of a conventional understanding of terrorism 
that demand a revolution of habitual ways of judging violence and a change of the 
political responses to terrorism. 
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1.15 The political relevance of a genealogy of terrorism 
In 2010, Omar al-Omari, a 59-year old Jordanian-American, lost his job at the 
Ohio Department of Public Safety after having been identified as a terrorist suspect at a 
training seminar for the Columbus Division of Police. The course was run by the 
Strategic Engagement Group, a non-profit organization run by terrorism experts 
providing strategic training and education for state officials and law enforcement 
agencies.
141
 During the seminar, the instructors displayed a photograph of Omari with 
members of a local Muslim advocacy group. Omari was the leader of a Muslim 
outreach program, and federal counter-terrorism experts had sent Omari abroad to 
present the program, so his contacts to Muslim groups should have come to no surprise 
to supposed experts. However, the seminar instructors claimed that Omari had links to 
the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas and even Al-Q‘aida. Even though no evidence could 
be produced to substantiate these claims, a climate of distrust mixed with a certain 
degree of Islamophobia caused state officials to search Omari‘s records. Eventually, 
they found something and Omari lost his job – not because he had ties with terrorism 
but because he had made a minor mistake in his job application forms. For the deputy 
chief of the Columbus Division of Police, the lessons from Omari‘s case are clear: ―as 
Americans,‖ he states, ―we are all over the board on our feelings about the terrorism 
issue. And as a law enforcement professional, even law enforcement is divided in how 
they view people‖ (cited in Temple-Raston 2011).142 
What Omari‘s case shows is that the prejudiced perception of certain 
populations is backed by allegedly neutral and objective science and warrants their 
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exclusion from legal and political frameworks that ought to protect them. As Butler has 
remarked, ―our conception of violence, in both its justified and unjustified forms, has 
built into it certain preconceptions about what culture ought to be, about how 
community is to be understood, about how the state is formed, and about who might 
count as a recognizable subject‖ (Butler 2009, 156). In other words, while there is, 
undoubtedly and horrifyingly, something to Agamben‘s claim that we are living in a 
condition in which everyone can potentially be deprived of legal protection, it is also 
important to note that the suspension of constitutional rights, the infringement of long-
standing liberties, and the abuse and torture of citizens who are unlucky enough to be 
mistaken as terrorists functions on the basis of certain normative frameworks through 
which violence and terrorism are represented. 
In particular since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, perceptions of 
terrorism have become tethered to racial and religious stereotypes that fix terrorism 
almost exclusively to populations that appear to be Arab or Muslim. As Butler has 
demonstrated, rights and liberties are today granted or denied on the basis of racist, 
nationalist, and anti-Muslim sentiments.
143
 She argues that perceptions about the 
modernity and civilizational status of individuals and populations are racially and 
religiously inflected and play a crucial role in the legitimation of excessive violence and 
the suspension of law. They also help to normalize ―prejudicial perception and a virtual 
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mandate to heighten racialized ways of looking and judging in the name of national 
security‖ (Ibid., 77). The proliferation of racist and anti-Muslim discourses in the 
context of national security results in a diffuse sense of fear that substitutes racial and 
religious prejudices for its empty center. These vague, ill-founded and yet prevalent 
suspicions in turn shore up support for more pervasive and less accountable state power 
that is portrayed as the guarantor of security. As a consequence, Butler contends that 
―some of the very terms through which contemporary global conflicts are 
conceptualized dispose us in advance towards certain kinds of moral responses and 
normative conclusions‖ which in turn have disastrous consequences for citizens 
belonging to a particular ethnic or religious group (Ibid., 156). 
The effects of the ideological bias shaping dominant perceptions of terrorism 
have become dramatically visible in the recent attacks in Norway. Immediately after the 
bombing of government buildings in Oslo and the shooting of teenagers at a youth 
camp in Utøya, media reports were quick to put the blame for these acts of terrorism on 
fundamentalist jihadis and Al-Q‘aida. When it became evident that the perpetrator, 
Anders Behring Breivik, was a right-wing extremist acting out of xenophobic motives, 
the rhetoric changed from terrorism to descriptions of the violence as shootings and 
bombings.
144
 Some commentators even argued that Breivik‘s actions had to be regarded 
as an overreaction to legitimate grievances.
145
 Breivik‘s defense attorney is now trying 
to claim that his client is insane and can thus not be held responsible for his crimes.
146
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Without wanting to enter into the complexities that an adequate analysis of the 
Breivik case demands, so much is clear: the stereotyped representation of terrorism as 
fundamentally linked to Muslims and the portrayal of violence perpetrated by 
Westerners as either insane or as an exaggerated response to real political problems 
shows the disingenuousness of official rhetoric – most prominently expressed in the last 
US counterterrorism strategy published in June 2011 – that there is no war against 
Islam. Even though official discourse would seem to promote a more narrow and 
focused understanding of terrorism, actual representations of violence circulating in 
public discourse exacerbate its racist undercurrents. Anti-Muslim sentiments become 
even more insidious because they are less visible and covered up by an ostensibly less 
racist discourse. The reality is that non-Muslim perpetrators are regarded as criminals 
and are tried according to standard legal procedure while Muslims are held responsible 
for acts of terrorism even when they are not and are subject to measures introduced by 
emergency legislation in the name of security and the protection of freedom.
147
 
What is more, these exceptional counter-terrorist measures are often normalized 
and engender their own forms of domination, thereby affecting not only those identified 
as terrorists but the population in general. As Sheldon Wolin explains, the intrusion into 
personal rights and liberties by executive officials ―is first accepted by the public as a 
practical response to terrorism, but then it is soon cemented as a permanent element in 
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the system of law enforcement. What may have emerged without premeditation is 
quickly seized upon and exploited‖ (Wolin 2008, 215). 
To be sure, the normalization of exceptional and temporary measures in 
response to political crises is by no means a new phenomenon. In their attempts to 
strengthen and expand executive power, governments can rely on long-standing 
practices of exceptional legislation. Early accounts of the transformation of democratic 
regimes occasioned by the expansion of executive powers and exceptional measures 
can be found in the works of Rossiter (1948), Watkins (1940) or Friedrich (1941). In 
particular, Rossiter predicted that the aftermath of the Second World War was 
characterized by processes through which ―The instruments of government depicted 
here as temporary ‗crisis‘ arrangements have in some countries, and may eventually in 
all countries, become lasting peacetime institutions‖ (Rossiter 1948, 313). 
In the same vein, Agamben has argued that the use of exceptional measures in 
the form of executive decree has become integrated into Western democracies as a 
normal technique of government. Moreover, he suggests that ―military emergency now 
ceded its place to economic emergency‖ (Agamben 2005, 13). In other words, 
legislation by executive decree has become a generalized instrument of government and 
is justified in the name of economic necessity and the security of the nation. The 
extension of executive power into the legislative sphere, once a useful measure in times 
of war, has become co-opted for the purpose of enforcing not only security but also 
economic interests. Based on an analysis of Weimar Germany and the United States, 
Agamben concludes that today there are two main ways of normalizing emergency. The 
first is failure to repeal exceptional measures. While so-called sunset provisions are 
now used to prevent such failure, decrees with these provisions – like, for example, the 
USA Patriot Act – are made permanent through repeatedly deferring the clause. The 
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second is an extension of powers granted in wartime and the proclamation of permanent 
war.
148
 As a consequence, Agamben argues, ―the sovereign power of the president is 
essentially grounded in the emergency linked to a state of war‖ and, therefore, ―over the 
course of the twentieth century the metaphor of war becomes an integral part of the 
presidential political vocabulary‖ (Ibid., 21). For Agamben, in other words, the 
legitimate exercise of presidential prerogative depends on the successful establishment 
of a rhetoric of war by way of which executive powers are extended into the legislative 
sphere for as long as the perception of a warlike situation is maintained.
149
 
The culmination of this process, it would seem, is a War on Terror which is to 
all appearances permanent.
150
 In the course of this war, the USA Patriot Act of October 
26, 2001, as well as the military order issued by George W. Bush on November 13, 
2001 allowed for the severe curtailing of civil rights and liberties, the expansion of 
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surveillance and intelligence gathering, increased discretion of law enforcement and 
immigration authorities with regard to the detention and deportation of terrorist 
suspects, and authorized indefinite detention and trial by military commission of non-
US citizens suspected of terrorist activities.
151
 As Rens Van Munster has convincingly 
argued, the rhetoric of a war on terrorism allowed the United States to institutionalize 
the state of exception as a permanent condition (Van Munster 2004). Shifting its 
political strategy from defense to prevention, most visibly in the National Security 
Strategy of the United States issued in 2002 discussed in chapter 4, American security 
policy has to intervene before an actual threat is posed. ―Security discourses,‖ Van 
Munster suggests, ―are increasingly dominated by the logic of risk management, a logic 
which calls for the management and government of potentialities of ‗risky‘ populations 
by means of (statistical) calculations and proactive management rather than through the 
reactive management of real events and threats‖ (Ibid., 147). Unlocalizable yet 
omnipresent, these perceived threats create a climate in which, according to Brian 
Massumi, ―Safe, it would seem, has fallen off the spectrum of perception. Insecurity, 
the spectrum says, is the new normal‖ (Massumi 2005, 31). 
For Wolin, ―The normalizing of deviations occurs when the main political 
institutions, such as legislatures, courts, elected law enforcement officials (e.g., district 
attorneys), mayors, governors, and presidents are able to exploit a fearful public and 
promote the powers of an increasingly militarized police but not their accountability.‖ 
In these examples we see the ingredients whereby antecedents become precedents: an empowered 
police, an officialdom that sanctions expanded police powers and reduced legal and political 
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 See Bush, George W. ―Military Order of November 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of 
Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism.― In Federal Register 66 (222), 57831-57836. 
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/eo/mo-111301.htm (accessed March 29, 2011), 2001a. See also ―Uniting 
and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct 
Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001.‖ http://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/patriot/index.html 
(accessed July 9, 2011), 2001. 
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safeguards, and public opinion that appears to favor methods which weaken legal safeguards and 
diminish the institutions whose traditional role is to oversee, check, and alert the public to 
dangerous tendencies in the system‖ (Wolin 2008, 215). 
In other words, in a climate of fear and suspicion and aided by racism and 
religious stereotypes, practices of surveillance become absorbed by and embedded in 
everyday life and give rise to a sort of disciplinary self-regulation of society. 
While this curtailment of freedom is justified in the name of safeguarding and 
extending liberty and democracy, it seems to be a naive and short-sighted belief that 
measures such as the proliferation of disciplinary mechanisms and virtually complete 
surveillance, the collection of biometric data and the monitoring of private 
communication, the militarization of airports and stops at national borders that purport 
to be arbitrary but indeed have a strong racial bias, in fact promote freedom. On the 
contrary, the erosion of freedom becomes less transparent, less accountable and 
therefore more problematic if it is justified in the name of security. To borrow from 
Foucault, we might argue that the irony of the security apparatuses mobilized in the war 
against terrorism is that they make us believe that what is at issue is the preservation of 
our freedom. 
Rather than contributing to the expansion of freedom and security, discourses of 
terrorism conceal and legitimate the loss of freedom and security generated by the often 
violent imposition of state interests. The invention of terrorism, understood as a 
particular discursive representation of violence, provides one of modernity‘s most 
powerful discourses of legitimating power dressed up as right. Even though current 
representations of terrorism seek to make us believe in the legitimacy of state violence, 
they are no more than a fairly successful way of concealing the state‘s own origin in 
unequal relations of power rather than right. Condemning terrorism does, therefore, not 
amount to an affirmation of legitimate violence. On the contrary, it helps to legitimate 
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relations of power that are founded in inequality and injustice and depend on violence 
for their preservation. If Foucault is right that politics is the continuation of war by 
other means, then terrorism is the name for those who are defeated in this war that only 
knows temporary victories, whose winners posit their power as right in an act of seizure 
and whose outcome are always tenuous and provisional relations of power and force 
(see Foucault 2004a). 
The history of terrorism is thus ―the history of singular inventions‖ which are 
seized upon and deployed by competing political rationalities and interests in the 
development of modern politics (Foucault 2010b, 310). The history of terrorism must 
not be referred to some sort of historically constant and unequivocally identifiable form 
of violence. In fact, it is precisely this understanding of terrorism that must be rejected 
in order to attain a more productive and a more adequate understanding of terrorism as 
an element in an ever-changing economy of power. The idea of terrorism as such has to 
be given up if we aim – through a critique of the frameworks for judging violence 
imposed by discourses of terrorism – for new forms of political legitimacy and new, 
perhaps non-violent, possibilities of political resistance. 
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